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CONTENTS

17 September 1990

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Ministry Official Views Mediterranean Policy [*MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN* No 8] 1

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

IZVESTIYA Commentator Interviewed on Summit [*Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN* 11 Sep] 8

Northeast Asia

Japanese Paper Interviews Shevardnadze 29 Aug [*Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN* 31 Aug] 8
 Shevardnadze Discusses Foreign Ministers' Talks [*Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN* 7 Sep] 11
 Primakov Suggests Return of Two Kuril Islands [*Tokyo JIJI*] 11
 Academy Official on Northern Territories Return [*Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI* 5 Sep] 11
 Newspaper Editor Reviews Kuril Islands Issue [*Tokyo SANKEI SHIMBUN* 4 Sep] 12
 Citizens Group Demands Return of Islands [*Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN* 5 Sep] 12
 Ivanov Discusses Asian Policy, Japanese Ties [*Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN* 28 Aug] 12
 Soviet Report Calls for Learning From Japan [*Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS* 8 Sep] 14

Near East & South Asia

Shishlin Says Advisers To Be Pulled From Iraq [*London THE SUNDAY TIMES* 9 Sep] 14

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

Popular National Security Concerns Examined [*London THE EUROPEAN* 31 Aug-2 Sep] 15
 Professor Yakovlev Views Role of Laws, Rights [*RODINA* No 2] 16
 Academy Member Analyzes Ecological Problems [*Moscow KOMMUNIST* No 11] 21
 Establishment of New Peace Institute Assessed
 [*MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* No 8] 27

Economics

Impact of Government's Economic Reform Discussed
 [*MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* No 8] 30

Military

Lopatin Outlines Military Reform Concepts [*ZNAMYA* No 7] 31
 Proposed Reform of Armed Forces Outlined [*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* No 15] .. 40
 Major General Interviewed on Military Reform
 [*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* No 14] 44
 Cut Planned in Number of Bombers at Irkutsk [*Tokyo TOKYO SHIMBUN* 14 Sep] 47

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

RSFSR

Problems of Soviet Far East Listed, Reviewed [MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 8]	49
Satellite Photos Show Eastern Forest Fires [Tokyo SANKEI SHIMBUN 4 Sep]	53

Western Republics

Academics Discuss Labor Strife in Donbass [RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNY MIR No 4]	53
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FBIS-SOV-90-180-S
17 September 1990

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

1

Ministry Official Views Mediterranean Policy

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[Article by Sergey Valeryevich Sereda, third secretary of the First European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Stanislav Viliyovich Osadchiy, counselor to the general secretariat of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, candidate of historical sciences: "Reflections on the Mediterranean"]

[Text] We have had close ties with this beautiful but troubled region since time immemorial. Trade developed along its sea routes, and friendship and cooperation were established with the peoples of many countries. Here, Russian sailors on the ships of Orlov and Ushakov [Russian naval commanders of the 18th century] fought courageously, helping the Mediterranean peoples throw off the foreign yoke and find national independence.

The Mediterranean awoke from its historical sleep earlier than other regions of the world and produced the first shoots of contemporary civilization. The name Mediterranean has come down to us through the ages as the "blessed lake" of civilization, whose banks saw the birth of antique culture and the emergence of the original model of European culture and art, and whence Hellenism and the Roman and Byzantine eras exerted a decisive influence upon the further development of Europe, Asia, and other continents. It would seem that these processes should have helped to draw these local countries together and to unite them....

However, history has decided their fates differently. In the words of Shakespeare's famous expression, the Mediterranean has frequently been compared to a "sea of troubles," and this is by no means a matter of chance. Political, economic, religious, and other strife and conflicts have been virtually unceasing in the region, exhausting the strengths of the local peoples, preventing them from coming to an understanding of the community of their interests, and from joining forces for the defense of those interests.

The region continues to be marked by sociopolitical dissonance to this day. Countries with diverse sociopolitical systems and different levels of development and large international organizations such as the EEC, the Western European Union, and the Arab League are represented here, and this very heterogeneity creates the preconditions for a certain instability. On the whole, the Mediterranean today is witnessing a clash of two opposing trends, which may be conditionally named "pro" and "con" ("for" and "against").

Phenomena of a Military-Political Nature

Let us begin with "con." The military-political instability of present conditions in the Mediterranean is exerting a negative influence on the European continent

and on the overall international situation, something which is being brought about by two main circumstances—a growing foreign military presence and acute local conflicts.

With regard to the first of these, we must speak first and foremost about the armed forces and armaments of NATO and the United States. After all, the countries of the Warsaw Pact, which do not directly border the Mediterranean, have virtually no armed forces here. As far as the North Atlantic Treaty is concerned, according to available data, it has at its disposal a contingent of 1.2 million servicemen here, and also 600 nuclear weapons delivery systems, more than 6,000 tanks, and 1,200 aircraft.

NATO's strategic plans have always considered the Mediterranean to be just about the most vulnerable link in the chain of the "collective defense of the West." Hence a conclusion was drawn about the need to tirelessly increase the alliance's arms, armed forces, and combat capacity in the region. By way of compensation for the resources eliminated under the IBM Treaty, NATO recently adopted plans for the deployment of certain types of nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean.

The program for the development of NATO's Armed Forces envisages a strengthening of the alliance's military and naval groupings and the creation in the Mediterranean of multinational combined naval units on a permanent basis. There is increasing military interaction between the Western Mediterranean countries. Drafts are being elaborated for a joint squadron of the navies of the West European states and for a unified system of antiaircraft defense; this presupposes the active involvement of the potential of the Western European Union, and a special Mediterranean group has been created within its framework.

Particular mention must be made of the military presence of the United States of America in the Mediterranean. The U.S. Armed Forces grouping deployed there is constantly growing. The number of American ships here was recently increased to 30, combat aircraft to 200, and military servicemen to 25,000. About 170 American bases and installations, 71 of which have nuclear weapons, have been sited in a number of the European countries of the Mediterranean—Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The United States may also use the military installations of its strategic ally, Israel, as a strong point in the region.

The Mediterranean Sea is an important component of the military doctrines and programs of the West European NATO countries. According to the evaluations of the French leadership, this is a zone of "particular French interest." France's military plans assign its nuclear forces the role of a Western deterrent to the proliferation of Soviet influence in a southerly direction. NATO also assigns the same role to Turkey, whose army

is the second largest in the alliance. This country shares a land border with the USSR and controls movement around the Black Sea strait.

NATO also assigns considerable significance to military installations in Italy, whose territory houses the command for the bloc of Southern Europe [presumably NATO Southern Region] and the headquarters of the U.S. 6th Fleet. The plans of the United States give Italy the role of a linking element between the American 6th and 2d Fleets. According to foreign press reports, excessive attention is being paid to the question of the possibility of deploying NATO tactical nuclear weapons on American bases in Greece. Great Britain, which is not situated in direct proximity to the Mediterranean, has one military base on Gibraltar and two on Cyprus.

In point of fact, a powerful NATO military grouping is thus concentrated in geographical proximity to the USSR and other East European countries.

The presence of the Warsaw Pact member states in the region is less significant and their goals are not so "ambitious." The task of the Soviet Navy (which has a squadron cruising in the Mediterranean) is strictly defensive—that of ensuring the security of the country from the sea—and its structure, intended to counter offensive naval force groupings—is also in line with this: Coastal ships [korably pribrezhnykh deystviy] account for 52 percent of its composition (for the U.S. Navy this figure is six percent).

Unfortunately, it is difficult to cite precise information about our military forces in the Mediterranean, since such information has yet to be published in the open press. This is one further example of the way in which our secretiveness contradicts the interests of the state as a whole. After all, the mere publication of these data, without any propagandistic efforts on our part, would reveal the significant (numerical) advantage of the NATO countries in this region and, in so doing, would not weaken but, on the contrary, rather strengthen our moral and political positions. This would give us a basis for formulating, albeit on a hypothetical plane, the question of how the United States would regard the creation of analogous superiority close to the American border in favor of the Soviet Union.

The fact that the Mediterranean Sea has not yet been embraced by confidence-building measures—a feature of the present military-political situation in the region from the "contra" category—is also closely connected with the foreign military presence there. It must be stated that the section of the Helsinki CSCE Final Act entitled "Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean" remains virtually unrealized. As a result, a clearly abnormal situation is taking shape and this very important region is, so to speak, lagging behind the dynamics of the present positive processes which are occurring in Europe.

Meanwhile, it is precisely with regard to the Mediterranean that particular care and consideration are necessary. After all, the knot of extremely acute contradictions which has been tied here has led on many occasions to serious **crises and clashes**. Detonating far beyond the region's boundaries, these dangerous flashes serve to destabilize the situation in the world as a whole.

Not long ago, in accordance with a directive of the European parliament, experts from the 17 Mediterranean countries prepared a "Comprehensive Prognosis of the Development of the Mediterranean Region Through the Year 2025." In their opinion, the next decade will see the imminent explosion of all the developmental parameters—political, socioeconomic, ecological, and demographic—of the Mediterranean countries. These researchers believe that only the creation of structures for political, economic, and ecological interaction in the entire Mediterranean, on the condition that regional conflicts are resolved, will offer a way out of the profound crisis which is brewing.

In this subregion, there is a neuralgic linking of East-West and North-South relations, and the resolution of these problems, according to the document of the European Parliament, depends on whether or not the political leaders are bold enough to reject the usual stereotypes of military-political confrontation or ideologized thinking and to embark upon a path of broad international cooperation. As expert calculations show, these stereotypes lead either to socioeconomic or ecological catastrophe.

Over the course of a number of decades, the conflict in the Near East has been severely contaminating the political climate in the eastern Mediterranean. With the support of the United States, Israel is striving to suppress the Arab national liberation movement and is implementing a policy of force with regard to the peaceful population on the occupied territories. All of this is raising the level of conflict in the Mediterranean.

There is also continuing tension in Greek-Turkish relations. The contradictions between Athens and Ankara embrace a wide range of questions, including the Continental Shelf of the Aegean Sea, the breadth of territorial waters, air space, operational responsibility in NATO, the demilitarized status of the Greek Islands close to the Turkish coast, and the position of national minorities. The periodically intensifying arguments around these problems are becoming extremely heated.

The matter of Cypriot regulation is also complicated. Since 1974, when Turkish troops were brought onto the island in connection with the coup d'etat organized by the Greek junta, Cyprus remains divided into two parts. Apart from the Turkish expeditionary corps and Greek troops, there are also English military bases and installations of the United States.

The conflicts which are making the establishment of peace and stability in the Mediterranean more difficult include Moroccan-Spanish rivalry over the two Spanish

enclaves on Moroccan territory—Ceuta and Melilla—and also the argument between Great Britain and Spain over Gibraltar. The bloody war in Lebanon is making a negative mark on the situation in the Mediterranean. The complicated question of the Western Sahara is of an acute nature: The right of the people to self-determination has still not been realized there.

There is no doubt that the strained atmosphere in the region is being intensified by the various forms of international terrorism which are not infrequently employed here.

The question logically arises of the extent to which the two fundamental destabilizing factors in the Mediterranean situation are interconnected—the foreign military presence and local seats of tension. The link between them appears to be a most direct one. Disagreements between the countries of the region are used to justify the presence of the armed forces of other states here, states which are striving to emerge in the role of judges and “peacemakers.”

For its own part, a large foreign military presence has a negative effect upon regional conflicts, since it objectively promotes the separateness of the Mediterranean countries and peoples and prevents them from creating their own forum where they would be able to jointly discuss and search for resolutions to the difficult problems of the Mediterranean. It is not by chance that at a number of assemblies and conferences where Mediterranean problems have been discussed, they have long remained, as it were, on the periphery.

Signs of Improvement

Times are changing, however, and trends toward a cessation of the arms race and an improvement of international relations are becoming stronger. Little by little, the situation in the Mediterranean, where positive processes are gathering momentum, is also beginning to change for the better. Of course, this is not by any means a simple and unambiguous matter, it is a matter of clashing opinions and struggle.

Against the background of the sharp contrast which has emerged between the positive processes predominating on the European continent and the unstable and frequently explosive situation in the Mediterranean, quite understandable concern is growing in the countries of the region, as is a desire to join the processes which are under way in other parts of the world. In addition, there is increasing understanding of the urgency of the problems which are common to the region, including the ecology of the Mediterranean basin, culture, tourism, the organization of shipping, the development of communications, trade and economic links, and the struggle with international terrorism. People also understand that an effective resolution of these questions can only be achieved by the joint efforts of the Mediterranean states.

The Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Medium- and Shorter Range Missiles [IBM Treaty] met

with approval on the part of these countries as a factor creating favorable conditions for activating efforts directed at a normalization of the situation in the Mediterranean and for taking new steps toward improving the military-political and moral and psychological climate in the region. Here, attention has been focused on the fact that a practical implementation of the IBM Treaty will mean a certain reduction of U.S. nuclear potential in the Mediterranean, in particular, elimination of the cruise missiles deployed on Sicily. With the elimination of medium-range missiles in the Southern part of Europe, the questions which will assume prominence are logically those of the presence of nuclear weapons on American forward based systems—U.S. bases, ships, and aircraft in the Mediterranean.

In conditions of a strengthening of positive changes in the world, the Mediterranean theme has become more audible at various international forums. The full extent of the urgency of the region's military-political problems became clear at the Vienna meeting of the 35 CSCE member states. The last and most dramatic accords of the meeting in January of last year showed that the Mediterranean is an important front of struggle for the extension of confidence-building measures to the sphere of military and naval activity. The results of the forum demonstrated the heightened interest in Mediterranean problems and took us as far as questions of naval disarmament. At the Vienna meeting, agreement was reached on holding a conference on the Mediterranean in Majorca from 24 September to 19 October of this year.

The participants in the Nonaligned Movement also manifest unabating interest in Mediterranean issues. They have been discussing the region's security as an independent problem since 1972. The June 1987 meeting of the nonaligned states on the island of Brioni was held under the theme of the organizational cohesion of the nonaligned countries of the Mediterranean and the promotion of the region's problems. Particular emphasis was given to the need to extend to the Mediterranean measures on disarmament, confidence-building, and security in Europe, everything positive which had been achieved over the years of the development of the all-European process.

A number of proposals were formulated at Brioni, including a prohibition on the presence in the Mediterranean of ships carrying nuclear weapons and the impermissibility of using military bases or other military installations against nonaligned Mediterranean countries. In many respects, they coincided with analogous Soviet initiatives. The meeting adopted a specific program of economic cooperation between the Mediterranean states for the first time. Subsequent meetings of the foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries in Nicosia and Algiers fully supported the Brioni decisions and expressed the desire of these countries to strengthen interaction on diverse questions of cooperation in the region.

Among the proposals put forward by individual representatives of this group of states, a notable response was accorded to that of the Cypriot Chamber of Representatives on holding a conference of Mediterranean parliamentarians on questions of progressing toward a nonnuclear Mediterranean without foreign armed forces and bases. In May 1989, in Nicosia, there took place a conference of Mediterranean parliamentarians in favor of peace and cooperation and the withdrawal of foreign fleets from the Mediterranean.

However, what is, on the whole, the productive line taken by the the Mediterranean nonaligned countries contains one aspect which reduces its prospects. Not reckoning on the formation of an independent area of struggle for military disarmament, they would like to integrate their own problems, including those in the sphere of security, into the all-European process. On a tactical level this is, of course, not a bad thing, and deserves our support (insofar as this does not oppose our idea of a Mediterranean conference). At the same time, however, the inclusion of Mediterranean problems in the all-European process does not look absolutely realistic from a practical point of view.

The point is that as far back as at the time of the birth of the all-European process in the first half of the seventies, the United States, Great Britain, and France, like the other NATO countries, were rejecting all attempts to include a businesslike examination of Mediterranean problems among the problems to be tackled within the all-European framework. The countries of northern and central Europe object to this, fearing that they will be drawn into Mediterranean regional conflicts. This factor continues to play its own role, something which must not be left out of account.

Since 1981, questions of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean have featured on the agenda of all UN General Assembly sessions. Resolutions No. 43 and 44 (1988 and 1989) contained a number of positive elements. They stressed the importance for this region of talks on nuclear and conventional disarmament in Europe and appealed to the participants in the Vienna meeting to apply all their efforts to introduce the tenets of the Helsinki Final Act into the political life of the Mediterranean.

Recent changes for the better in the regulation of regional conflicts have introduced a new and positive feature into the overall development of events in the region. The first grains of reconciliation have been sown in the soil of Greek-Turkish relations. Within the framework of the January 1988 economic symposium in Davos, two meetings took place between the heads of the Greek and Turkish Governments. These contacts were continued in the course of the July (1990) NATO Council session. As a result of the personal meetings, the sides fixed their intention to refrain from statements and actions which might lead to an intensification of tension in relations between Athens and Ankara, and measures

were also taken on developing cooperation in various spheres and creating a mechanism for examining contentious issues.

The prospects for a normalization of relations between Greek and Turkey which were revealed in Davos, Brussels, and London and an improvement in the Mediterranean climate have created a more favorable atmosphere for a political regulation of the Cypriot problem. Dialogue has been renewed between the two Cypriot communities.

The first steps have also been taken toward turning the Balkans from the "powder keg of Europe" into an important and cementing unit of the common European home. The Interbalkan Conference held in Belgrade from 24 to 26 February at the level of the foreign ministers of all the Balkan states, and in which Albania participated for the first time, laid the foundation for future multilateral cooperation between them in the political, economic, scientific-technological, and cultural spheres and for an amelioration and, thereafter, a complete elimination of regional contradictions. This representative conference made the political climate in the South of Europe and the Mediterranean more healthy and demonstrated the Balkan countries' receptivity to the new political thinking and their desire to proceed toward the creation of a new model of interstate relations in this region.

There are also certain, if less notable, shifts in the process of achieving a regional regulation of what may be the most complicated and involved knot of contradictions—the Near Eastern problem. The absence of unity among the Arab countries in their approach toward regulating this conflict has a pernicious influence on the security of the entire Mediterranean. At the same time, some changes for the better in the positions of the Arab countries and the proposals of the Egyptian President H. Mubarak make it possible to hope that their lack of cohesion will be overcome.

A sense of the need to convene an international conference on the Near East is becoming almost universal, and has not only seized extreme right-wing forces. To a significant extent, they have proved to be in a blind alley, and are trying to emerge from this difficult situation by extreme methods of force. However, it is virtually impossible to do this. In any case, Tel Aviv would emerge from the crisis not strengthened but weakened. That is why it will inevitably be compelled to seek a resolution on a different basis, that is to say by peaceful means.

In this way, the contours of the possible future foundations of a peaceful regulation and the symptoms of a reduction of tension have begun to loom on the political horizons of the Mediterranean. It is, indisputably, still difficult to say with certainty whether or not this will bring tangible results. The picture as a whole remains contradictory, and difficult problems, old hostility, and lack of cohesion have not been resolved. At the same

time, however, it is impossible to deny that there is an increasing aspiration toward a search for new and mutually acceptable resolutions, mutual understanding, and rapprochement.

Our Package of Proposals

The USSR's approach toward the complicated spectrum of Mediterranean problems is determined, first and foremost, by the fact that our country is not seeking any unilateral advantages for itself here, whether of a military-political, political, or other type. Soviet policy is not directed against any country or group of countries. We believe that states which have their own lawful interests in the Mediterranean must not be excluded from participation in the process of establishing regional cooperation there.

All the USSR proposals which are currently in force with regard to this region are aimed at turning it into a zone of stable peace. In June 1981, we proposed extending those confidence-building measures in the military sphere which had already justified themselves in international practice to the Mediterranean, carrying out a coordinated reduction of armed forces here, withdrawing military ships carrying nuclear weapons from the region, and refusing to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of nonnuclear Mediterranean countries. At the same time, the nuclear powers would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit their deployment on its own territory.

M.S. Gorbachev's initiative of 26 March 1986 on a unilateral withdrawal of the USSR and U.S. navies from the Mediterranean Sea and also on holding a conference on the Mediterranean, analogous to the CSCE, was an important Soviet step directed at improving the military-political situation in the Mediterranean. These proposals were also expounded in a special letter from E.A. Shevardnadze, dated 8 July of the same year, addressed to the general secretary of the United Nations.

Soviet initiatives on the Mediterranean were further developed in the replies of the USSR minister of foreign affairs (August 1987 and February 1988) to the appeals by participants in the conference of nonaligned Mediterranean countries on Brioni. They expressed concern with regard to plans currently being studied by NATO to "compensate" for American missiles destroyed under the IBM Treaty by increasing other types of nuclear weapons, including sea- and air-launched weapons, and put forward the task of reducing the level of nuclear confrontation in the Mediterranean, in particular by eliminating the foreign military bases and installations of non-Mediterranean states, limiting the scope and scale of naval activity, and prohibiting non-coastal states from using the infrastructure of the countries of the region (aerodromes, ports, and bases) for military purposes.

By way of a first step, the Soviet Union declared its readiness to undertake—if the United States would do

the same—not to increase nuclear armaments in the Mediterranean and to refrain from increasing the strength of its Navy here.

M.S. Gorbachev's speeches of March 1988 in Belgrade and November 1989 in Rome substantially augmented these peaceful initiatives of ours. On the whole, they generated a lively response, not only in the countries of the region but also far beyond its boundaries, first and foremost because our country stated firmly and unambiguously that it rejects a search for unilateral advantages for itself and any claims to an individual presence in the Mediterranean.

It was not by chance that during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Italy in November-December 1989, a coincidence of views was noted on prospects for overcoming confrontation in the Mediterranean and, on the whole, the similar positions of both countries with regard to the entire development of the situation in this region.

In the context of preparing for the conference on the Mediterranean in Majorca, M.S. Gorbachev proposed creating an interparliamentary and scientific-social group to promote elaboration of the relevant problems, establish contacts between East and West on the economic problems of the Mediterranean, embark upon an exchange of opinions about many-sided measures to avert incidents at sea and in the air, and start consultations on the expediency of the constant presence in the Mediterranean Sea of the USSR and U.S. Navies.

Our Tactical Line

At the same time, it must be said that many of the whole set of Soviet proposals [on the Mediterranean] which were positively received by other countries, including those of the Mediterranean, have proved to be "in a state of suspended animation" and have remained unrealized. This is clearly due to the fact that the soil for them was not always sufficiently prepared and that a "yawning gap" separated them both from real circumstances and indeed from the actual situation in the region.

Apart from that, the majority of our initiatives have so far been built on principles of parity and have envisaged preserving the Armed Forces and armaments of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in equal measure. In practice, given the superiority of the West over the Warsaw Pact states in the Mediterranean, this would mean virtually unilateral concessions on the part of NATO since, as a result of implementing the Soviet initiatives, the West would lose much more than us. Consequently, our proposals contained an element of inequality which makes it difficult to count upon reciprocity.

However, even the West could have taken account of the fact that any advantage is always temporary. If the arms race in the Mediterranean continues, parity will be established sooner or later. However, is it worth proceeding along such a path, which is reminiscent in many

respects of the sad past and which, of course, has nothing in common with the new political thinking and new approaches?

If the West manifests interest in effecting a radical change for the better in the situation on the seas, it is imperative that the key to such a turnaround should be found jointly. Universal human values must take precedence over the interests of military-political groupings, and it follows from this that the question of naval forces in the Mediterranean must become an object of talks. It would be possible to proceed toward the resolution of this complicated problem in stages, beginning with measures of confidence-building and stability, for example, notification of naval exercises and transfers of naval forces within agreed periods, limitation of the scale and duration of major exercises, prohibition of exercises in regions of intensive shipping activity, and the conclusion of a multilateral agreement on measures to avert incidents.

As far as the Soviet Union's basic tactical line on the Mediterranean theme is concerned, account must be taken here of the sizeable amount of promising peaceful initiatives which we have put forward.

At the present stage, it is evidently expedient to avoid putting forward major new proposals on this theme, since this would only serve to devalue those which we had made earlier. In view of the fact that some of them are clearly unacceptable to the West, new proposals on our part would inevitably be regarded by the states of the region, including the nonaligned ones, as propagandistic.

A transition to military detente in the Mediterranean is a lengthy process and undue haste (zabeganiye vpered) can scarcely promote the achievement of practical agreements. It is therefore preferable, in our view, to concentrate our efforts on a painstaking search for ways of initiating dialogue, first and foremost with the Mediterranean countries themselves.

If the states of this region managed to create the dynamics of dialogue and peaceful cooperation, these dynamics would, in the course of time, also gradually begin to promote the formation of a more favorable atmosphere for the resolution of any other problems, including conflict situations. It is no secret that in some of the existing crisis manifestations here, our specialists have been inclined to see something positive, something which undermines NATO's southern flank.

They have sometimes evaluated the role of the EEC here in a one-sided manner, regarding it simply as an outpost of the West. Although the member countries of the European Community, under the cover of NATO's military-strategic curtain in the region, are aiming to considerably strengthen their positions, the tension which now exists does not entirely suit them, and a sharp exacerbation of conflicts would threaten their plans for expanding cooperation with the Mediterranean states. On Italy's initiative, there is already discussion of the question of creating a regional association of states of the

Western Mediterranean, which would include four EC countries (Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal) and all five members of the Arab Maghreb League (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania).

At the present time, Spain is holding consultations with its closest neighbors in connection with its initiative, currently being elaborated, on convening a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean [CSCC] in 1991 with the participation, in addition to all the states of the region, of the EEC countries, the USSR, and the United States. The forum projected by the Spaniards would focus on the same three "baskets"—questions of security, economic cooperation, and humanitarian problems—as the Helsinki Conference in 1975.

It is possible to imagine that a future CSCC process (if, of course, it is initiated successfully) may develop independently, without direct ties to the CSCE. A hypothetical format of the CSCC according to the formula "the 35 members of the CSCE plus the states of North Africa and the Near East" would probably make this process too cumbersome and slow, and rigid linkage between the CSCE and the CSCC could potentially exert a restraining influence on the course of the all-European process.

The EEC partners are exhibiting a desire to see our country as representing a certain counterbalance to the military aspects of U.S. policy, and they also have an obvious interest in weakening tension in the Mediterranean by political means. Thus there is probably potential for activating efforts with the aim of making progress toward military detente.

It also seems that we might offer more overt support to the positions of the nonaligned countries of the Mediterranean, whose interests coincide in many respects with the Soviet Union's tasks in the region. At the same time, we must take account of the policy adhered to by the nonaligned states of remaining "equidistant" from the USSR and the United States, and must not undertake any steps which might be evaluated as anti-American.

Nor must we lose sight of the fact that in many countries of the region, there is a tendency to regard the military-political situation in the Mediterranean as one which is largely autonomous of European processes and subject in the main to local regional conflicts. Such moods made themselves particularly clear at the International Conference on Problems of the Mediterranean, held in September 1989 in Prato (Italy), with the participation of representatives of the parliaments, political parties, social organizations, and academic, business, and religious circles of a number of states.

Many of them do not associate the presence of the American 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean with a threat to their security but rather explain it by the striving of the United States to guarantee the security of communications and to protect law and order in the region; the presence of the Soviet squadron, on the other hand, is virtually ignored as being insignificant in the military

FBIS-SOV-90-180-S
17 September 1990

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

7

respect. The following question appears to be legitimate: To what extent is the presence of our ships in the Mediterranean Sea justified at all in light of the political damage being caused to our country's image and the large amounts of financial resources being expended in connection with it?

At the forthcoming CSCE conference in Majorca, taking account of these diverse factors, it will evidently be expedient to assist the progress of those tasks which are of prime concern to the Mediterranean countries themselves. A wide-ranging discussion on military aspects of security could generate difficulties and would scarcely bring significant results. In the course of the meeting, it is therefore probably more expedient simply to state the importance of military-political problems and to recognize that it is imperative to try and resolve them. It seems to us that it would be better to concentrate upon questions of the development of ties in specific political, trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian spheres, and in the sphere of science and ecology.

In our opinion, such an orientation would help to single out the Mediterranean as an independent region and to multiply the number of ties binding its states closely to one another. In the course of time, these ties would become interwoven into a dense fabric of Mediterranean cooperation and form a basis for holding more extensive forums, including those on questions of security.

It seems that what is most important now is to activate all of the positive potential which has been accumulated by the Mediterranean countries and to try, in Majorca, to lay the foundation of a future Mediterranean structure or, as a minimum, to create conditions for the more active development of contacts in the region in the near future, and to enhance the role of various international organizations. In the future, on the basis of what has been achieved, it will be possible to set about implementing all constructive proposals, including those for holding a wide-ranging conference on a Mediterranean of a European type.

United States & Canada

IZVESTIYA Commentator Interviewed on Summit

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[Interview with IZVESTIYA political commentator Stanislav Kondrashov by reporter Koichi Hamazaki in Helsinki on 10 September]

[Text] [Hamazaki] What do you think was the goal of the Soviet Union in the recent summit, and to what degree do you think it was achieved?

[Kondrashov] As you know, the recent summit was held at the proposal of the United States to discuss measures for dealing with the Persian Gulf crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Soviet Union sought to establish U.S.-Soviet cooperative relations for crisis management, and succeeded in doing that. The Soviet stand is not to opt for military action, which can bring predictable results, but to achieve a peaceful solution by political means, while enforcing economic sanctions based on the UN resolutions. This stand was confirmed. There was much progress toward the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) by the end of this year and the promotion of economic cooperation.

[Hamazaki] In the news conference, President Bush declared that "there were no talks on military actions." Since it had been supposed previously that this subject would be a major topic at the talks, we were rather surprised. What is the truth concerning this?

[Kondrashov] President Bush did not exclude the possibility of using military power. However, even the U.S. Congress realizes the problems associated with use of military power at this time. This means that both countries have a common understanding that for now they should seek a peaceful solution, by maintaining contact with the Iraqi leadership and making efforts to persuade them.

[Hamazaki] The tone of the joint statement issued was milder than expected, and some are of the view that the statement's effects as a means of putting pressure on Iraqi President Husayn are weak.

[Kondrashov] Certainly, no dramatic decision was announced, but they emphasized willingness to take additional measures through the United Nations. This means that they will review the effect of the economic sanctions in the near future and will decide to tighten the clamps on Iraq further if necessary. Hence, this indicates the possibility, at a later stage, of the United States taking military action and the Soviet Union participating militarily within the framework of the United Nations. Since a review concerning additional measures is expected to be made within the next two months,

depending on the attitude of Iraq, I think the effect of the statement as a means of pressure on Iraq is quite strong. But more than anything else, the solid U.S.-Soviet handshaking should have made President Husayn feel Iraq's international isolation more acutely than before.

[Hamazaki] The United States and the Soviet Union expressed an intention to begin working toward the establishment of a framework for ensuring security in the Middle East once Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait is realized. What kind of plan does the Soviet Union have in that regard?

[Kondrashov] That portion of the U.S.-Soviet joint statement was intended to reject President Husayn's attempt to put the question of Iraq withdrawing from Kuwait on the same level as that of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. But what is more meaningful is that the United States and the Soviet Union for the first time have agreed to take a position of tackling the work of stabilizing the Middle East situation in cooperation. This has become possible because of the end of the cold war. The Soviet Union is thinking about creating the framework centering around the United Nations.

[Hamazaki] Remarks of the two top leaders with regard to the question of withdrawing the military advisers group stationed in Iraq did not sound too lively.

[Kondrashov] President Gorbachev reconfirmed his policy of withdrawing the group as soon as their contract expires, but he thinks withdrawing it altogether at once will weaken the influence of the Soviet Union on Iraq in a single sweep. I think the United States understands this, too.

Northeast Asia

Japanese Paper Interviews Shevardnadze 29 Aug

OW0109112490 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese
31 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 3—FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY

["Summary" of interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by Muncyuki Matsushita, chief of the editorial bureau of ASAHI SHIMBUN Tokyo Head Office, at the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the evening of 29 August]

[Text] Moscow Bureau, 30 Aug—A summary of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's remarks stated at the 29 August interview follows:

Japan Visit

Because preparations have to be made for President Gorbachev's visit to Japan during the upcoming visit, it will be of great significance. The president's visit, as well as his talks with the leadership during his stay in Japan, will be extremely important. There is no doubt that his visit will be a turning point.

The issue concerning the timing for the president's Japan visit probably will be brought up for discussion at my talks with Foreign Minister Nakayama. More definite timing will be decided through mutual accord. It is still too early to talk about the timing.

Moreover, among the topics for discussion during my Japan visit will be the prospects for wide-ranging issues on international politics and bilateral relations and the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. It goes beyond any doubt that attention will be drawn to various issues concerning Japanese-Soviet relations, particularly the most complicated and sensitive issue on signing a peace treaty. I think it will be a good idea to analyze and summarize activities of the group organized in 1988 to work on the peace treaty and then determine the orientation of major tasks for this group in the future. All Japanese proposals made within the framework of the preparations to sign a peace treaty will be discussed at our talks.

Talks will be held on military factors. The scheme of military blocks is changing. We are getting out of military confrontations. It is true with both the Soviet Union and Japan. I do not think we will fight with each other. We now have partners with which to hold serious talks and to promote new relations between us. I consider that measures for building confidence in the military sphere will be included in our discussions. I do not think that the Japanese welcome military cost increases with applause. The rise in military expenditures indicates that Japan does not trust the Soviet Union. Therefore, serious discussion is needed at the expert level.

During the past one or two years, the Soviet president met with many prominent Japanese political and social activists. In 1989 alone, foreign ministers of our two nations held consultations on four occasions. Frequent exchanges were held at the parliamentary level. A new channel for dialogue has been set up through contacts between ruling parties of our two nations. As a result of creating a new structure for political dialogue between our two nations, our mutual understanding has greatly intensified.

In response to the wish of the Japanese side, we have increased by a large margin the number of Japanese tombs in the Soviet Union that Japanese citizens are allowed to visit.

Concerning "new thinking," I hope the Japanese will not take it as a concept indicating that the Soviet Union will make unilateral concessions on various issues. New thinking means an invitation to hold forward-looking dialogues. It means an invitation jointly to seek new approaches toward international or bilateral issues. Moreover, new thinking will have the greatest effect only when our partners take corresponding measures in response to the Soviet intention to take such approaches. This has been justified by the unprecedented development in our relations with the United States, West

European nations, and China. I hope that Japanese-Soviet relations will not fall behind in this positive process.

Persian Gulf Situation

Energetic endeavors in political and diplomatic matters are needed to break the deadlock in the crisis as early as possible. For this purpose, we must grab at any chances of success in this concern. It is important to have high-level contacts, such as the contacts between UN General-Secretary Perez de Cuellar and Iraqi top leaders. We welcome Perez de Cuellar's visit and we are ready to provide our support to make his visit a success.

Taking advantage of wide-ranging political and diplomatic channels, Soviet officials have been in daily contacts with Iraqi representatives at various levels. I do not rule out the possibility of my personal visit to the Middle East, depending on the development of the situation there.

The resolutions of the UN Security Council represented the most appropriate responses of international society, and the resolution on sanctions was unavoidable. These were actions made necessary by the situation. However, I hope the situation will not prolong the period it will take for results of economic sanctions to show full effects. An early withdrawal of troops from Kuwait will serve the interests of Iraq itself.

If Iraq accepts the resolutions of the UN Security Council voluntarily, it will regain its political position from the viewpoint of the world community and will not lose face. That is the best solution. Once that is accomplished, foreign forces must withdraw from the region in response.

I regard Arab factors as important. In solving this problem, Arab people themselves must speak up and make decisive statements. The Soviet Union has had good relationships with almost all Arab nations traditionally.

I do not exclude the possibility that UN forces will be employed at some stage. This will not necessarily be to punish some people. The UN forces may become necessary to ensure peace at a certain stage.

We believe Iraqi President Husayn will move toward a way for compromise. I would like to recall the position President Husayn has taken in Iran-Iraq negotiations. In the negotiations, there now can be seen a basis upon which final agreements may be reached and all problems may be solved.

Security of Asia and Pacific Region

One of the characteristics of the present world is that people are becoming increasingly inseparable and that very close interdependence is developing. That being the case, it will be only under certain conditions that one can speak about the security of one region. Security can no

longer exist only for Asia or only for Europe. It has to be for the entire world and for all people.

For that reason, there are concerns about situations in the Asian-Pacific region, in which the speed of normalizing situations is slower than in Europe or in view of developments in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The countries in this region have unique problems. Hence, in applying experience learned in other regions, one must take into account the unique features of Asia.

Our ideas on ensuring security in this region were explained in President Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk.

As a first step in strengthening security in this region, we must think about creating a mechanism for wide-ranging negotiations so we can jointly search for concrete solutions to problems. We are hoping that new interesting concepts will be announced at an international conference to be held in Vladivostok soon. I myself will speak at the meeting.

At present, with very rapid arms reduction in progress, the structure of a military bloc confronting another bloc is expected to be gone from Europe soon. However, the arena of military confrontation is being shifted to the oceans. Conditions being such, we must tackle without delay the task of restricting and limiting naval military activities. It is only natural that the Soviet Union and Japan, both major sea powers, should have concerns about this matter. Japan is a major power in the Asia-Pacific region, and its influence over the world is very strong. I think Japan should join in activities toward talks to probe ways of normalizing the situation in this region.

We think it is to the benefit of both our nations that we begin bilateral dialogues on military and political issues. If the two countries want to make contributions toward the task of strengthening world security together, the two countries—Japan and the Soviet Union—must rid themselves of their mutual suspicion and take appropriate actions to further mutual understanding and to promote trust.

We do not think Japan should discard its security treaty with the United States. However, if we are to discuss the issues of security in the Asia-Pacific region in the same context, there are points we should look into together. For instance, what degree of military capabilities are required to secure safety? If there are no plans for aggression by any of us, we should be able to come to an agreement on matters of security covering the Soviet Union, Japan, and South Korea. We should be able to set upper limits to military capabilities.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Whether we can sign strategic arms reduction talks [START] with the United States will depend on how well we can push our negotiations. We have succeeded in

eliminating basic disagreements, but there still are problems to be settled. In the beginning of the negotiations, we thought the problems were technical. However, as we enter the stage of finalizing them, we find the problems are more political. We now have an understanding that we should get together once a week to expedite the process. This has been agreed upon by the U.S. secretary of state. Taking into account the progress of the negotiations, we will decide on the time for President Bush to visit the Soviet Union.

Whether he can visit the Soviet Union before the end of this year will depend on negotiations in progress in Geneva. There have been basic agreements, and there are needs and calls for his visit. However, there probably will be one more summit between the top leaders of the two nations before his visit is realized. The summit probably will be held when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meets in Paris.

Relations With China

At the foreign ministerial talks to be held while I am in China, I foresee the Middle East situation becoming a topic, because both the Soviet Union and China are members of the UN Security Council. We also will talk about the question of Cambodia, as well as Chinese-USSR relations, which recently have been seeing dynamic developments. We will discuss the question of eliminating all forms of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and China. Because the Soviet Union and China are scheduled to begin soon formal negotiations for reducing troops and weapons on the border areas, my meeting with the Chinese foreign minister will take up the question of how these negotiations should be conducted. We will also exchange views on ways to establish mutual trust militarily.

Korean Peninsula

During my visit to the DPRK, I will discuss bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea as neighboring nations and as allies in economic and other areas. My second topic will be the situation of the Korean peninsula and the question of removing military confrontations. The peninsula has a great excess of weapons and military capabilities. This is a question that bears on the interests of Japan, the Soviet Union, and the region as a whole. We would like to push for the removal of military confrontations. I think conditions are ripe. Dialogue with the United States is necessary. Serious discussions of bilateral relations and multinational relations are also necessary. Japan must think about improving relations with North Korea.

Concerning South Korea, I believe everything is going well. We are seeing developments in economic and trade relations with South Korea. Both sides are concerned greatly with developing mutual relations. I do not wish to reply now to your question on when diplomatic relations will be established.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

11

European Situation

Progress being made in the talks on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) is not bad. The most difficult questions have been resolved. However, there are some remaining questions, particularly regarding aircraft. If the Warsaw Pact nations so agree, there is a possibility that we will present a new position regarding aircraft after consulting with pact member nations.

Shevardnadze Discusses Foreign Ministers' Talks

OW0809135390 Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN
in Japanese 7 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 1—FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze granted an interview to YOMIURI SHIMBUN and IZVESTIYA at the Soviet Embassy, located in Azabudai, Tokyo, on the evening of 6 September, and stated the following: "I am satisfied with the current Soviet-Japanese foreign ministerial talks. This does not mean that the two sides have reached accords on many points. However, it is of great significance that dialogue has started for future development of Soviet-Japanese relations." Thus, he gave a positive appraisal of the talks.

Adding that "the basis for Soviet-Japanese relations for the next 10 to 15 years is being created now," the foreign minister indicated the Soviet position of dealing with the development of Soviet-Japanese relations, including the territorial issue, over a long period of time.

Upon the conclusion of the three-day talks, the foreign minister stated that "a major change is taking place in Japan's policy toward the Soviet Union," and then he noted that "the Japanese side has taken an approach of discussing the issue of conclusion of a peace treaty in parallel with other issues connected with political and economic cooperation."

As for the reason why Japan has begun moves to break the deadlock in its relations with the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated his understanding that it is because Japan is being forced not to lag behind in the international situation in this drastically changing world.

Touching on President Gorbachev's visit to Japan, scheduled for next April, the foreign minister stated his view that the framework with regard to preparations for his visit had been completed, and then said: "Unless President Gorbachev will have to sign very important treaties and documents when he visits Japan, I will not have to visit Japan for some time in the future." Thus, he indicated that there would be no major obstacles to the president's visit to Japan.

Concerning the outcome of the current foreign ministerial talks, the foreign minister stressed that "I have established a personal relationship with Foreign Minister Nakayama and others."

Primakov Suggests Return of Two Kuril Islands

OW0709151190 Tokyo JIJI in English 1428 GMT
7 Sep 90—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Moscow, Sept. 6 (JIJI PRESS)—President Mikhail Gorbachev is ready to discuss all problems blocking the restoration of fully normalized Soviet-Japanese ties when he visits Japan next spring, a high-ranking Soviet official said Thursday.

Yevgeniy Primakov, a member of the Kremlin Presidential Council and Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser, made the comments in talks with a group of Japanese parliamentarians.

Veering from the past Soviet line, Primakov acknowledged the existence of the territorial dispute involving four northwestern Pacific islands taken during the closing days of World War II.

Primakov's remarks to the delegation of the House of Representatives Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems, led by Japan Socialist Party (JSP) member Tetsu Ueda, echoed Gorbachev's statement in a press conference last Friday in which he said he is prepared to discuss all outstanding issues during his scheduled visit to Japan.

Primakov suggested that the Soviet Union is prepared to return two of the four disputed islands based on the provisions of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese joint declaration.

The 1956 declaration stipulates that Shikotan and Habomai Islands shall be returned to Japan after the signing of a peace treaty. But Primakov stressed that the dispute should be settled through a wide-ranging discussion rather than focusing solely on the issue of territorial claim.

Academy Official on Northern Territories Return

OW0709115490 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN
in Japanese 5 Sep 90 Evening Edition p 2—FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By reporter Koike]

[Text] Vladivostok, 5 Sep—Titarenko, director of the Far East Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences, granted an interview to NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN on 4 September, expressing his views on the Northern Territories issue.

Speaking about (then) Foreign Minister Gromyko's (1960) memorandum to Japan overturning an agreement to return two islands under the 1956 Japan-Soviet joint statement, Director Titarenko reiterated: "The memorandum should be revoked; this is not only my opinion but the opinion of the institute as a whole."

Director Titarenko said he does not know at this stage whether the memorandum will be actually repealed. He said this is a matter for bilateral negotiations between the two governments. He added that the revocation of the

memorandum could be announced in the form of a declaration if both governments agree.

Newspaper Editor Reviews Kuril Islands Issue

OW0709115790 Tokyo SANKEI SHIMBUN
in Japanese 4 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 3—FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By correspondent Yoshihisa Furumori]

[Text] Washington, 3 Sep—On the eve of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan, growing attention is being given to the future of Japan-Soviet relations and the Northern Territories issue. A SANKEI SHIMBUN correspondent recently interviewed Vladislav Starkov, editor of "ARGUMENTY I FAKTY," a Soviet daily which enjoys the largest circulation of any periodical throughout the world, and a member of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Congress of People's Deputies, while the latter was visiting the United States. In the interview, the editor expressed his view that there are many Soviet people who consider the Northern Territories Soviet territories; the Japanese side, among other things, should clearly state the compensation it would offer in exchange for the Northern Territories.

In the interview, the editor also stated: "As long as Japan asserts that the four islands must be returned immediately and that compensation will be discussed at a later time, no progress will be made. Japan, among other things, should give the Soviet Union a clear-cut guarantee about what it plans to give the Soviet Union in return for the four islands."

The editor said that he exchanged views with many people on the Japanese side on the Northern Territories issue during his visit to Japan last December. The editor went on to state: "At that time, I realized that many Japanese ardently hoped for the return of the Northern Territories. However, the same percentage, or more, of Soviets believe that those islands (the Northern Territories) belong to the Soviet Union. The two nations should make an equitable decision." In this connection, the editor added: "Many Soviet people at home are criticizing President Gorbachev for giving up East Germany without obtaining any compensation during the debate on German unification. Therefore, it is now difficult for him to unilaterally return the islands to Japan."

In connection with the Northern Territories, the editor continued: 1) The demand for the return of the Northern Territories appears to have become a question of political prestige for Japan; 2) the positions of the Soviet Union and Japan differ widely on the Northern Territories, and in this regard, the Japanese side does not fully understand the Soviet side; 3) Japan should work for some sort of agreement concerning the territories before Gorbachev visits Japan; and 4) the Japanese side should seriously consider an offer by RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Yeltsin to turn Sakhalin into a free economic zone in connection with the territories issue. The editor

spoke carefully, saying: "I talked with many officials in Japan when I visited Japan last December. I sensed a suggestion in remarks made by some officials that it would be rather wise for the Soviet Union not to return the territories to Japan."

Citizens Group Demands Return of Islands

OW0709105790 Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN
in Japanese 5 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2—FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Vladivostok, 4 Sep, JIJI—An unexpected incident took place in Vladivostok on 4 September, just before Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's departure for his visit to Japan, as a Soviet citizens' group directly appealed to the foreign minister for the early settlement of the Northern Territories issue.

This citizens group, known as "Heisei," was organized in Vladivostok last month to promote friendship with Japan. Two citizens, including Vladimir Khazanchev, who seems to be the chairman, stood outside the "House of Knowledge," the site for the international conference on the Asian-Pacific region, carrying a banner which read: "For peace and friendship through settlement of the territorial issue." When Foreign Minister Shevardnadze saw the banner as he was leaving for the airport, he approached these two citizens and discussed Soviet-Japanese relations with them for about 20 minutes.

Mr. Khazanchev strongly demanded: "Since the territories issue constitutes an obstacle to Soviet-Japanese relations, a peace treaty should be concluded to settle the territories issue." In response, quoting Russian Republic Supreme Council Chairman Yeltsin and others, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze pointed out that "island residents are afraid (that their islands will be returned)." He also stated that "this issue would be brought up for discussion at the talks with Foreign Minister Nakayama."

Moreover, Mr. Khazanchev demanded that graveyards for Japanese soldiers in Siberia should be opened to their family members. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze replied: "That is correct. The Japanese are a race that cherishes their memories. The Soviet Government is moving in this direction." Thus, he indicated a positive approach toward the settlement of the issue concerning graveyards for the detained Japanese soldiers.

"Heisei" is also known as "a group of people who love Japan"; its membership is approximately 100.

Ivanov Discusses Asian Policy, Japanese Ties

OW0209012290 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN
in Japanese 28 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2—FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Interview with Vladimir Ivanov, head of the Asian and Pacific Department at the Soviet Academy of Sciences' World Economics and International Relations Institute, by unidentified reporters; place and date not given; from

the "Frankly Speaking" column; Ivanov has been visiting Japan since 23 August at the invitation of the Kawazaki International Exchange Association]

[Text] [ASAHI SHIMBUN] It will be interesting to observe how the easing of European tension affects Asia. What is your comment?

[Ivanov] In Asia, particularly northwest Asia, there remain difficult problems, for instance the question of the Korean peninsula and the issue of Japan-USSR relations. There is not much U.S.-Soviet cooperation here either. However, East-West confrontation is easing throughout the world, and I think the "new thinking" in the United States and the Soviet Union will spread to this region sooner or later. In fact, there were signs of this in the U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers' talks held (in Irkutsk) early this month. This is because both sides agree on the need for Asian security and for mutual cooperation in this respect.

[ASAHI SHIMBUN] Will Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announce a new Asian policy at the "International Conference for Peace, Cooperation and Dialogue in the Asian and Pacific Region" to be held in Vladivostok in early September?

Time Ripe for Planting Trust

[Ivanov] The Middle East situation worries us somewhat. But it is my understanding that the foreign minister will attend the conference and will present a proposal on the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet Union, through General Secretary Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok (in 1986) and Krasnoyarsk (in 1988), has already expressed its views on Asian security. Hence, I think his proposal will be an extension of these views.

[ASAHI SHIMBUN] Specifically, what ideas may come up?

[Ivanov] For instance, a framework for multinational negotiations on security. I think the time to establish trust is ripe in Asia now that this is being done in Europe. It is possible that some concrete ideas may be presented regarding dialogue between South and North Korea and also regarding peace in Cambodia.

[ASAHI SHIMBUN] Developments in ROK-USSR ties are outstanding. Take the ROK-USSR summit in San Francisco, for one.

[Ivanov] The ROK views the developments as laying the ground for establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, while the latter views them from the angle of easing tensions on the Korean peninsula. It is important to note that the meeting in San Francisco was held with U.S. understanding. By showing that it is willing to help ease tensions in concert with the United States, the Soviet Union is trying to contribute to the establishment of trust. The Soviet Union and the DPRK have had good and stable relations, and I think the Soviet Union

volunteered to take on the role of explaining North Korean thinking and concerns to the ROK and the United States.

Joint Efforts for Middle East Peace

[ASAHI SHIMBUN] You referred to Japan-USSR relations as one of difficult problems, along with the question of the Korean peninsula. Did you mean the Northern Territories question?

[Ivanov] Because the two nations' relations have been fraught with friction, the question is difficult to solve. But I am optimistic about the future. In order for the two countries to better understand the problem, it is necessary that they cooperate in building an international order. At present, as a result of Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, international peace and security faces a crisis. Japan and the Soviet Union should cooperate in tackling the restoration of peace to the Middle East and in teaching Iraq a lesson. When compared with such global problems, pending bilateral issues seem small.

[ASAHI SHIMBUN] At the industrialized nations' summit (Houston summit), Japan insisted that "the Northern Territories question was left over from World War II."

[Ivanov] If the statement referred to Stalinist and expansionist residues, the expression is correct. But do not forget that Japan, through its militarism, also expanded its power into Sakhalin and the Chinese mainland. What concerns the Soviet leadership is the fact that Japan internationalized the Northern Territories issue at the summit. If there is a problem, it should first be discussed between the two nations. What should come first is cooperation in the search for a compromise. I think, for instance, cooperation for preservation and control of fishery resources in the Sea of Okhotsk is desirable.

Soviets Believe They Have Many Friends

[ASAHI SHIMBUN] How do you view the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in context of the question of improving Japan-USSR relations?

[Ivanov] As a result of improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is no longer a threat to the Soviet Union, and therefore it should no longer be an obstacle to the improvement of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. Those expressing concerns about the situation are Japan's neighbors. They are concerned lest Japan should return to militarism. In the midst of all this, the security treaty is also making helping maintain security in Asia and the Pacific. It might be called key to this region's security.

Evaluation of U.S. forces in Japan has also changed. Since the United States and the Soviet Union have promised not to go to war, and since the United States decided to reduce the strength of its forces in Japan, the impact of U.S. forces in Japan on the security of the

Soviet Union has also diminished. We, the Soviet people, are beginning to see that we have many more friends all over the world than we previously thought, all as a result of U.S.-Soviet conciliation.

Soviet Report Calls for Learning From Japan

*OW0909095990 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS
in English 8 Sep 90 p 3*

[Text] The Soviet Union, now pushing economic reforms based on market principles, is trying to learn from Japan's successful postwar experiences, according to a Soviet report to President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The report, prepared by Anatoliy Milyukov, an economic adviser to Gorbachev, says Moscow should streamline its heavy bureaucracy in order to increase efficiency in the Soviet economy.

Milyukov, head of the social and economic affairs department of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, visited Japan in November last year and in April this year for talks with government officials, business managers and scholars.

The 110-page report, submitted to Gorbachev in August, is entitled: "Why Are Japan's Experiences in Economic and Social Development Useful to the Soviet Union?"

Gorbachev, in a speech last June, said Japan's postwar recovery offers "exciting lessons" to the Soviet Union.

The report says state-owned Soviet enterprises should be reorganized along the lines of Japanese companies in which ownership and management are separated. The separation between shareholders and managers, coupled with the overwhelming strength of corporate shareholders, has prevented Japanese companies from falling into the hands of rich individuals, the report notes.

On the role of the Japanese Government in economic management, the report observes that the bureaucracy maintains a "relationship of trust and cooperation" with private industry in working out long-term forecasts and plans.

It also observes that the central government gives priority to protecting small businesses and that it has the authority to place orders for jobs related to public works projects.

The report praises the Ministry of Finance as a "well-maintained administrative agency," adding that its program of cutting the budget deficit has a "great significance" to the deficit-ridden Soviet economy.

The study says the absence of major strikes in Japan is due to the fact that labor and management share common interests and that a company's success means better employee welfare.

Near East & South Asia

Shishlin Says Advisers To Be Pulled From Iraq

*LD0909121290 London THE SUNDAY TIMES
in English 9 Sep 90 pp 1, 2—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*

["Bush Seeks Pact With Gorbachev Over Gulf Crisis; Moscow To Pull Out Military Advisers From Iraq"—THE SUNDAY TIMES headline; by John Cassidy and James Blitz, Helsinki]

[Excerpts] The United States will make an historic offer to the Soviet Union to join a long-term strategic alliance in the Middle East at today's emergency superpower summit in Helsinki. The aim will be to contain Iraq and other belligerent powers in the region. [passage omitted]

A Soviet official also revealed that the Kremlin is on the verge of withdrawing some of the 193 Soviet military advisers in Iraq. [passage omitted]

In a key concession to Washington, a senior Soviet official told THE SUNDAY TIMES that the Kremlin was about to withdraw some of the Soviet military advisers now in Iraq. "Some of them are going to be returned. We are trying to withdraw them," said Nikolay Shishlin, a senior adviser to the Communist Party's Central Committee. "We want to return them as soon as possible, but maybe it will take time. Many are ready to return now."

The Russians have assured Washington that the advisers are not assisting directly with the Iraqi war effort, but their presence has caused concern in the United States. Until now Moscow has said they would remain until their contracts were completed, but Shishlin said there had been a change of thinking. [passage omitted]

Political & Social**Popular National Security Concerns Examined**

PM3108132890 London *THE EUROPEAN* in English
31 Aug-2 Sep 90 p 9—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Artucke MEZHODUNARODNAYA ZHIZN deputy editor Aleksey B. Pankin article: "Defence Begins at Home for Russia's Villagers"]

[Text] Writing about the national defence of the USSR is becoming an impossible task. What can be said about defence of a country whose future—and even present—borders are unpredictable? What are the security problems of the Soviet Union, a state which is quickly turning into a fiction, but which remains a major actor on the world scene? What, if any, are its national interests; who can legitimately define and express them?

It was a search for answers to these questions that took me to the south of Russia in June, to the city of Rostov-na-Donu, and to Bagovskaya in the middle of this month.

Bagovskaya is a Cossack village in the Krasnodar province, in the northern Caucasus. It was founded in 1862, a couple of years before the end of Caucasian wars, as one of the outposts of the Russian empire's expansion to the south. The Cossacks settling on these extremely rich lands were privileged subjects: They never knew serfdom, they could carry arms, they were granted a degree of autonomy by the Tsars; and in return they had to defend themselves and secure the expanding southern frontier of the empire.

Now, almost 130 years later, the spirit of the frontier seems to be back again—in very peculiar circumstances. This time it is a spirit of a shrinking frontier.

On my many previous travels throughout the USSR I had often thought that Soviet people were alienated from the notion of defence. Even at the height of the cold war, when many people were genuinely concerned about the "aggressive designs" of the Reagan administration. The perception of a threat was abstract; not something affecting people's everyday lives.

Now, with progressing detente and new thinking, it is becoming a conventional wisdom that we are living in a much safer world. So I was amazed to discover, in this safer world in Europe, a place where people feel deeply and personally threatened. They have good reason to worry. The Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict is just across the mountains. It has spilled over into Krasnodar province, with 200,000 refugees flooding the already densely-populated region, exacerbating existing problems such as housing, and creating new tensions.

The northern Caucasus is home to numerous nationalities (many of them Islamic) with a long history of conflicts and hostilities which were never resolved, but rather frozen, first within the Russian empire, and then

the Soviet Union. Now, a lot of the tensions have come back into the open, and the whole region might be described as a powder keg.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait made many people in the Caucasus aware that they are the part of European Russia closest to the explosive area of Islamic turmoil—a kind of underbelly of Europe. So this region has found itself on the frontier between still relatively stable Russia, and its unpredictable neighbours. This is not only a geographic frontier. It is also a fine line beyond which the law and order problems of the Soviet Union might become defence matters for Russia. In this situation, local residents start thinking about security and strong defence in very concrete terms.

How, in the opinion of the people that I talked to in Bagovskaya and the surrounding town and villages, do the security policies of Moscow relate to their concerns?

My first instinct was to say that they feel that Moscow's preoccupation with western and Central Europe and the United States neglects their problems. But this is perhaps to misrepresent the picture.

So I would rather take my story back two months, Rostov-na-Donu. It was in this unofficial capital of the northern Caucasus that an independent research programme on security, which my journal runs, held one of its events, together with the Rostov School of Socio-Intellectual Enterprise: a five-day seminar exercise on the subject of civic control in the security system. The idea was to bring together high- and middle-ranking officials from the central government—the ministries of foreign affairs, defence and the interior, Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the KGB, the state committee for environment protection, national legislators, academics—with the people they are supposed to represent—tax-payers and producers, local politicians and administrators—and have them work together on a common concept of security.

An interesting thing happened just after a few hours of work. Most of the Muscovites gathered in one working group, called "Security of the Country." For five days they talked to each other about the priority of universal human values and deideologisation, strategic stability and reasonable sufficiency, the virtues of the multi-party system, and ways of transition to a market economy. In the final paper that they produced, they came up with a lot of specific proposals for the president and the Supreme Soviet, concerning national legislation or national programmes which needed to be urgently adopted.

By any standards that was a big achievement. The paper will be reported to the participants' respective bodies, and parts of it are highly likely to be incorporated into official policies.

The only problem with this group was that nobody from Rostov—directors of factories, chairpeople of collective farms, police officers, educators or "greens"—could last

more than an hour sitting in this group. They kept leaving to go to the groups which were discussing more immediate concerns to them than the "Security of the Country." And this was perhaps the most honest evaluation of many of the reform impulses coming from Moscow. So, coming back to the security interests of Bagovskaya, it is not that Moscow neglects them. The real issue is that the villages don't expect much from the capital city. While the people there feel that their security concerns are real, Moscow for them is an abstraction.

Actually, I believe the strongest impact that national politics is having on Bagovskaya at the moment is that the direct broadcasting of endless congresses and sessions has all but wiped out entertainment programmes from the national television channels.

Being conservative in their outlook (not communist conservatives, but traditionalists) the villagers deplore much of the criticism of the Soviet Army coming from the national press and progressive politicians. But, as they are also practical and down-to-earth people, they take it almost for granted that, in its present shape, the Army can hardly be relied upon. In these circumstances their frontier, do-it-yourself, Cossack mentality is being revived. Most often it is expressed rather vaguely, in conversations; though some people formulate it rather more clearly.

A director of a big furniture factory, a major local employer in Mostovskoy town, told me that he would not mind employing a number of officers who are now being discharged from the Army. He wants them to work at the factory for six hours, and for the remaining two hours to do the "real thing": by which he means, of course, military training. Interestingly enough, similar ideas, of having some sort of locally-controlled military formations, were aired at the Rostov seminar exercise. What I like most about such an approach to military reform—to any reform—is that it is not inspired by any talk about national interest or the good of the country. Having found themselves among the ruins of an old order, people are trying to define their own identity and their own interests. Their emerging paradigm is not to waste time on restructuring, but to start a new construction.

However rudimentary these sentiments might be at the moment, I believe it will be an amalgam of very down-to-earth local initiatives which will lead to creation of a new country and a new society. And it will be quite different from anything that the Moscow reformers, who speak about national security strategies, or the Western observers who obtain most of their information from them, can envisage.

Professor Yakovlev Views Role of Laws, Rights

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[Report on interview with Professor Aleksandr Yakovlev, USSR people's deputy, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, Law and Order, by correspondent Yelena Skvortsova; place and date not given: "The Burden of Freedom"]

[Text] Are you prepared to take it on your shoulders? In a conversation with our correspondent, Yelena Skvortsova, this is reflected upon by Professor Aleksandr Yakovlev, USSR people's deputy and member of the committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for questions of legislation, legality, and law and order.

[Skvortsova] There is perhaps nothing more "corrosive" than the sense of one's own degradation. It twists a person and does not allow him to breathe.... There is nothing which will get rid of this feeling. It is in your blood. Remember the Bible story about how Moses spent 40 years leading his people to the promised land? Tired to the point of death, the people asked: Why were they spending so long in the desert? Moses was waiting for everyone who had known slavery to die.

Conventionally the concept "life of a generation" fits within the framework of 25 years. Consequently, a minimum of four generations of our people have lived, been educated, been born, and died under the mark of Violence, Degradation, and the Power of Dogma. Does such an individual need freedom?

[Yakovlev] There is such an expression as the burden of freedom. It is a very precise expression. If you have turned over the burden of freedom to a leader, the society, your parents... you have a boring but peaceful life. People do your thinking for you and take your risks for you. When things get bad you blame someone else—never yourself. We have gotten used to being a little bit warm and comfortable and we will probably not die of hunger.... And the main thing is that we do not have the burden of freedom.

But society can hope to develop only to the extent that the masses of individuals are ready to become internally free.

[Skvortsova] So we can encounter situations where people do not want freedom because they want to escape responsibility?

[Yakovlev] There is that danger. Escaping from freedom is one of the most terrible phenomena of the 20th century. When people acquire freedom but are not prepared for it or are not capable of preserving it, when freedom does not bring them an immediate sense of well-being—then there can arise the temptation to shake off the burden of freedom and place it on the person who gives them bread. This tragic situation has been played out repeatedly in the history of mankind.

[Skvortsova] People went through a great deal without complaining as long as there was at least something in the stores. Now the shelves are almost bare. There are coupons for which the norms are inadequate. And the people are complaining.

Try to convince **them** to "tighten their belts" another notch. Try to share with **them** the joy of the awakening of a civil society and the successes of glasnost and democracy. They are not in the mood for that now. They are longing for normal living conditions and a full supply of food products. And they fully deserve this since they have worked all their lives, been patient, cut down on everything since they were quite sure that this was necessary for the country and the society. And I cannot make myself make myself condemn these people because they do not want to take on the burden of freedom as well.

[Yakovlev] Indeed, if the economic reforms are late in coming the burden of freedom might seem too heavy for those who are given too much freedom and not enough to eat. But I am convinced that an intelligent village resident, an intelligent sovkhos [state farm] director, an intelligent craftsman, an intelligent cooperative chairman, an intelligent enterprise leader, and an intelligent worker—all of them need economic freedom above all. It is just that they all need different degrees of freedom.

[Skvortsova] Consequently, the people are ready to take freedom. The state wishes to give it to the people. So why do these hands that are reaching out to one another not meet? Who is standing in the way?

[Yakovlev] It boils down to the fact that the concept of "government" (or "they") and the concept of the "people" (or "we") are dissimilar.

Who are these "we"? They include also the people on top who do not need freedom at all. They have lived handsomely and were excellently situated in the previous system, and they are also living relatively well now. They are doing everything they can to make sure that the real transformations are kept to a minimum. For example, in Article 17 of the draft of the Law on Land of 1 September 1989, which was handed out to the deputies, it says that it would be possible to turn over to renters only land from the existing state land reserve or by a decree of the local soviet. In the draft published on 6 December 1989, "Fundamentals of Land Legislation," nothing is even mentioned about the creation of a supply of land to be allotted to peasant farms and agricultural cooperatives. So where will they get land from? Whose? I am convinced that those who do not want real freedom for the peasants are quite deliberately avoiding this issue.

And so those on top, for whom reform is unnecessary and dangerous, and those on the bottom, for whom changes are also unnecessary and dangerous, are extending their hands to one another.

I think the only hope is in the possibility that socially active elements in the country and the city—precisely they!—will finally be able to extend a hand to those on top, who will be willing and able to give them economic liberation.

[Skvortsova] But, after all, we have conducted a reorganization of the apparatus (at least officially, according to the press). This should lead to a weakening of precisely those who are "in the middle"....

[Yakovlev] The phrase "reorganization of the apparatus" means not a replacement of people but a replacement of structures. But which structures have changed? None.

There are two kinds of reaction to possible disorders. The first is the path of reform: real restructuring of existing relations.

The second path is the "crusade." Horns are blown, the newspapers prance around on their hind legs, three to five bribe takers are shot, and dozens are put in prison.... The public is satisfied, the noise dies down, and everything is peaceful and goes back to the way it was. Do you recognize this? The "crusade" serves beautifully for concealing the real social structure, protecting it from real reform, distracting people's attention, and gaining cheap propagandistic capital. And yet the replacement of individuals does not mean a replacement of structures.

[Skvortsova] Aleksandr Maksimovich, everyone is now asserting like an incantation: "Make man an economic subject...." It has long been time for this. But it is not enough just to adopt a law. That will not feed anybody, it will merely set certain norms. But the people are hoping that as a result of the legislatively conducted economic reform things will become better for **everyone**. But that is not happening. Really intensive production means stiff competition. Therefore there will inevitably also be those who lose, who fall overboard.... Real freedom means that a person also has a chance to fail, not to be successful.... And if our society is not ready for this kind of differentiation, then....

[Yakovlev] Then we will be not merely marking time but slowly sinking to the bottom. We have no easy choice. If we are not prepared to deliberately allow segmentation of the society, the outcome could be extremely sad.... We must release the citizenry from the totalitarian yoke of the state, and the individual from excessive protectiveness on the part of the society. Unless we have a rule-of-law democratic state, the citizens cannot become the subject of the law either. They will continue as before to be objects of state coercion.

[Skvortsova] But if the person has neither rights nor influence in the country's economic life how can he exert pressure on political life? He has no levers with which he can regulate the degree of influence the state has over him.

[Yakovlev] The citizen's political rights give him the possibility of gaining and reinforcing economic rights. For in the final analysis the fact that we are now democratizing the political structure should serve a more important goal: economically liberating the citizen and granting him the real rights of the owner. On the other hand, the democratic political structure will be able to preserve itself and justify its existence only to the extent to which we succeed in carrying out a radical economic reform in all areas.

But since the directive plan is inflexible, all discussion of economic liberation is unthinkable. The most terrible trick, which is now taking place, is that while talking about a new economic policy we are moving in the direction of military communism. The ration cards are the first system of this. The second is the general attitude of leveling.

What are we waiting for? Do we need another Kronstadt in order to begin to seriously restructure the economy? It will come. Not all strikes will be so peaceful and organized.

We are being persuaded that it is impossible to do everything at once. They say that first we shall undertake reform, even if it is just the owners without any rights, and then we will gradually get used to everything.... What will we get used to? How will we get used to it? Either a person is free or he is not.

[Skvortsova] The aspiration of the Baltic countries for independence is an attempt actually to move a little bit forward on the path to a rule-of-law state. How do you evaluate these steps on the part of the Balts which have already been backed up by the law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Yakovlev] The republics' right to secede is a legal right which nobody can ever take away. But the question is the extent to which this legal right is based on real economic possibility and the need or requirement for separation. If we abolish the existing compulsory distribution of goods and replace this with free market relations we will have a complete collapse. For the time being we are avoiding this only by coercive measures. In the previous geographical terms, we can continue to exist only if our unity, including the legal right to secede, is nonetheless based on common economic, cultural, and scholarly interest.

The basis of the Union Constitution should be the **treaty** (this is what it has been historically) of republics with **equal rights** to the effect that **some** of their functions, which they cannot actually carry out within the framework of a federal state, they **allow** to be taken over by a higher authority.

[Skvortsova] I recently returned from the Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. Bulgarians have been working in Udorskiy Rayon in this republic for 20 years now. According to the conditions of the agreement, they work with our technology and using our technical equipment, contributing only their work force.

On the scale of the entire country this is an advantageous agreement. But for the Komi ASSR specifically it is an obstacle. One asks: Since it is an independent republic, should the Komi ASSR have concluded such an agreement?

[Yakovlev] But even with regional economic accountability the republic would not stand to gain anything. One should buy and sell that which is most advantageous and produce what people will buy (regardless of where)—this is the classical formula for trade. Real economic accountability cannot be regional. Can you imagine a store in Paris refusing to sell to a customer from Lyon? That is absurd. Unfortunately, we do not fully understand the entire tragedy of the separatism of nonmarket relations. This is a feudal separatism, that is, a return to a couple of centuries ago. And here we have before our eyes the example of the countries of West Europe which, on the basis of the Common Market, have already almost eliminated state borders and have not lost an iota of their independence, cultural autonomy, or national pride in the process.

But under the conditions of a unified political structure and the pressure of decisions coming from the center, there is no possibility of trying to change anything in the economy except for regional economic accountability.

[Skvortsova] Previously the people would believe in any tsar. Now they have developed a belief in good laws—they will be adopted in the session and our lives will immediately become wonderful....

[Yakovlev] The law can neither generate new forms of being nor order them to appear. It can only provide space for their development.

Our people have a terrible legacy in the form of a whole series of false laws. And all the activity of our so-called representative organs has been nothing but a manifestation of the lies. We have never had real law.

[Skvortsova] The law is the measure and the existence of freedom. According to this concept from the early Marx, the law is nothing but a form of existence of freedom which can manifest itself only within the framework of the law. Otherwise limitless freedom ultimately leads to war of everyone against everyone and to the victory of the most aggressive. Violence prevails. This is precisely the case when the reverse side of freedom turns out to be arbitrary behavior.

[Yakovlev] The law performs its socially useful function only if the laws really become a form of the existence of freedom—of the producer, the citizen, and so forth—and at the same time it will... limit it. Because my freedom is limited by yours. In any case this is the only requirement for any limitation.

[Skvortsova] Indeed, this is one of the most important laws on earth and it is an idea that is very widespread in philosophy: "The circumference is nowhere," that is, within your own sphere you may spread out as much as

you want to, but in no case may you stifle someone else's life.... Remember Pierre Bezukhov's dream? He dreamed of a living, boundless, fluctuating globe. Its surface consisted of drops densely crowded together. All of them were moving and each tried to take as much space as possible. "That is life," the old teacher told Pierre.

For many years in a row we have seen in real life a quite different variant of Pierre's dream—how the strongest, the people with the power, have absorbed and wiped out the weaker.... And in this context it is very alarming to hear the phrase uttered by A.I. Lukyanov in a television interview on the results of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. He said that the session and the congress had adopted remarkable laws and draft laws but everything would depend on how they were taken locally, how conscientiously the leaders would implement this same policy in the future.... But this is the approach that has been taken for many years in our country and has caused a great deal of harm. Incidentally, even the events of recent, already "perestroika," times have shown that this tendency still remains. For example, just from ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (which received a letter with a request to explain which benefits are granted to individuals who suffered from the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant) we finally learned for sure that such a decree did exist (it was not rumor) but was of an "in-house" nature and therefore neither could it be published in full nor could excerpts from it be printed. Because of all of the aforementioned factors, it is recommended that the citizens go to the rayon ispolkoms [executive committees] for answers. A familiar story.... What is keeping the law from being mandatory for everyone?

[Yakovlev] Two-thirds of all the "output" of recent legislative activity is not "working." This is partially because of deliberate foot dragging in local areas. But it is mainly because of the lack of a clear cut and consistent position from above. If they adopt laws that are ambiguous, to put it mildly, what confidence can anyone have in them? And they contain the same clever formula: We will retain feudal dependency completely but we will try to gain a free worker within its framework. This kind of cheating is continuing on the scale of the entire country.

[Skvortsova] It seems to me that even the emancipation of the citizen in our country will be carried out through force and coercion. The more so since the entire history of our state consists of constant compulsory measures with respect to society—for its good. Is it right to force a person to bear his freedom?

[Yakovlev] There is always force in a state. But coercive measures with respect to those who, by virtue of their quite clearly defined departmental interests, stand in the way of what is done for the good of the people, are justified. Coercion can also be economic and political: Through real democratic elections remove from the sphere of administration those who do not desire real improvement of the society.

I hope that we are now finally entering into a rule-of-law state. Of course, the truest and most correct path is coercion based on the law. We have already been through a situation with force that is not restricted by law (this was the dictatorship of the proletariat, military communism, Stalinism...). I am in favor of adopting democratic laws and then, if necessary, using force to implement them.

I assure you that as soon as the law reflected your real economic interests, there will be no need to impose it on you. Is it necessary to force a peasant to sell grain at market prices? No, he must be forced to sell only when the prices are artificial.

[Skvortsova] Freedom introduced by force, in my opinion, is directly correlated to the question of human rights. How do you assess the current situation in the area of protection of human rights in our country? Do you consider the changes that have taken place to be radical?

[Yakovlev] We are still continuing to exist without any rights. And the decisive blow in this direction has not been dealt. We have spent so much time in the barracks that we can no longer see them as barracks.

We still do not recognize that a citizen has irreversible and inalienable rights. Why should he ask for permission to engage in individual labor activity? Simply because my age-old right to work at what I choose has been taken away by the state? And now the ispolkom, out of kindness, may give it back to me or it might not. Why should we have to ask for everything? And even now our concern for increasing the rights of the citizen frequently amount to merely somehow improving the form of consideration of our requests. Or another point: A person cannot decide for himself where he is going to live in his own country! There is nothing more antidemocratic than the registration system in our country. We will soon ratify the Vienna Conventions, particularly the law on free travel in and out of the country. And it might turn out that it will be much easier to go to Paris than to Moscow or Leningrad.

We are reacting to Vienna like people of modern Europe, but within the country we are acting like medieval feudals. Yet the international legal act ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet should automatically become part of our national legislation. Then at least at the international level we will look like worthy members of the world community of rule-of-law states.

[Skvortsova] A rule-of-law state presupposes above all mandatory universal equality before the law. We do not have that in our country yet. As before, those who have a large amount of power have "closer" relations with the law. But why, in the fifth year of perestroika, are we still not equal before the law?

[Yakovlev] Because we have structures that are not regulated by the law. I have in mind the party leadership. It leads the country outside legislation. We are now

entering the area of the multiparty system. But this does not change the essence of the matter.

There must be parties. And they have the right to develop any political principles. But everywhere in the world there is a separation of state and party. And everywhere in the world there is a policy that a political principle may be realized only through the law. And as long as party directives are implemented directly—and this is the case now—we can forget about a rule-of-law state. Nothing adopted at any level of party leadership can be carried out in reality unless it has passed through the state legal system. This is a very simple rule which leads to a rule-of-law state, and we can follow it even now.

[Skvortsova] But those for whom such a state of affairs is advantageous will not forfeit their positions without a fight....

[Yakovlev] Of course. The main thing—the fight for a rule-of-law state—still lies ahead. But we have a good means of fighting against bureaucrats who are impeding the reform—they must be placed in conditions whereby resistance to the laws will lead to the loss of their official positions. This is possible only under the conditions of true democracy.

[Skvortsova] Aleksandr Maksimovich, we are now discovering for ourselves the truths that became reality a long time ago in the West. I have in mind certain principles for human beings living together, the system of relations between the state and the citizen, the individual and the society, the consumer and producer, and so forth. Do you have your own concept of a rule-of-law state or are we to create one by borrowing Western models?

[Yakovlev] It is useful to learn from others but we have to act here and not there. We really do not have a concept developed in detail. But traditionally two methods are possible for distribution of rights in the society.

The first consists in the notion that all rights are concentrated above—with the monarch (tyrant, dictator...). He delegates a certain portion of his rights to those below him, for instance, the provincial governors, who transfer a small share to the local areas—village constables or elders. And the peasant is left with very few rights. Incidentally, this is precisely the scheme from which the rights and authority of the Union, republics, local soviets, and, finally, the citizens are formulated.

The second path is this. All rights belong to the citizen and only to him. Consequently, the point of departure for discussions is radically different. The sovereign, that is, the bearer of the highest power, is chosen by the people. This means that the citizen has the right to do anything that does not interfere with the same freedom of others. But there are some things he may not do. For example, build a road in a city. Then he says: "I will elect

a local self-management organ." The local soviet, considering what he has done for the happiness of others, says: "We will build a road in the city but we cannot build one between cities. Therefore we transfer the right to solve these problems to the scale of the rayon and oblast above." But there are also issues which cannot be resolved through the forces of the oblast either, and so the oblast transfers this part of its authority to the republic which, in turn, says: "I cannot solve the problem of the country's defense capability and the management of all the railroads. I will transfer this above, to the Union." I do not think there is any need to explain the fundamental difference between these two concepts.

It is simply necessary to measure everything that is going on in our country now according to elementary democratic principles already known to mankind.

There is no need to be afraid of the lack of a structured system. Life itself will show the diversity of structures in a rule-of-law state. I am confident that in the Baltic republics there will be one concept, in Central Asia—another, and in Moldavia—some kind of different concept. What will we have in Russia? We shall see.

[Skvortsova] But nonetheless I think that an overall concept is still necessary. It should include all the best that has been achieved by Russian philosophical thought. Our traditions of seeking spiritual freedom have always been very strong.

[Yakovlev] And this, incidentally, is our salvation.

[Skvortsova] Many models for the construction of a democratic society have been developed in Russia. Excellent thinkers have engaged this issue especially. They had a wonderful knowledge of the history of their people, the development of the economy.... Can it be true that nothing from this spiritual wealth can be invested in a rule-of-law state?

[Yakovlev] We have been left an invaluable treasure house in the area of the spirit. And here again, out of custom, we are trying to devalue it. And yet this should become the spiritual food of the generation. Where do people speak, for example, about Berdyayev? In the VUZ [higher educational institution]? No, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA talks about him. But why is Berdyayev not included in the courses in training programs. Because again we are waiting for directives concerning this to be handed down from above.

To be sure, we must not forget that there is an extremely large middle area between the idea of freedom and the reality of being free—the area of social action. How frequently the noblest and the most freedom-loving ideas are transformed into their opposite in practice! Therefore while rejoicing in the great spiritual force mastered by the best Russian philosophers, we must not forget that in Russian social practice the skills of constructive social action were inadequately developed. Although there has been this kind of experience in Russia. Above all, the

work of our first parliament, the state Duma. Then there was the experience in the operation of a multiparty system (before the revolution there were about 20 political parties in the country). Any bits of experience in this area should be collected, analyzed, and used for the good of the people and democracy.

[Skvortsova] Speaking about emancipation of the individual, we have not yet considered this problem from the standpoint of economic reforms and legislative acts. But a person and his spirit cannot be forced into the crowded framework of a law. The law is far from the only or an adequate way of keeping man's dark side in check. We must not rely on the law to play some kind of decisive role in the life of the society. Legal experts themselves assert that the law is only a dwarf on the shoulders of a giant. And this giant is the morality and culture of a given society. The philosophy, psychology, and practice of totalitarian force, which has prevailed in our country for a long time, have had a strong disintegrating effect on public morale. Remember the Leningrad television program in which people imagined themselves in the role of a hangman? Of course, it was only their imagination—they do not know what it is to kill a person, even on an order from the court. It is terrible that these people are not even ashamed to admit their **readiness** to kill a person (even if he is a criminal).

The morality and culture of a society comprise the third "buttress" without which it is impossible to fully liberate the human being from all kinds of bondage. In your opinion, what forces in society will help to raise us to our previous level of spirituality?

[Yakovlev] In the first place, those who have provided and are providing us with models of spiritual resoluteness—Likhachev, Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn.... Everywhere where we see appeals for mercy, for mutual understanding, for building—there one can hope that the morality of society will gradually begin to heal its wounds and grow healthy tissue. In the second place, all kinds of social associations which give impetus to the regeneration of culture. For example, the Ilya Chavchavadze society—an association of Georgian intellectuals. They are quite capable of raising national culture to its previous level.... Third, of course, there is the church. Only it is capable of protecting us from the temptation of the devil—and it is with us (Nechayev's example, in spite of Dostoyevskiy's warning). And it might seem like a tragedy when young people inspired by a holy idea decide that it is possible to hate in the name of the fight against evil.

When fighting a dragon make sure that you have not grown a tail yourself.

Academy Member Analyzes Ecological Problems

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[Article by Vladimir Kotlyakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR people's deputy: "Geographical Aspects of New Thinking"]

[Text] Without waiting for favors from nature, we have been taking everything possible and impossible from her for decades. Nature responds by degrading to an extent which borders on disaster. If only one of its components is violated or seriously altered, the others become caught up in a chain reaction. Unless such "reactions" are nipped in the bud, the degradation processes will gather momentum, and then it will be very difficult to struggle against the transformation of once prosperous regions into technologically produced deserts.

As we approach the end of the 20th century, mankind has begun to realize the transitory nature of its existence. An understanding of the possibility of its destruction as a result of a nuclear war has come as a shock. Today, however, an ecological threat is no less imminent. The irreversible degradation of the environment is leading to a degeneration of mankind. The course of historical development has confronted society and every human individual on our earth with the need to work out a new type of thinking which will apply to the planet as a whole.

Back in the eighties, we only spoke about the emergence of an ecological crisis on our planet in terms of symptoms such as the reduction of areas covered by vegetation, which alters the interaction of the earth's surface with the flow of solar energy and leads to a deterioration of gas exchange; the drying up and erosional destruction of the territory; the exhaustion of mineral reserves and traditional energy sources; environmental pollution; and, finally, a violation of the quasi-stationary state of the ice caps, violation which has numerous negative consequences on a global scale.

Today, there are no longer any doubts that such a crisis is brewing, and this is manifested in a sharp deterioration of living conditions in some areas and on the earth as a whole. The anthropogenic contribution to the circulation of carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulphur has reached and in some places even exceeded the level of their natural circulation. The greater part of the dry land surface is being tilled and, not infrequently, irreversibly transformed by man.

Forests are being destroyed and deserts produced at a rapid pace. Deforestation is proceeding at the rate of 4 million hectares a year and the area covered by tropical rain forests—the planet's richest genetic fund—has already been reduced by one-half. Over the historical period, mankind has lost nearly 2 billion hectares of productive land, that is to say more than is now occupied by arable land (1.5 billion hectares) as a result of accelerated erosion and other negative processes. The present rate of desert formation is between 5 and 7 million hectares a year.

These processes have also been actively involving the territory of our country. In particular, the development of the USSR's water resources alone is responsible for the loss of about two percent of the country's territory which has been inundated, salinized, swamped, or over-dried. Approximately another six percent is in a critical

state. If the rate of the USSR's economic development remains the same or, especially, if it intensifies, by the years 2110-2020 the specific economic burden on the territory of the European USSR will have become between three and three and one-half times greater than in the present-day FRG and between two and two and one-half times greater than in present-day Japan. The answers to the questions of how these burdens should be distributed and how the territory should be prepared for them depend, to a large extent, on geographers.

The contamination of air, water, land, and foodstuffs constitutes a major problem. The mechanisms of propagation of pollutions are described by geographical laws, by the laws of atmospheric circulation, global and regional moisture circulation, and local concentrations of the pollution which are connected with the characteristics of the earth's relief and the location of towns, and by the laws of the geographical division of labor. It is impossible to understand the mechanism of generation [of pollutions] and find a protection from them unless we know the fundamental laws which govern the development of the biosphere and of geographical systems.

Neither the tasks and place of geography in discussing and resolving ecological problems nor the weight of strictly ecological problems in geographical science have been fully understood yet. However, the idea of bringing the interaction between society and the environment into harmony demands that the nature of the globe and of human society be regarded as that of an integral system possessing a specific property—spatial orderliness which is the subject matter of precise geographical science.

Geography's strong point lies in the fact that its two main branches—physical (natural) and socioeconomic (social)—are equal in rights, influence one another, and are even interwoven. This feature enables precisely geographical science to study the most involved problem of human ecology in all its completeness.

As recently as in the fifties, an opinion prevailed in geography to the effect that, by using its own specific means and methods, it may throw enough light on the laws of development of the natural environment without turning to the problems of human society or civilization. However, the situation began to change in the sixties. Man does not simply live in nature, he gradually replaces its natural elements and objects by artificial ones. The main object of geography—the geographical shell—no longer exists in its initial form, just as there are virtually no natural landscapes or natural geosystems left. All of them have been altered by man, to one degree or another, and we are now dealing with natural-anthropogenic and natural-technological geosystems.

The problems of interaction between society and nature have philosophical, socioeconomic, bioecological, geographical, and technological aspects. The notion of social ecology has been introduced to designate a science dealing with the natural environment which surrounds

society. It is said that this science studies the objects of "secondary" nature, including that which has been created by man—cities, dams, canals, road networks, and so on. The existence of this man-made "secondary" nature is precisely what generates the ecological problems which are confronting society.

Social ecology identifies artificial elements within the environment and analyzes them against the background of and in their interrelation with natural elements and processes. Sometimes, social ecology also begins to play the role of a kind of ideology: Models of behavior, guidelines, and directives are proposed in its name which lay claim to the role of an ideology and which mankind must allegedly adopt without delay in order to avoid an ecological disaster. Ecology perceived as an ideology is sometimes contrasted with Marxism, which supposedly lacks ecological realism.

It may be stated that all the problems which civilization encounters in the process of its interaction with nature are essentially ecological. At the same time, these problems are also social because they give rise, first and foremost, to socioeconomic difficulties. They are rooted in geography—the shortage of energy sources and of natural resources and a deterioration of the environment on specific territories.

A significant obstacle to the development of geographical science in the USSR has long been its excessive ideologization, something which is also characteristic of our entire life, and this was an expression of the domination of the class approach over universal human values. An indirect result of this has been excessive and often scholastic theorizing in isolation from our country's specific sociocultural and economic problems, and the virtual resignation of a broad circle of geographers from resolving acute tasks of protecting nature and ethnocultural and ethnic problems.

The ideologization of geography was expressed in various forms. This science suffered terrible damage during the period from the thirties to the fifties, when struggle was conducted against various "idealistic" trends. The fundamental conceptions of the geographical shell were declared to be scholastic and man was represented as being opposed to nature in every way. Anthropogeography and demography (the latter having had close ties with geography) were crushed and political geography was strangled at birth.

A deintellectualization of science was the consequence of such an approach—in many respects, geography in the USSR began to lag sharply behind the world level. The shifting of the studies into the channel of pseudo-efficiency and incorrectly understood topicality was detrimental to the culture of scientific work and promoted an alienation of geography from the family of fundamental sciences. "Information" for centralized management and recommendations for specific projects have been the sole result of such studies.

In the not so remote past, we considered the State Planning Committee, the State Committee for Science and Technology, ministries, departments, regional authorities, or even individual design institutes at the State Committee for Construction or at the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources to be exponents of our society's ideas and will. Today, there is no need to prove that these organizations are not the only ones which are pursuing the aims of society. In the future, we will have to draw up our plans proceeding from the diversity of social interests, to propose and analyze alternative decisions, and to make more extensive use of open discussions of topical problems.

The state of the environment depends to a large extent on the actions of mankind. Evidently, we may expect an intensification of this trend in the future. V.I. Vernadskiy's assumption to the effect that the global ecological system of "nature-society" can no longer develop spontaneously is seen to be justified. Some adjusting and regulating actions are necessary to guarantee the survival of nature and mankind, actions which may be taken only provided the complex intermingling of the processes in global and regional natural-anthropogenic geosystems is understood.

Future global "reason" cannot be purely "technocratic" or primitively "scientific." Its basis must inevitably contain first, the imperative of humanitarian thinking and second, that of precisely geographical thinking adapted to the individual characteristics both of the earth as a planetary whole and of its separate zones, regions, and landscapes. No sensible choice of managerial decisions is conceivable unless it is based on an extensive knowledge of the dynamics of natural processes, their anthropogenic transformations, the territorial distribution of resources, population and production dynamics, the limits of the stability of natural, technogenic, and social territorial systems, and their combination in space.

At present, as the processes of perestroika inevitably undergo radicalization, not only a fundamental change in attitudes to geographical science is necessary, but also a change in the disproportion which has taken shape in our country between the natural-historical and social trends in geography. We used to account for the more extensive development of social geography in other countries by pointing to the requirements of the market, profit, competition, and social inequality. However, the increasing role of social scientific studies has now become obvious in our country too, because our main concerns include the creation of commodity-market relations and a sharp enhancement of the economy's social orientation in the new conditions of a federation, mixed economy, and diverse forms of ownership.

Much attention should be given, on the one hand, to offering a profound geographical justification of the legislative acts being adopted and, on the other hand, to geographical forecasting of the consequences of implementing the new laws. Even at this stage, it is necessary

to study the possible ecological, social, and political and geographical consequences of the adopted laws on ownership, land, and local self-government.

The need for a territorial and not only departmental approach to the planning and management of the national economy is now quite clearly understood. As a specific type of spatial arrangement of resources, the territory is now becoming more valuable than natural-material resources. Natural resources may be replaced one way or another or their loss may be compensated for, but territory is an exhaustible and irretrievable resource. It cannot be replaced by anything. It is impossible to put into effect such a territorial approach or the striving to coordinate the planning for branches of the industry and for regions unless we take account of geographical factors. However, even this approach to territory in terms of resources and the economy is inadequate. Any territory is an arena of life for people who have their own social, cultural, national, and spiritual interests, needs, and attachments.

Numerous examples of irrational and even erroneous economic organization of territory and of the exploitation of natural resources convincingly show that it would have been possible to reduce or avoid many dangerous negative consequences with the help of existing knowledge and an active civic stand on the part of geographers. It must be said, for the sake of fairness, that in a number of cases the perseverance of scientists has made it possible to prevent the implementation of dangerous projects such as the construction of a hydroelectric power station on the lower reaches of the Ob river or of a Caucasian mountain-pass railroad. We may also recall the geographers' desperate though unsuccessful attempts to influence the top-level decisions on the large-scale opening up of virgin lands and the construction of polluting enterprises on Lake Baykal. However, science had also sanctioned short-sighted decisions which were conducive to ecological calamities: These include the excessive accretion of irrigated areas, which has led to the drying up of the Aral sea, the construction of major canals which has led to the degradation of land, and the building of the Leningrad Dam and other structures of this type.

Times are different now and so is the attitude to the positions of science. However, the tasks are becoming increasingly complicated. The resolution of many acute ecological and social problems is impossible without a deepening of the foundation for long-term planning, the modelling of multicomponent geosystems and the spatial interrelations between them, or the conducting of studies at macroregional and global levels. Special attention must be given to studies of the interactions between geosystems, especially interregional ones, which include atmospheric transfer across borders, drainage in borderland river basins, various migrations, and so on. Special attention to these natural processes is necessary because the situation within our federation and within neighboring states is changing and we can no longer rely on neighborly "universal forgiveness."

The need is arising to intensify the theoretical and especially the methodological and systematic potential of Soviet geographical science, a potential which enables it, as it also enables the geographies of a number of developed countries, to raise and resolve the most complicated multicomponent problems with regard to the state of the environment, territorial aspects of socioeconomic development, and interrelations between natural conditions, the economy, culture, health, and the social well-being of man. At the same time, we are confronted by the problem of actively involving geographical science in the resolution of numerous practical tasks of remaking society at a stage of its development which is so difficult and so rich in events.

I would like to list four of the central problems of contemporary geographical science which emphasize the priority of universal human values and the humanist principles of the interrelation between society and nature.

1. Organization of the geographical shell and its components and the internal and external interactions between natural and social structures.

We are now dealing with complex integral geosystems and with an intermingling of natural processes and all types of human activity. New objects, including global ones, have emerged within the geographical shell: oil films in oceans, aerosol clouds in the atmosphere, synanthropic animal and plant populations, and mutants. New processes and flows of matter have formed within the geospheres: anthropogenic geochemical migration, erosion, formation of deserts, and others. New mechanisms for interaction between different components have emerged which, in addition to their local occurrence (anthropogenic elements of water and biological cycles), also have new chains of ties supported by man.

Hence the task of creating, on the basis of the classical conceptions of V.I. Vernadskiy, A.A. Grigoryev, and L.S. Berg and, at the same time, proceeding from new empirical evidence and new methodological approaches, a theory of the structure and development of the geographical shell in contemporary socioeconomic, scientific-technological, demographic, and ecological conditions. Special attention must be given to the geographical aspects of contemporary global processes, in particular to studies of local and regional disproportions and to the elaboration of recommendations with regard to their prevention at precritical and preglobal stages.

Evolutional analysis of the geographical shell presupposes studying its development within a macrocycle with a duration of about 100,000 years (the recent interglacial period, the glaciation, and the postglacial period). It has to be noted that, proceeding from the most recent conceptions of the theory of catastrophes, the universal conception of cyclicity turns out to be inadequate for forecasting the "natural" future which is awaiting us. It is very important to determine the place of the present period against the background of long-term climatic

fluctuations and to study their causes and the functional role played in them by the natural "atmosphere-land-ocean-glaciation" system. One of the urgent tasks amounts to learning how to differentiate, on the basis of paleographic, historical, and instrumental observations, between the natural historical and anthropogenic factors of changes in the geographical shell, and then study and forecast them separately.

2. Territorial organization of the life of society and its dynamics.

People are now becoming increasingly aware of the unity of universal human problems, and more attention is being paid to major regional studies and projects—concerning Europe as a whole, the Asiatic-Pacific region, and the North [Arctic Region] as a world phenomenon, that is to say to those territories where questions of economic and political integration and the expansion of international cooperation are particularly acute. Interest is shown in geopolitical models of the past and present. A geographical validation is being elaborated for the economic principles of integration, the formation of new markets, active changes in the territorial division of labor, reconstruction of the economy, and the drawing in of new territories.

There is sharply growing interest in social aspects of life, problems of the social inequality of different regions, ethnic problems, and the role of religious beliefs in ethnocultural differentiation and regional conflicts. At last, the thesis of our economy's unique and matchless development is being dropped, and a chance and urgent need have now emerged to master the theoretical principles of world socioeconomic geography and to conduct specific comparative geographical evolutionary studies which will make it possible to objectively assess the place of the USSR in the world community, to better understand our specific features, and to foresee prospects for the future.

The development of market relations will inevitably be accompanied by changes in the territorial structure of economic regions; an important place in the formation of the latter will be occupied by economic levers and not by the administrative command principles of construction of territorial production complexes. All this will require an accelerated investigation of the previously ignored spatial differentiation and integration of market processes, and of the efficiency of combinations of various forms of ownership depending on the particular location.

Whereas Western geography has, for a long time and quite constructively, participated in regional planning, programming, and management, regional economic geographical studies in our country have largely been quite abstract in character and their results have resembled recommendations issued for departmental organs of management. There are now grounds to believe that once local organs of management acquire economic independence, the possibilities for regional planning in the

USSR will become more realistic and interest in economic geographical investigations more specific.

The shift of the economy and social policy toward the interests of man imparts unprecedented acuteness to the need to create a strong social geography. This is a branch [of science] in which we have been particularly far below the theoretical and empirical level of world science. Today, we do not know the pattern of spatial differentiation between social prosperity and unhappiness: the level of the population's income and expenditure, the quality of living accommodation, provision with long-term facilities, the level and typology of crime, alcoholism, and drug addiction, the level of medical, cultural, and consumer services, the state of the population's health, and so on. One should not forget that such studies must not only encompass the population as a certain statistical series but also assess the quality of the living conditions of individual social strata and groups.

We must also think about renewing political geography in the USSR. The principles of the Soviet federation and local government are now taking shape, and this invalidates the previously adopted elaboration of "regional aspects of the realization of political decisions." More and more new forces are emerging in the political arena, political activity is intensifying rapidly, and a multiparty system is taking shape. In conditions of acute interethnic conflicts, the critical state of the economy, and an increase in localistic tendencies, there is a real threat of dangerous destabilization in the country. Geographic studies of these sociopolitical problems must help us understand the specific nature of the situation in particular regions and reveal its deep-seated roots.

3. Natural and socioeconomic causes and mechanisms of the emergence of global and regional geoeconomic problems.

The possibility of optimizing the interrelations between society and nature depends on overcoming those serious contradictions which have emerged and are on the rise between the natural and social components of the contemporary geographical shell. When reading publications, one often comes across a thesis about the need to attain harmony between society and nature. Evidently, such a state [of harmony] may be regarded as an inevitable alteration of nature by man of a kind which leaves inviolate nature's ability to reproduce conditions which are acceptable for the existence of man himself as a biological species. However, is it possible to attain such a state, by what means, and by imposing what restrictions?

The resolution of the problems of harmonizing the interaction between society and man is associated, first and foremost, with the optimization of relations between the natural and social components of the landscape shell. Like any optimization of a multiplicity of interacting variables, it requires the setting of optimization criteria, which will be used as a basis to determine restrictions on

the admissible values of the variables. How is this to be done? If one proceeds from the unconditional demand to preserve (or restore) peoples' health (which is now a major issue in many countries of the world and in a number of regions of our country), then it is necessary either to limit the economic variable, that is to say to slow down the rate of economic development without changing existing technology for exploiting natural resources or to change the technology itself. This requires huge economic and other social resources.

The above contradiction confronts our science with a most important and purely geographical question: In order to achieve a concurrent development of nature and society, to what extent and by what means can we exploit nature exclusively through their rational territorial organization?

Ecology is also presenting geography with a number of other topical challenges: To give an assessment of the negative and positive results of interaction between society and nature in specific regions, to elaborate forecasts for the changes in integral geosystems, to propose scientifically validated recommendations for their regulation, to study and predict the consequences of implementing major economic projects, and to find ways of preserving the ability of geosystems to maintain their resources and reproduce the environment.

There exists an erroneous tendency to reduce the range of the above problems to exclusively bioecological tasks. A truly ecological approach must be based on an analysis of the spatial structure of the environment, that is to say it must also embrace geographical science.

Let us take, for example, the water resources of dry land. It is very important to treat the hydrological system, like the climatic one, as a complex system of reservoirs, channels, and waters distributed in the soil and in the biota and to regard it together with the characteristics of other components of natural and technological geosystems which influence these waters and are dependent on them.

Then, the management of water resources must also be based on a theory about such a broadly understood hydrological system, and management's prime concern must not be gigantic redistributions of flow but, first and foremost, control of the processes in local hydrological systems—changing the filtration, rationing irrigation, practicing forest reclamation, economizing water consumption, adapting the economy to surpluses or shortages of water, changing water purification methods, banning emergency discharges of waste products into rivers, creating receptacles for such discharges, and so on.

The difficulties which are involved in resolving these and many other questions are due to the insufficient elaboration of principles for determining the stability of geosystems, methods for a comprehensive assessment of the anthropogenic influence on the natural component, and criteria and methods for an assessment of the quality

of geosystems in terms of peoples' living conditions. This problem is far from simple. The point is that the criterion of the "admissibility" of anthropogenic burdens on the natural component is established by society, but even if we do determine the values of admissible burdens, this will not yet resolve the problem. The main thing depends on resolving the issue of whether or not such norms should be adhered to. This issue, in turn, is determined by the goals and possibilities of society at a specific stage of its development. Besides, in the case of vast territories, the problem of determining "admissible" anthropogenic burdens has already become meaningless. These territories have been altered to such an extent that we must now look for ways to return them to a state acceptable for human life. Let us recall the ecological disasters in the Aral region and in Chernobyl, and what has happened to 80 percent of the tilled land in some areas of the European part of the USSR and to 25,000 ponds and reservoirs in the Dnieper basin, and so on.

The crux of the matter lies in the fact that technologies must be ecologically sound and compatible with the conditions prevailing in the biosphere. Evidently, society has been confronted with the problem of changing priorities for the sake of its own development in all its magnitude. The ecological imperative is coming to the fore. It will lead to a perestroika of the goals of social development proceeding from the principles of a coevolution of nature and society, that is to say to an ecological revolution.

Hence, geography is faced with the task of participating in the elaboration of approaches to the formation of a "new" nature which will be suitable for human life and for the development of society in specific regions and will, at the same time, conform to the criteria of stability of the entire biosphere.

Among the priority tasks which may contribute to resolving this problem is that of dividing the territory of the USSR into zones in terms of the resistance of geosystems to the effect of local combinations of natural and anthropogenic factors, and also that of elaborating a conception and methodology for preparing maps of acute ecological situations for the country as a whole and for its individual regions.

A special task lies in revealing the factors and mechanisms responsible for the formation and mutual dependence of regional and global geoecological problems. It is necessary to assess the contribution of the environmental changes in individual regions of the earth to global changes in the biosphere.

4. Development of geographical foundations of the theory of exploitation of natural resources and of the principles of regulating mixed natural and anthropogenic geosystems.

Active participation in the elaboration of ecologically suitable technologies for exploiting natural resources is among geography's urgent tasks. In order to resolve this task, it is necessary to generalize the experience of rational utilization of natural resources which has been

accumulated in various regions over historical time, for example, the experience of the use of biological resources by the peoples of the North, terrace farming in Dagestan, the soil fertility reproduction system of farming used in the Baltic region, various sociocultural restrictions imposed on the utilization of natural resources, and so on. It cannot be ruled out that these devices, in spite of their lack of coordination, could be used in the future system of ecologically justifiable or, as we tend to say, rational utilization of natural resources. It is also important to become familiar with the experience, accumulated in advanced countries, of shaping a new environment in which the contradictions between socioeconomic and natural units of geosystems are reduced to a minimum.

Unfortunately, the tension associated with regional ecological problems is not abating in our country. These problems imply situations in which environmental changes in one region or another are hazardous for human health and life, for the development of the economy, and for the ability of natural complexes to play the role of systems which reproduce resources and the environment and which safeguard the genetic fund.

Every regional problem is unique. It needs to be studied separately and requires that a specialized set of measures be devised for preventing, eliminating, weakening, and compensating for undesirable changes. It is necessary to specify ways for individual regions of the USSR to resolve the acutest ecological problems, regions such as the Arctic Region, Central Asia, the Aral, Caspian, and Black Sea basins, the Baikal-Amur railway zone, and others.

The most acute problem of the Aral region and in a number of our country's other regions indicates that it is time to introduce the notions of ecological emergency and ecological disaster zones into science and into the practice of economic management. Territory on which natural processes and ecological ties have been violated to such a great extent that this has resulted in severe environmental degradation and the population has been deprived of the possibility of living and engaging in economic life in a normal manner must be categorized as a region of ecological emergency. An ecological disaster zone is that territory on which degradation has become irreversible and has rendered human existence impossible. The Aral region is at present an ecological emergency zone. Urgent measures are needed to prevent it from turning into a zone of ecological disaster.

In order to comprehend the sources and the mechanism of ecological problems in individual regions, we have to revise the place and the role of man in the contemporary environment. This is not so easily done. It is worth recalling that our traditional conceptions have taken shape in the conditions of the Siberian and Central Asiatic expanses and have developed on the basis of servicing extensive strategies of economic management. The notion of "opening up" a territory was a leading category in these strategies, and set against nature was a

featureless mass of people—"labor resources" which had, as we have written, to master nature by way of "locating industries and the population."

The territorial expansion of our "monopolies"—the numerous ministries—presents another danger. Let me give an example. A movement for banning nuclear power engineering is gathering momentum in the European part of our country. It may be assumed that the Ministry of Atomic Power, while agreeing to reduce the construction of nuclear power stations in the European USSR, will try to sharply increase such construction in the country's northern regions. The large proportion of temporary nonindigenous residents among the population there, its low density, and the underdeveloped nature of the mass media predetermine weaker resistance on the part of public opinion to ecologically dangerous projects.

This is why it is extremely important, even at this stage, to think over a just legal system which will guarantee protection for the interests of the indigenous population of these regions, especially of the small peoples residing in the Arctic Region, Siberia, and the Far East. Generally speaking, the North numbers among those territories where the level of social life is directly dependent on the state of the environment, an environment which not infrequently deteriorates catastrophically as a result of a voluntaristic departmental offensive against the delicate Arctic nature. It must be added to this that whereas, as a rule, scientific and technical progress brings a new quality of life to the bulk of the population, in the case of small peoples it not infrequently causes suffering. However, the progress of mankind cannot be achieved if the price is imposing hardships on individual peoples. A system of measures must be worked out which would help extend the advantages of civilization to the northern peoples but would, at the same time, protect them from undesirable manifestations of the scientific-technological revolution.

One of the necessary elements of a long-term strategy for preserving the earth as a live system involves studying the ways in which society perceives the current global and regional changes and determining the possibility of regulating these changes or of adapting to them (or a combination of both).

Comprehensive geographical forecasting of [the consequences of] the exploitation of natural resources is a matter of independent significance. It is necessary to narrow down the range of uncertainty in the assessment of the future state of mixed natural and anthropogenic geosystems, to determine the amplitudes of their potential, even if hardly probable states, and to specify the limits of our influence upon nature, beyond which any consequences of its alteration become equally probable.

When we analyze geosystems, we frequently talk about the problems of controlling them. It will perhaps be more accurate to speak not about controlling them but, by analogy with the economy, about regulating their

changes through actions which are not so much those of control as of "guidance," such as, for example, measures for restoring forests, consolidating deserts, and so on. The package of laws on the protection and restoration of the environment as a human habitat and as a medium for the utilization of natural resources should be placed in the category of "guiding" measures.

As the practice of the past two decades has shown, scientific forecasting and assessment of, for example, the future of the Aral and Caspian seas and of the pollution in cotton growing regions have not been keeping pace with the increasing acuteness of these problems. In practical terms, this means that we have been moving in the dark.

Among the causes for the growing ecological degradation are the concept of extensive development of the national economy, the domination of departmentalism, the actions of incompetent officials who created those bastions of the administrative command system which have not been overcome to this day, and the legal deprivation and economic poverty of the soviets of people's deputies—the country's constitutional masters.

The further progress of Soviet society is impossible without a radical change in ecological policy. However, I am sure that the problems of ecology cannot be resolved unless radical political and economic reforms are implemented. An important role here will belong to the geographical aspects of the new thinking which are capable of making their own contribution to guaranteeing our country's stable ecological future.

Establishment of New Peace Institute Assessed

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[MEMO interview with Professor Aleksandr Konstantinovich Kislov, doctor of historical sciences, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Peace Institute: "A New Institute in the System of the USSR Academy of Sciences"]

[Text] On 15 November 1988, the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences adopted the resolution to "Transform the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council for Research on Problems of Peace and Disarmament, the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace into the USSR Academy of Sciences Peace Institute." In May 1990, Professor Aleksandr Konstantinovich Kislov, doctor of historical sciences, was elected director of this institute. Our journal has requested him to answer a number of questions concerning the tasks facing the new institute.

[MEMO] Aleksandr Konstantinovich, what was the reason for transforming the Scientific Council for

Research into Problems of Peace and Disarmament into the Peace Institute (IMAN)? Why was it not possible, as before, to entrust the Scientific Council with the implementation of the same tasks relating to the organization of scientific endeavors on problems of peace and disarmament and also with the establishment of appropriate contacts with influential foreign scientific circles, particularly given the fact that, during the years of its activity, this council had acquired a certain prestige not only among Soviet but also international scientists?

[Kislov] There are several reasons why this was done. One can highlight the following: First, the somewhat amorphous structure of the Scientific Council itself could no longer meet the demands being made upon it by our rapidly changing times which present us with new problems literally every day; second, from the point of view of establishing contacts with influential foreign scientific and political circles, the form of an institute was considered to be preferable as it corresponded more to the practice of scientific research which has evolved in this sphere abroad where there are over 300 different institutes conducting research into the problems of peace; finally, it is also of significance that the Peace Institute is purely an academic establishment whereas many of our potential colleagues in the West viewed the Scientific Council as an organization connected with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and, hence, more as a propaganda than scientific body.

[MEMO] What will be the structure of this institute? Should it copy the usual structure of an academic institute with its permanent staff, be it large or small, and its fairly rigid system of departments and sectors, or should it assume the highly flexible organizational forms which predominate in foreign scientific-research centers?

[Kislov] It has been decided to base its structure on the second variant, as it is envisaged that IMAN will have a very small staff (approximately 15 people); the World Economics and International Relations Institute (IMEMO) will be entrusted with ensuring its scientific, organizational, and economic activities and the institute's research work will be conducted primarily on a contractual basis.

In this connection, it must be emphasized that this idea was far from being immediately and unanimously received. Thus, for example, it did not seem wholly comprehensible to certain scientific workers at the USSR GKNT why the USSR Academy of Sciences had requested such a small staff and for this reason (there were also others) the institute's legalization was delayed for a certain time. As a result, it was only on 26 December 1989 that comrade N.I. Ryzhkov signed the appropriate decree of the USSR Council of Ministers.

[MEMO] What criteria formed the basis for determining the immediate lines of activity of IMAN?

[Kislov] We are proceeding from the fact that, on account of its structure and, more specifically, its ability to attract a very wide range of specialists on a contractual

basis, the institute is able to organize and conduct extremely varied research for the elaboration of which it is enlisting the services not only of colleagues from IMEMO but also, when necessary, natural scientists and representatives of exact sciences.

In planning the institute's immediate lines of activity, we have tried, at the same time, to concentrate our attention, first and foremost, upon those acute and topical problems to which other institutes, primarily those in our department, have not yet been able to give due attention, for one reason or another, in spite of their great importance. In May 1989, the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences adopted a resolution in which IMAN's immediate lines of activity were determined as the practical organization of research which is to be conducted in the following areas:

- the conversion of military production into civil production;
- problems of all-embracing international security, including its ecological aspects;
- analysis of ideological trends, public opinion and the alignment of sociopolitical forces on problems of peace and disarmament, and the role of social movements and political forces which are participating in the struggle for peace and their influence on the adoption of foreign-policy decisions.

Of course, even at the very first stage of its activity, IMAN will not limit itself solely to these lines of research. As it seems to us, the political regulation of regional conflicts and possibly other subjects should also occupy a prominent place in our research.

[MEMO] Could you not dwell in more detail on IMAN's immediate lines of activity which you have mentioned?

[Kislov] To begin with, let us look at conversion. I believe that the principle objects of research in this sphere are problems such as an assessment of world experience in this area which we should make use of in our own practice, and participation in the comprehensive scientific study of problems relating to the conversion of military production, first and foremost those connected with the mechanism of conversion. Evidently, of all these questions the following require the most detailed attention:

- the study of principles, forms, methods, and mathematical models (both on micro- and macro-levels) for converting the defense industry, taking into account the country's political, military, and national economic interests and proceeding from the planned reductions in the volume of output of armaments and military hardware and expenditure for conducting Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work;
- research into the mechanism of cutting back on military production, structural perestroika of military enterprises, and the remodeling of sectors of the

defense industry in the interests of the national economy, including highly acute social aspects of this problem;

- the substantiation of what can be made able for conversion, and proposals for the effective utilization of construction and production capacities which are being released.

IMAN's research workers and the scientists whom we have attracted have already carried out specific work on this line of research. They have taken an active part in the preparation of a most important document—the State Program for the Conversion of the Defense Industry for the Period up to 1995—which is now in the final stages. The institute was one of the active founders of the Soviet National Commission for Assistance With Conversion with which the closest cooperation has now been established. Considerable attention is being given and will continue to be given to the problem of conversion in IMAN's publications, in particular, in its periodical publication "Paths Toward Security."

The accomplishment of the organization of IMAN will also enable us, *de jure*, to set about practically implementing one other commission of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, namely, the creation of a laboratory incorporating different branches of science for the comprehensive scientific study of the problems of converting military production into civilian production and models which will enable us to guarantee the most effective implementation of such conversion.

[MEMO] As is well known, as early as the third special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, the Soviet delegation spoke in favor of holding an international meeting on conversion in the USSR in 1990. The preparations for holding the UN international conference on conversion in the USSR this year are now entering their final phase. The United Nations attaches great importance to this conference and considers it to be the most important forum of its kind to be held under the aegis of the United Nations in 1990. Will IMAN take part in this conference?

[Kislov] The success of the conference would make a serious contribution to international security and economic growth. It is precisely because of this that we are most actively participating in the preparation of this conference; apart from anything else, we feel that it will provide extensive opportunities for expanding existing contacts and establishing new ones with the most distinguished foreign scientists who are working in this sphere. IMAN has already established and is now expanding its ties with a number of corresponding American scientific centers (for example, the Council of Economic Priorities) with which it has reached agreement on a joint research program.

[MEMO] What are the prospects for studying problems of all-embracing international security?

[Kislov] In organizing research into these problems, we intend to give special emphasis at this stage to their ecological aspects since it is precisely the state of the environment which is beginning to represent a major threat to the future existence of man as a biological species. Ecological security and the development of international cooperation on environmental protection are assuming ever increasing importance in the considerations of, first and foremost, the industrially developed countries of their global responsibility towards mankind as a whole. This problem is also assuming paramount importance in the context of the priority of universal human values in contemporary conditions.

In this line of research, IMAN together with the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, is creating a mechanism of international cooperation with leading scientists from a number of countries—the United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and several others—by initiating a series of international scientific research projects.

The first of these was signed by us in April 1989 with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute and the Center for Maritime Policy (the United States) and received the name "Ecological Security and the World Ocean: Analytical Approaches and Joint Decisions." The problem of financing this project has been practically solved today. The Soviet Peace Fund (which, in principle, has agreed to allocate approximately 90,000 rubles for the implementation of the project in 1990-1991) and the American MacArthur Fund (which has already allocated \$309,000 for this purpose) have shown great interest in participating in the project as sponsors.

Within the framework of the project, it is planned to prepare joint monographic research and also, in its concluding phase, to elaborate recommendations for the governmental organizations of both countries on the development of cooperation in this sphere.

The second project—"Toward Stable Security: Economics, Ecology, and Ethics for the World Community"—was signed in November 1989 with the Transnational Fund for Research Into Problems of Peace and the Future (Sweden) and the Pacific Institute for Research Into Problems of Development, the Environment, and Security (the United States). It is planned to implement this project over three years. From the Soviet side, the organization, financing, and implementation of the project will be conducted jointly with IMEMO.

The principle aim of this project is to conduct research into the problems of interrelations between economic development and the natural and cultural environment as one of the imperative conditions for the future development of human civilization, and to elaborate ecological and ethical bases for international relations and an international legal conception of the biosphere. The project has practical-scientific significance and is oriented toward preparing a "package" of proposals and recommendations in the context of preparation for the UN Conference on the Environment and Development

which is planned for 1992. During the implementation of the project, we plan to publish stage by stage materials dealing with separate aspects of the project. On completion of the work, these materials will be used in a monograph which, it is envisaged, will be published in Russian, English, and Swedish. Furthermore, some of the materials will be specially prepared for the 1992 UN conference. At present, the project is being financed mainly by the Swedish through budgeted government funds, and charities.

It is further envisaged that Soviet specialists will take part in the important international conference "Ecological Security in the Modern World" which should initiate the regular exchange of ideas between leading scientists and specialists who are researching a number of social aspects of global ecological problems. Agreement has been reached on this with Laval University (Canada). According to the published program, representatives of the most important scientific centers in the United States, Canada, the West European countries, and the USSR will take part in the conference.

Other possibilities are being investigated with regard to the participation of Soviet scientists in joint international scientific research projects. In particular, in 1989, in its plan of propaganda and elucidation of the USSR's peaceful foreign policy initiatives in the foreign scientific milieu, IMAN supported the creation of the commission "The Murmansk Initiative" whose tasks include promoting the establishment in scientific and political circles in the Arctic countries of the desire for unified efforts aimed at reducing military tension in the Arctic, creating a climate of trust, and proclaiming the nonnuclear status of individual regions, subregions, and territories in the Arctic. Within the framework of this commission is the organization of a seminar and an international conference on politics in the Arctic and also the exchange of scientists who are researching problems of the Arctic. Provisional agreement has been reached on the participation in this commission of McGill University (Canada) and also the Dartmouth College Arctic Research Institute and the Dick Fund for International Understanding (the United States).

In speaking about IMAN's international connections, I would particularly like to mention those extensive and fruitful contacts which we have established with the International Peace Institute in Vienna which has been rejuvenated, so to speak.

[MEMO] What do you see as being the principle tasks of the institute in the area of analysis of public opinion and alignment of sociopolitical forces on problems of peace?

[Kislov] On the one hand, it seems expedient to organize and conduct serious analytical research in this area, and on the other hand, to concentrate on those problems which, previously, were not the focus of our attention. For example, we should examine the position taken by church circles on the most acute contemporary problems as they are currently assuming a more influential role. At

the same time, in analyzing these problems, it is obvious that we should not limit ourselves solely to the situation existing in other countries but also examine new trends in the Soviet Union and the attitude of the Soviet public to these problems. In this respect, of course, we will have to work in closer contact with different Soviet public organizations.

[MEMO] Our editorial board and editor wish you and the USSR IMAN success in your scientific endeavors and we have no doubt that the new institute will, in the near future, make itself known as an authoritative research center. We count on further fruitful cooperation with you.

Economics

Impact of Government's Economic Reform Discussed

AU1309073190 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No.8, August 1990 (signed to press 17 July 90) page 132—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by L. Grigoryev: "The Government Program of 13 June"]

[Text] Let us recall the sequence of events which has developed of late with regard to economic reform as a whole and price reform in particular. During the recent period of acceleration, leading economists believed price reform to be necessary, but in view of indignation on the part of the public, it was stopped (others had vacillated). Since fall 1989, there has been talk of a transition to a planned market economy or, as was explained to us later, to a regulated market economy. In December, with great difficulty (and all its weight), the government pushed an emergency stabilization program through the Congress of People's Deputies. In January and February, the decline in production intensified, and it was clear that the program was not working. On 11 March 1990, the Council of Ministers passed a decree on preparing a new package of documents, and this was followed by two-and-a-half months of agonizing waiting for the conclusion of discussions in the Presidential Council.

Finally, on the morning of 24 May [1990], N.I. Ryzhkov spoke at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet about accelerating the transition to the market as planned in the previous December but with price reform built into the first stage. As of lunchtime that same day, there was panic on the last of the country's markets which was in any way stable—the Moscow market. On 13 June, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a decree presenting the government with a demand to rework the program and, by fall, to reach agreement with republican, autonomous, and local soviets. Thus, the program has been "put on hold" until a transition to market relations becomes its main component part. Five years after the start of perestroika, the government finally proposed a program

(good or bad) of movement toward a market. The public, however, continues to worry: Once again reform, once again scientifically grounded, and once again absolutely necessary, but why begin with stabilization plus price reform, from 1990 to 1991, and not introduce the market and destatization until 1991-1992?

What is panicking the population? After all, out of 200 billion rubles of additional receipts, the Ministry of Finance has promised to reimburse approximately 70 percent through various channels of compensation! Surely it cannot be the case that there are people who do not trust our Ministry of Finance? Or our State Committee for Prices [Goskomtsen]? Economists evidently agree that the structure of prices has become a brake on the country's development, irrespective of the crisis state of the economic mechanism as a whole. That structure must be changed, but the question remains as to what the price of reform itself will be. How do Goskomtsen and the Ministry of Finance intend to distribute the burdens of reform between social groups, regions, and so forth? The government report said nothing about this. The break with the existing structure and the appearance of prices between 10 and 15 percent of which are free prices and between 25 and 35 percent of which are regulated prices will lead to an inevitable burst of inflation, by comparison with which all price changes imposed from above will seem like a joke.

It is easy to calculate who will suffer: the majority of the urban population, who live on their salaries and have no access to other occupations; mass factory professional groups (particularly on account of accompanying inflation); and also all those whose pattern of consumption includes expensive commodities.

Burdens will fall on the intelligentsia and will tend to diffuse downward along the income scale. The basic mass of the population on average income (by our internal standards) will lose with regard to their level of consumption or will have to pay three times as much in order to maintain it. At the same time, price reform will reduce the potential purchasing power of savings.

On what conditions would the population be prepared to embark upon this "last sacrifice," especially that part of it which will suffer most? Perhaps in exchange for real economic reform and freedom of economic activity, accompanied by a gradual privatization of large-scale industry, sales of property, and so forth. Only then may enterprising people who know their business hope to compensate for lost income within a foreseeable period of time. Otherwise, we will simply be faced with consumption cuts in the name of reducing the state-budget deficit and presenting the government of N.I. Ryzhkov with a new period in which to consider reform.

Military

Lopatin Outlines Military Reform Concepts

90UM0857A Moscow ZNAMYA in Russian No 7, Jul 90 (signed to press 5 Jun 90) pp 147-159—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by USSR People's Deputy Vladimir Lopatin: "The Army and Politics"]

[Text] Brutal questions were born in the fire and blood of 1941 which to this day have not been fully answered: Why, after two months of combat, did the enemy stand at Moscow and Leningrad? Why did Hitler's forces cover more than 1,000 km from the border in the shortest time frame, completing 20 km spurts with every day? Military people know this is a very high rate of offensive. Why did we lose so many people in the first months of the war?

Hard questions, hard facts. Accustomed to reading about the heroic resistance of the Red Army—able to pulverize tremendous masses of German Armed Forces in spite of gigantic losses and in the final analysis stop their offensive, we are reinterpreting with difficulty the events of those days so terrible for the country.

All of this is so. Soviet soldiers exhibited heroism. There were heroic feats performed by pilots and infantrymen, sailors and tankers. We did indeed frustrate the plans of the Hitler blitzkrieg—lightning war—but the initial period of the war saw about 3.5 million of our soldiers and commanders taken prisoner. In essence, almost our entire army was captive!

The Army was not prepared for war. By the day of its onset a great number of our soldiers were discharged and the officers on leave. Military units were in summer camps and ammunition was locked up in depots. We did not expect war. At its very outset, therefore, the Western Front lost practically all its air assets, a tremendous number of tanks, and other combat equipment.

But why, why did we suffer such horrible losses? Why was our Army unprepared for war?

Without getting into subtle polemics on historical topics, I would propose a single—indisputable no less—answer to all these questions: The Red Army was crushed because it was poorly led. It was poorly led by young lieutenants promoted to colonel by the events of 1937, and by colonels promoted to general by the same force—since, according to the latest data, we lost 43,000 officers during the years of repression, and this figure more than doubled prior to June of 1941. About 1,800 generals were subject to repression, and surging to the positions vacated was a wave of people whose suitability for the military was often determined only by "party zeal" and "political vigilance." For example, in command of naval forces were the uneducated P.A. Smirnov and then

"Chekist" M.P. Frinovskiy—right out of Saltykov-Shchedrin: "Make me a censor—I will be a censor... I can be anything, I can even be commander of the frigate 'Pallada'..."

What saved the country was the people and, bitter as this might be to acknowledge, what saved the Stalinist leadership was the self-sacrifice and heroism of the disarmed soldier. How many times had this happened now in the country's history—that on the shoulders of the simple man lay a most awesome burden of responsibility for the mistakes of political leaders—who not only deprived the Army of its leaders but propagated a false concept, under those conditions, of offensive military strategy.

The contradictions of military theory of that day, designed to substantiate the offensive nature of a future war, brought about a whole number of distortions in the development of the military economy, in determining its priorities. Having about 23,000 tanks (1,860 of which were new varieties) and 35,500 aircraft (including 2,700 new varieties) by June of 1941, we created a cavalry at accelerated pace. From 1934 through 1939 the number of major cavalry units increased by a factor of 1.5, and just prior to the end of 1941, when it was clear this was a motorized war, another hundred cavalry divisions were formed. Funds spent on this were five times greater than what was expended on construction of the naval fleet.

The Army was deceived by the political leadership of the country, which criminally improperly selected cadre and interfered in the accomplishment of operational missions, and for this soldiers and commanders paid with their lives on the field of battle. Military scholar B.I. Gorev, who in the 30's developed an original theory of the mutual dependence of base and superstructure in the Army and fell into disgrace, warned: "As in society the superstructure sometimes lags behind the base, and production relations lag behind the development of the forces of production, likewise in the Army the organizational (tactics) and ideological (military theory) superstructure lags behind the base, i.e., the development of combat technology. As a result, in society you have revolutions, and in the military—combat catastrophe."

The origins of the tragedy of 1941 lie here. The origins of a shamefully huge number of combat losses also lie here. Like the origins of the war itself.

The June morning of 1941 which cost us so dearly is far behind us, in the haze of the past. But the past 50 years have not voided an old truth—that the strength of an army lies in its proper leadership. If this is observed—we will have the proper strategy, we will have high-quality weapons, we will have the necessary trained and qualified cadre, we will have victory.

But what is this factor—leadership of the Armed Forces?

Let us begin with fundamentals—what does leadership itself mean? Its various definitions given in a number of interpretative dictionaries come down to one thing: To

lead means to direct someone's activity, to constitute the motivating factor for someone's actions. But this is too general a concept, and I will attempt to give it concrete expression using the example of leadership and direction of the Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces comprise a portion of the state system. Their specialization consists in protecting the state from external threat and securing its internal stability under extreme circumstances. The union of two concepts—"leadership" and "army"—exists in the CPSU Program, and this is how it is interpreted there: "The absolute basis of military structuring is the CPSU leadership of the Armed Forces..." Everything is so, if you do not consider that the laws of formal logic are violated here. For if the Army is part of the state, then it must be led by the state in the entity of its highest organs of power—state, but in no way social—organs of power. We have barely taken just the first practical steps in this direction...

Prior to the beginning of perestroika, "the leading and directive force of Soviet society," the CPSU, exercised indivisible rule over society in general and the Armed Forces. Leadership and direction amounted to the fact that decisions made on military issues by a narrow circle of people in the CPSU Central Committee were thrust upon all levels, as a rule, for implementation. What was the net result of this? Irresponsibility and the accomplishment of expensive, criminal "experiments," such as Afghanistan. No one has borne any responsibility for these decisions. Who is calculating all the material and moral costs of these decisions? Who will answer for the lives of those who perished at the will of anonymous managers of our soldiers? Finally, how did such a thing become possible?

Political leaders of totalitarian social systems have always viewed the Army as an element of their own power. And their use of it in no way benefited the military, but rather harmed it. Following the revolution, for example, the party became the ruling entity and made the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army its weapon in the struggle for power and establishment of it. The year 1925 became the logical conclusion to this process, when the institution of unity of command was introduced in the Army on the basis of the party. By 1929, it was "planned" through reform to raise "party saturation of command personnel" to 60 percent among company commanders (in 1923 it was 41.5 percent), and to 100 percent among regimental, division, and corps commanders (in 1923 these amounted to 33, 34, and 58 percent, respectively)...

Due to the fact that a limited number of people participated in developing and making political decisions, power was concentrated in the hands of a small group not in fact under society's control. The instrument of the group's power—not the power of the people—again became the Army, and for this it was not mandatory for it to be a good military professional organization. It was sufficient to possess political conviction, "devotion to

the party," and discipline in executing orders. This was not sufficient, however, for the Army to remain a combat unit. Under such conditions it disintegrates, comprising an obedient and inexpensive tool of violence, a magic wand for accomplishing the most diverse internal tasks—the Army crushes popular insurrection and participates in carrying out collectivization. It becomes a "school of communist upbringing," engages in economic projects, and is transformed into a source of cheap manpower. It is not necessary to dig deep to find examples. The 30th Territorial Infantry Division of Kiev Military District, having executed such missions from 1922 through 1934, was four times decorated with the Order of Lenin...for participation in socialist construction. Banners of honor, challenge banners, certificates to military collectives for such "achievements"—this is the "payment" for Army labor, evidence of the wanton practice of patching up economic holes with Army forces, a practice which continues to this day.

In order for the Army to quickly execute decisions of the political leadership, without hesitation (even when this contradicted common sense), a careful and thorough selection was made of leader-executors, and this practice precluded the rise of independent, creative personalities to high posts except in the most infrequent instances. The result of Stalin's intrigues was the removal of L.D. Trotskiy, and then M.V. Frunze. Later, in 1957, G.K. Zhukov was eliminated, one of the reasons for this being his failure to fully understand the role of party-political work in the Army. Under such conditions, priority development of the theory and practice of military structuring often depended on one or several individuals far removed from military matters. In the 1960's, when a military-space aircraft had already been developed within the Experimental Design Bureau of A.I. Mikoyan, A.A. Grechko declared categorically: "We will not engage in nonsense"—and this peremptoriness of a figure fashioned by the authorities is entirely mindful of a phrase of Nikolay II: "There will not be enough cartridges," when he rejected the idea of introducing the automatic rifle in the Russian Army. There are quite a few such examples in Army history. It still remains for history to determine the damage caused by interference of dilettantes empowered with this right, the responsibility of each "ruler."

Has anything changed in our time of perestroika? Ten years have passed between the introduction of our troops into Afghanistan and the events in Tbilisi, yet the mechanism for making decisions regarding employment of the Armed Forces is the same. And attempts to evade responsibility, to thrust it on the Army, are the same. Dushanbe, Kishinev, Baku, the Baltic region... Who will the Army be with in one or another instance? The lack of a clear-cut answer, which engenders a certain tension in society, is determined by preservation of the previous mechanism of leadership and direction of the Army in spite of certain apparent changes in form. Making the decision is not all that important—it is its implementation which is important, and the mechanism of implementation falls primarily under the control of the party.

Rejecting a monopoly on power through constitutional means, the party leadership attempts at the same time to keep the Army subordinated to it, using old drive belts to manage and direct it.

The first of these is unity of command, which amounts to unity of power—and in the absence of laws, often to absolute power. Social rights of military servicemen and members of their families often lie in the hands of a single individual. Although it would seem that forms of democratic resolution of these issues have arisen in recent times—there is the officers' assembly, for example. The commander, however, who heads it by virtue of his position, has the right to repeal any decision of this assembly. There is a housing and social-life commission, but the commander need not sign its decisions. There is the nursery school commission where that same commander has reserved seats—he gives and does what he wants. And just try to say something against him—you have presented a criticism. It will cost you, as they say.

Selection of cadre and moving them up the career ladder under such circumstances are often determined not by the professional qualities of an officer, but according to perverse principles of "personal devotion," favoritism, servility. And the higher ranking a person is, the more of such qualities are required, since only in this way can you ensure unquestioned execution of any order issued "from the top." Fewer and fewer people remain in the Army leadership who are capable of opposing the strict disciplinarian approach. Such an order is reinforced by a corresponding system of privileges and benefits through which the system bribes and subordinates people, fashions from independent individuals people who are like themselves. This is supplemented as well by the absence of any kind of effective control in the Army, often permitting those senior in rank to exercise arbitrary rule. Hidden in the personal interest of today's military leadership to avoid any radical changes in the Army is the reason, in my view, for the gulf that separates the main body of generals from the backbone of the Army.

The second drive belt is the party basis of unity of command. On the one hand, this entails the obligatory requirements of cadre organs to show "party spirit" in their applications and biographies. It involves the presence of "devotion to the CPSU cause" in the section on party characteristics. The CPSU Central Committee stands at the head of this cadre policy, and all military leaders of major rank are discussed and approved in its departments. The 100-percent membership level of highest ranking officers in the CPSU is explained by this precisely—otherwise the path "to the top" is closed off. The composition of communists among officers in general amounts to 75 percent.

The party nature of unity of command is guaranteed by the system of the party-political apparatus, which is supported by the state. The assertion is made that the existence of political organs assists in counteracting and restraining high-handed commanders. Everyday practice

in military units, however, confirms the opposite—by virtue of their subordination to commanders and the presence of their own power interests, political departments are transformed from organs to protect servicemen's interests into organs for suppressing everything individual in them. The most important thing is to ensure uniformity, so that no one sticks out, no one "dares," so that everyone is the same. If there is an absence of power of the commander, authority of the party is consolidated.

In brief, this is the system for carrying out decisions of the upper echelons of party power within the Army. In conjunction with a similar mechanism in military industry, this system, having feedback and exerting pressure on the Armed Forces, forms a powerful layer of military-industrial bureaucracy on the party foundation. This is the way it has been and the way it remains, and no external democratic transformations—delivering the entirety of the country's state authority to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, electing a USSR president—have changed a thing. Without creating an appropriate mechanism for implementing decisions, new state structures will constitute just a slogan, a declaration. As before, the Army is the party's instrument of power. Is this not related to the fact that the posts of USSR president and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee are combined? How long will such "diarchy" last? At the March (1990) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, General of the Army A.A. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, stated that "we do not raise the question of eliminating political organs or depoliticizing the Army." He believes that "the functions of political organs must be differentiated between political and party organs... from the regimental party committee to the highest party organ of the Armed Forces invested with the rights of a CPSU Central Committee commission." But in my view, to thus resolve the matter under the multiparty conditions that are taking shape means either to transform the Army from the guarantor of state stability into an object of direct struggle for its employment in the mercenary political aims of certain parties, which in itself is dangerous both for the Army and for society, or to do everything so as not to allow the establishment of other parties. But does this not contradict the ongoing democratic transformations?

The question arises—if such a decision has already been made, then, first of all, by whom? Secondly, who calculated the consequences of its implementation and where was this done? If the situation was not predicted and the decision made was erroneous, then who will bear responsibility? We have been, and remain, witnesses to numerous miscalculations of such a method of leadership, when in the striving to "encompass all and everything" the party found it did not have sufficient forces, opportunity, or time for the main thing it should have been engaged in—the formation of policy based on a systemic analysis of assessments and predictions. It will suffice to recall just a few examples. It is written in the

CPSU Program: From the point of view of internal conditions, the Soviet Union does not need the Army. The USSR Armed Forces are created only to defend from outside attack. But in practice the USSR Armed Forces have been and continue to be employed to maintain order within the country. And this is an internal function. A much closer, a bleeding example, is Baku. One can make various judgments concerning the pretext—whether the Army was or was not necessary there, whether or not the introduction of troops was justified, but one thing remains certain: Here the Army became "the final argument of kings," following which reasoned argument is ultimately simplified. He who is stronger is right, and the Army is stronger. Or the person who leads it. Why was this provision not taken into account in the party program, in its new version adopted by the latest congress?

But here is how the party assessment of the Armed Forces has changed depending on the situation. They employed the Army in Afghanistan—justification was found immediately: the need to broaden the concept of "the defense of socialism." First this provision was extended to the allies of socialism, and then it was developed to the defense of interests of peace and security in countries comprising "the united bloc of the forces of social progress." The very method of elaborating political decisions and assessments speaks to the fact that they are constantly late, insofar as they always simply ascertain facts—first the fact, then its justification. This is typical, however, not only with respect to the Armed Forces, but on the whole with respect to all of our society.

Let us consider further the question of an Army of reasonable sufficiency in lowering the level of parity of forces. What was the situation at the outset? Just like a mirror it reflects all the deficiencies of that same system of making decisions and implementing them. Here they are most tangible and painful, for their uselessness and erroneousness are fed by tens of billions of rubles which go toward eliminating the consequences of mistakes, and committing new ones in the process, which affect the lives and destiny of millions of people. Of course, these mistakes are paid for by none other than the ordinary taxpayer, on whose shoulders lie defense expenditures already gigantic in scope.

What mistakes are we talking about? In the 1970's it was declared that "of all the branches of service, armor troops are the most suited to the nature of nuclear-missile war." How was this idea implemented in practice, under conditions of acknowledged military-strategic parity? I will cover this in greater detail in order to show by specific example the mechanism for adopting erroneous decisions. For a long time the Ministry of Defense stressed that the Warsaw Pact and NATO have "approximately the same amounts of armor capability... The NATO countries are not inferior to the countries of the Warsaw Pact with respect to total number of tanks." ("Whence the Threat to Peace," Moscow, 1984). Quite recently, in 1987, it was stated in published Ministry of

Defense materials that "the Western version of a so-called 'armor threat from the East' does not stand up to criticism." It was asserted that the NATO inventory comprises 25,000 tanks and that "NATO is not inferior to the Warsaw Pact in total number of tanks." Then the USSR Minister of Defense acknowledged in PRAVDA 8 February 1988 that the Warsaw Pact has an advantage in tanks. "With respect to tanks," he declared, "the Warsaw Pact in Europe has approximately 20,000 more..." But even these data turn out to be understated, since according to the statement of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact Nations dated 30 January 1989, the Warsaw Pact had 59,500 tanks and NATO—30,700. It is not difficult to calculate what kind of superiority the Warsaw Pact had over NATO!

In his interview with the newspaper IZVESTIYA (21 April 1989), the USSR minister of defense declared that the Warsaw Pact has 80,000 tanks, NATO—40,000. Thus, the Warsaw Pact has a twofold advantage in tanks over NATO. However, our information on the number of NATO tanks almost twice exceeds data from Western sources. According to NATO calculations, they have 16,000 tanks in the field and another 6,000 maintained in depot. Moreover, the Soviet Union alone, according to the latest official data, has almost 64,000 tanks—more than all the remaining states in the world put together...

With respect to infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, according to the statement of the Committee of Defense Ministers dated 30 January 1989, the Warsaw Pact has one-and-a-half times as many as NATO—70,000 in the Warsaw Pact, 47,000 in NATO. Whereas IZVESTIYA dated 16 December 1989 reports that the USSR alone has 76,500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in its inventory...

We must ask—who benefits by the deception, and how much will it cost? We are about to destroy two-thirds of our entire armored equipment and artillery, reducing our conventional weapons, but we have significantly less in the way of antitank systems! Some time ago we witnessed a similar deceit with medium-range missiles. Prior to M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States in 1987 it was officially asserted that the USSR had 355 medium-range missiles, but when the treaty on their elimination was signed it became known that we had 826 of these, including 470 deployed. And here I ask myself—why were hundreds of medium-range missiles situated in Europe, where 200 nuclear reactors are operating which in the event even of conventional war will become nuclear mines? Situated so as to be later destroyed?

Construction of the Krasnoyarsk Radar Facility took place in violation of the ABM Treaty with the United States (1972). Now it has been decided to "tear it down to its foundation." And what about the costs, amounting to hundreds of millions of rubles? At whose expense will costs be written off when new billions are required to destroy and eliminate armaments produced in excess of

any norm? Or for the reorganization of military production over to civilian production? The military-industrial complex has requested 60 billion rubles for carrying out the conversion—13 billion for the conversion itself, and the remainder for the construction of new capacities for the economy and at its expense, but under the aegis of the military department. Here is what you get—whether we arm or disarm, the leadership of the military-industrial complex will not come off the loser. Again, no one is guilty. And can we find a guilty party in the system of blurred responsibility we see in the party? The military budget is distributed among a dozen ministries, which are at the same time customers and organizers of an unchecked race in arms and equipment production to the detriment of quality. Such races often have no justification, nor will you be able here to find the initiators either. K. Marx was right—he was right—when he asserted that "the universal spirit of bureaucracy is the secret, secrecy. Observance of this secrecy is ensured in its own medium of hierarchical organization, but with respect to the outside world—by its closed corporate nature." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol. 1, p. 272). Such a closed nature is seen in our distribution of funds and assets for the Army, and this is accomplished, as a rule, in party and government offices. Such a situation constitutes rich grounds for forming the military-bureaucratic lobby which, even after the establishment of military-strategic parity, has continued to spin the military flywheel—13 new missile systems have been developed, as compared with six American ones, three times more multipurpose nuclear submarines have been built than in the United States, twice the number of tactical aviation aircraft, and 30 times the number of air defense fighters. (And only in five of 20 fundamental technology sectors is the USSR on the level of the United States). Moreover, the country has a tremendous budget deficit, many social programs are being curtailed, and tens of millions of citizens are on the "poverty threshold." All this is taking place against a background of Army reductions not entirely thought through. Military servicemen, not protected socially, are practically deprived of many civil rights, confused by the absence of reference points in restructuring the Army, and are rejected by society. In this I see the reason for growing tension within the USSR Armed Forces.

To this day the most crucial question remains that of housing—280,000 families with relationship to the Army are in critical need of improved housing conditions. The homeless Army community, which presently includes more than 180,000 families of officers and warrant officers, will soon be increased by over 100,000 families of servicemen returning to the USSR from Eastern Europe. The military leadership is transferring responsibility for settling them over to local soviets, which for the time being are not in a position, realistically speaking, to resolve these problems. A state program is urgently needed for settling and making provision for persons discharged, and there is none. Such a program should be financed, in my view, primarily

through the redistribution of funds allocated for purchasing military equipment and technology. There is one condition for this—the entire military budget must be in the hands of the Ministry of Defense and, naturally, under control of the state.

There is an increasing variance between the nationwide significance of the Army and the fall in its prestige. One reason for this is hidden in the unfavorable state of material well-being and social provisions afforded servicemen and members of their families. Social apathy of the officer corps is on the rise. A striving is manifest to break with their profession. Their interest in military service is reduced. Whereas, according to sociological data, in 1975, 77.6 percent of sergeants in their basic term of service and those in the reserves declared that they are serving in the Armed Forces with interest, understanding the importance and necessity of executing their military obligation, studies conducted in 1986 and 1990 among soldiers (sergeants), and graduates of schools and professional-technical institutes, show that the level of interest in military service is dropping catastrophically: in 1986—63 and 44 percent; in 1990—11.6 and 23 percent; 66.8 percent of soldiers and sergeants, and 41.2 percent of school graduates stated they had no interest in serving although they understood its necessity.

Professionalism is falling among personnel, insofar as everyone is being called up for the Army indiscriminately. Thus, in 1989, 45 percent of those conscripted were psychologically disturbed, 37 percent had poor command of the Russian language, and 15 percent had previously been sentenced by a court. The Army's engagement in economic projects and the lack of sufficient funds for combat training do a great deal of harm. One-third the amount of money spent on a pilot in the U.S. military is allocated for a Soviet pilot, one-tenth the amount for a Soviet tanker. Professionalism is reduced by constantly diverting officers and warrant officers for training new recruits in rudimentary military skills due to the large turnover of the latter. Officer substitution for noncommissioned officers in matters of everyday activity significantly reduces the professional growth of officer cadre. Thus, in 1989 during the course of inspection visits and according to results of combat training, 40 percent of officers were evaluated as "satisfactory." And even with this state of affairs, 26 percent of the military budget is allocated, as before, to maintaining the Army, while 44 percent is allocated for purchase of weapons and equipment (the opposite is true in the United States). All this is a consequence not so much of the impotence and obedience of the military leadership as it is a result of the fact that to this day the same approaches are used in military structuring by the political leadership. This is why it is stated in the appeal of a group of officers, who are USSR people's deputies, disseminated at the Third Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies: "Among personnel in the Army there is ever more frequent open expression of distrust in the government, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and the

head of state precisely because there is no specific program of measures capable of ensuring the stability of the Armed Forces." The authors of the appeal do not see a way out of the situation in cosmetic repair of the existing system of formulating and implementing military policy, nor in resolving issues taken separately, but rather in a fundamental reorganization of the Army, in preparing and carrying out military reform in the USSR.

What conditions ripened to bring this about? Along with exacerbation of those contradictions I mentioned earlier I would add the lessening of military danger and, as a result, of the level of military-strategic confrontation in the world, a broadened and deepened process of disarmament, in which the USSR is an active participant, and also the necessity of creating a system of overall security in the world community and in Europe (the "common European home"), as well as in the USSR. Here we are referring not only to the number of participants in this process, but to the diverse aspects and sides of security—economic, ecological, demographic, ethnic, information-psychological, military, and so forth... The first steps in this direction have been taken. By direction of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a working group has been created and its composition approved by the USSR president. The group will work out issues related to improving and perfecting the country's security system, draw up a concept of overall security, and prepare proposals for creating a mechanism for implementing it.

It would be impossible to develop true goals and principles of military reform without recognizing the need to transfer decisions on defense matters, questions on the Armed Forces and state security, to the joint competence of the USSR and the republics which comprise it. Following adoption of the 1977 Constitution, deciding these matters became the exclusive right of the center.

Working on military reform, we must find support in the priority of nonviolent means in both the state's foreign and domestic policy. This should be propagated in society in general as well as in the Armed Forces. For example, J. Charles, director of the A. Einstein Institute and one of the leading experts in this field, asserts that there are about 200 such means in world practice. Yet in our country to this day we do not have a serious analysis of their effectiveness or system of employment. I must state that, for exactly this reason, the international community is leveling criticism against the USSR.

Having analyzed the objective conditions and natural laws which determine the state of defense and its prospects for development, we can formulate the basic principles of military reform.

1. Guaranteed provision of the country's security on the basis of primarily qualitative factors.

2. Optimization of structures operating in the sphere of formulating military policy, making decisions and monitoring their implementation, and guaranteed provision in this sphere of the unity of rights and obligations of all its subjects.

3. Ensuring that the military department is under the control of the highest state organs as well as society in general, with full glasnost and the greatest possible degree of openness.

4. Conformance of the organization of the Armed Forces, the priority orientation of their development of weapons and equipment, and the financing of military construction to the level of real military danger and defensive sufficiency.

5. Phased professionalization of the Army and the intensified personal involvement of each citizen in high-quality accomplishment of the tasks of defending the country.

6. Democratization of intra-Army relations and bringing the entire military organization of society into conformance with the principles of a rule-of-law state and the norms of international law.

7. Taking into account national-historical traditions and the progressive experience of modern military structuring accumulated in our country and in the world.

Optimization of military policy may be achieved having conditionally separated the levels of leadership and direction into political, administrative, and strictly military. This entails creation of a system of interaction among them, with determination of a zone of responsibility at each level; what this means in actuality I will try to explain below.

We enter into foreign policy issues as peacemakers, but this principle is contradicted by our military-technological might. Because an army 4-million strong in and of itself presents a certain threat. What we have is more an army of "waging war" than of averting it, although it is the latter we discuss. And I am not at all talking about the contradiction which arises when we reject methods of force in foreign policy but often resort to methods of force in internal policy. I have in mind the methods that are sometimes used to achieve stability in our society and the fact that a spirit of violence flourishes in the Army—over the individual ("hazing") and collectives, and over the Army in general. This paradox must be thought over again so that such contradictions can be reduced to a minimum. In my view, here we see one of the tasks of theoretical research at this level.

Military doctrine also needs to be rethought. We must take under consideration all the processes that are underway in Europe, take into account the fact that Soviet contingents are returning to the USSR. In my view we must arrive at a major conclusion concerning the necessity of defending the Fatherland only on the territory of its state. Without a doubt, such provision

must be reflected in the political portion of our doctrine if we are going to be engaged in construction of a common European home. In rethinking security issues, I am convinced we will also come to rethink the role and place of Union, republic, and local organs of power in resolving the issues of military construction. There is nothing new in this—after all, our USSR was conceived as a union of republics with equal rights in all respects, including the military sphere. There are historic premises for this. As an example, even as far back as the times when the Russian centralized state was formed, there existed in Russia's armed forces national military formations of various types. These existed after the revolution as well, which had a positive effect on resolution of the nationalities question, insofar as we factually eliminated in this manner the inequality of peoples of the USSR in the military sphere.

At the end of 1924, the country's Revolutionary Military Soviet adopted a five-year plan of national military structuring of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, which was approved by the Third Congress of USSR Soviets half a year later. By that time national formations constituted 10 percent of the overall strength of the Red Army. It would be more correct to call these national-territorial formations since, according to Military History Institute data, 70 percent of their personnel represented indigenous nationalities. By 1935, 74 percent of all existing divisions were territorial.

On 1 February 1944, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a law which ratified on a constitutional level the decision of the State Defense Committee on creation of national units of regimental size [chast] and larger [soyedineniye]. In accordance with this law, all Union republics obtained the right to form troop subunits, and a number of republics instituted organs for their administration. Prior to adoption of the 1977 Constitution we preserved this practice. I believe this experience must be taken into account in today's complicated national-demographic situation. We see an increase in desertion and evasion of military service—the number of such instances has exceeded 6,000. So it is all the more necessary to resolve on an urgent basis fundamental issues related to affording equal rights to all republics in the military sphere as well.

What does this involve? First of all, each republic, in providing for its own security on a treaty basis, must have the right to delegate necessary powers to the center. And here the peculiarities of development of each republic must be taken into account. Secondly, each republic is obliged in fulfilling treaty terms to guarantee the security of the country as a whole, accomplishing this at a minimum of cost on its part. National-territorial formations of ground forces and the professional reserve on the territory of each republic must be subordinated to the central and local leadership, but in operational-strategic matters—only to the center. In extreme situations these formations may, upon decision of the local leadership, be used for eliminating the aftereffects of

natural disasters or putting an end to disturbances in localities. But, of course, all of this must be stipulated by law.

According to data of the Center for Studying Social and Psychological Problems of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, in such formations (a poll was conducted among personnel in their basic period of service) 70 percent of Baltic region personnel wanted to serve, as did up to 57 percent of those from the Transcaucasus, more than 50 percent of those from Moldavia, and up to 43 percent of those from Central Asia. If we turn to the Army in general, such a point of view at the beginning of 1990 was shared by 24 percent of officers, 21 percent of warrant officers, 36 percent of sergeants, and 47.5 percent of soldiers.

Testifying to the importance of this question is the fact that, day after day, we see an increase in the flow of demands from the civilian population of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Belorussian SSR, and the Baltic region not to use the military servicemen of these republics to restore order in other regions of the country, as was the case in Tbilisi and Baku...

Along with the organs of state (legislative and executive) power, parties, social organizations, and all of society must participate in the development of military policy. Political parties which claim a vanguard role, including the CPSU, must win this right, but not by virtue of eliminating all other parties, as was the case in the 1920's, but rather through serious scientific studies, discussion in the community, and the search for optimal decisions in this sphere, entailing generalization of everything of value which has been developed through to this day. We can no longer repeat mistakes of the past, when a small group of people practically ruled the country in the name of the party. We must create the conditions for formation of a collective intellect. The vacuum in our social structure, which until recently was filled exclusively by the CPSU, is today filled by rapidly growing social organizations of the new formation, quickly developing to the level of party. There is no need to fear this. The collective intellect must have a real opportunity to participate in the development of military policy, and this process must be established on a legal foundation (through laws on the party and on the press), taking the party out of state structures, providing for the country's security and stability of society.

Even today, of course, the CPSU is a powerful, organized structure, having an establishment, apparatus, and traditions—although not the very best in all cases. This is beneficial to a great extent, but harmful as well to an equal extent—for to this day all the basic information concerning military policy flows down to the CPSU Central Committee and settles there. In this manner the monopoly on information turns into a monopoly of a narrow circle of individuals from the apparatus and leadership of the CPSU Central Committee, which has led and continues to lead to serious errors—for it is

precisely on the basis of the information "authorized" for use that state organs, social organizations, and the majority of the membership of the party itself structure their work.

Today we see the most critical need to establish an independent information center under the USSR Supreme Soviet (I would provisionally call it the Center for Assessments and Strategic Forecasts), where all information would flow and be analyzed which has any relation to providing for the security of the USSR. This information would provide the basis for development of recommendations by the Presidential Council, and the formation and priority determination of military-political decisions, adoption of which will become the exclusive right of only the highest organs of state power—the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR president, and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The legislative power must have the exclusive right to ratify the legal foundations of the organization of defense and of the Armed Forces, the concept of military policy and doctrine. It must adopt laws which regulate military structuring, determine the size of the Armed Forces and the reserve, duration of service and personnel training, determine the qualitative and quantitative composition of military armament and equipment, and determine, line by line, the financing of military structuring (the U.S. military budget is approved by over 100 line items; we have five). The legislative power must have authority to elect and appoint civilians to the post of military minister, they being fully accountable to it. Within the framework of preparing and conducting military reform, the deputies must have the right to organize joint studies and hearings on military-political and military-economic problems.

As of today there is still no unified view of reform. Having agreed in form with the concept of "military reform," the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff are attempting to change nothing in essence, in developing their draft concept of development of the USSR Armed Forces to the year 2000. In our view, military reform envisages the aggregate of legislative enactments and state measures directed toward bringing the economy and military policy of the state, the structuring of the Armed Forces, and the system of defense management into conformance with the level of real military danger and defensive sufficiency, proceeding from the country's capacities and the radical changes taking place in society.

The main idea of the draft concept prepared by the Commission of the Armed Forces Subcommittee of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security is phased transition to a professional armed forces—lower in strength, but of higher quality. Such an army must be voluntary in its means of recruitment, mixed in its structuring principle, and interethnic in its composition. According to 1990 sociological research data, 87 percent of officers came out "in favor" of a professional army. Expressing a desire to serve in such

an army were more than half the personnel fulfilling their basic term of service, including 25 percent—soldiers, and 26.5 percent—sergeants, and about 15 percent—warrant officers and reenlistees. Among graduates of schools, professional-technical institutes, and vocational schools, here too more than half of those surveyed are prepared to serve in a professional army.

The political direction of such an army is possible only on a foundation of law. It is no accident that I touch on this matter, since the question of political parties in the Armed Forces and how political work will be structured under multiparty conditions is an entirely critical one. It seems to me that servicemen, like other state employees, must realize their political freedoms during nonduty time. With a mandatory reduction in their total number, political organs should be reorganized together with military-legal organs into "human services," which would be engaged in military- judicial, judicial-legal, sociopsychological, and cultural-social support for servicemen and members of their families.

The necessity is upon us to radically renovate the composition of the Committee on Defense and State Security (up to 90 percent of whose members are in one way or another connected with the military-industrial complex). We must define its status and structure. If we turn to the experience of the U.S. Congress, there we see about 100 individuals involved on a permanent basis in similar committees and subcommittees. In our system, of 43 committee representatives, five or six deputies are working on a permanent basis—and they are involved mainly in forwarding correspondence.

I explain the extremely poor work of the committee (and this is one reason for the increased tension and crisis in the Army) in the fact that its former chairman simultaneously occupied the posts of chief designer and general director of a scientific production association, and his work at the enterprise took up most of his time. What was the cost to the Army of a year of such "direction"?

What should be the functions of the Ministry of Defense? Jointly with organs of executive power and also with the community, the Ministry of Defense should participate in the development of military policy, and in the preparation of proposals and recommendations for their examination in legislative organs. This involves first of all an assessment of the military-political situation and determination of the threat level. It entails preparation of the military-technological bases for implementing political decisions. It involves production planning, planning for the purchase of weapons and equipment, planning for expenditures on personnel, their combat training, and ensuring their technical, rear-services, and retirement support to the extent established in the military budget.

In order for such activity to be productive, it is necessary to separate the functions of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff. The former should be transformed into an organ of administrative management headed by a

civilian. We must reconstitute the institution of authorized military department representatives under Union republic governments and afford them representation in the Ministry of Defense, concentrating, as I have already stated, the military budget in the hands of the Ministry of Defense. The need is upon us to radically reorganize the ministries of the military- industrial complex, and in order to do this we must eliminate from their structures interim and duplicating elements. We must effect a radical restructuring of the ministry's system of military-scientific research, reducing the number of high-paying general and officer positions in its authorization tables, and increasing the number of true specialists who are so critically needed by administrative management, rear-services supply, and military science. We do not rule out the possibility of civilians working in these positions. Over the past two or three years we have seen a turnover in the collegium of the Ministry of Defense of 75 percent, and in the major commands and commanders of military districts and fleets—of 90 percent. However, the situation in the Army has not changed for the better. We cannot explain this only by the deterioration in the situation of the country as a whole, by the fact that "the Army is a chip of society," since clearly there are other major and secondary problems at work here. We should not be replacing people, but rather structures and functions. We are right up front in the world when it comes to "general-saturation": one general per 700 servicemen (in the United States it is one per 3,400; in the FRG—one per 2,400). When we consider that generals have to have dachas, personal airplanes, vehicles, and other free benefits—at the expense of the people!—we are most definitely competing for top position with respect to expenses for maintaining them. Here, in my view, is concealed one source of financial reserves for at least the first phase of transition to the professional Army. In any case, it would enable us to increase sergeants' pay, i.e., that segment of our servicemen which provide greater benefit to the Army's combat readiness than a thousand "symbolic generals"...

And, finally, what should the General Staff be like? This should be an independent organ which, jointly with other military command organs, will effect realization of military-political and military- technical decisions through strategic and operational planning, and through direct organization of the combat-training and combat activity of the USSR Armed Forces.

However, this activity will only become fruitful when the major axis commands are eliminated, when all the Armed Forces services and military districts are reorganized according to the principle of guaranteed execution of assigned missions. The structures of the General Staff and command organs of the combat activity of forces must be qualitatively replenished on a competitive basis. We must strengthen the role of communications, reconnaissance, and command systems. We must separate rear-services formations and administrative subunits which are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense from combat units. Only when our Army's administrative

activity, today conducted to the detriment of combat readiness, is reduced to a minimum will our Army comprise one worthy of competing with the best foreign armies.

We cannot say that nothing is being done in this regard. In recent years, 101 in-truth nonexistent "grave" divisions were eliminated, but the "rain" of generals was coming down not only because of the increased number of major units—it was also due to the number of servicemen in each being reduced, in the division for example. Thus, according to foreign data, in 1965 the Soviet Armed Forces had 140 divisions with 25,500 men in each. In 1985 (when Army strength had increased by half a million men), we had 197 divisions and the average strength of each was 21,500 men. Here is an example of how the Army's combat capability was fashioned to please personal interests...

What is it that unifies all levels of the command and direction of the Army, and who organizes their interaction?

In accordance with the USSR Constitution, the USSR president must be this coordinator, standing at the head of the Army, being the supreme commander. His actions with respect to use of the Armed Forces are stipulated by law. The effectiveness and flexibility of this system should be ensured by the program and target-oriented method of elaborating the most important problems of military policy and military structuring. It must be said that in our country we tried unsuccessfully to introduce such a program and target-oriented method two decades ago. This has been used most effectively in the United States. The armed forces were structured there not so much by service, but by the missions the services execute. The organizational-procedural mechanism which was established there incorporated seven systems. At its peak was the National Security Council. From there—a unified system of strategic planning, which includes the Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then we see the system of planning, programming, and developing the budget; the system of weapons and equipment development and acquisition; the global system of operational control of the armed forces; and a national system of operational control. On the bottom of this pyramid is unified operational planning in the theater of combat operations. These systems, united with respect to programs and targets, enable one problem or another to be studied from top to bottom over the course of a short time.

Whereas today our Armed Forces are structured by service (we have five services of the Armed Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces existing as a separate service only in China in addition to the USSR, and Air Defense—not as such in any other armed forces of the world), in using a similar method we could structure the Army to take into account specific programs and missions. For example, we must have subunits capable of effecting operational implementation of decisions made by the USSR president. Such "quick reaction forces"

require development of a mechanism for their use. But in order for such a program not to malfunction all information of value must be placed into the command system—the where, what, how much, how, and how long of a mission. Today because of muddled planning it is difficult for us to expect any positive effect. If even under peacetime conditions trains and convoys do not transport cargo where they are supposed to, then I think it is not hard to predict what we might expect under wartime conditions. To all appearances the creation of a new system might provide interrelationships, and therefore result in great efficiency in the use of all elements and levels of command.

Changes in the Army and its place in society are imminent. The absence of clear-cut reference points in Army restructuring heightens tension, and if we do not take some significant measures at this point to improve the situation, we may see—in addition to problems of primary importance going unresolved—the further deepening of crisis not only in the Army but in our whole society as well.

Military reform is necessary, but it is not realizable without the establishment of an "institute of reformers," without reorganizing the entire system of the formation and implementation of military policy.

Proposed Reform of Armed Forces Outlined

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[Article by Major General V. Ivanov, candidate of military sciences, senior lecturer at the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces: "Radical Renewal or 'Cosmetic Repair'?"]

[Text] It is stated in the policy declaration of the 28th CPSU Congress "Toward Humane and Democratic Socialism" that the party considers it essential to implement military reform based on the new defensive doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency as well as on the priority of qualitative parameters in military organizational development.

On the basis of an analysis of the situation which has taken shape, an attempt is made in this article to advance certain proposals regarding the system of transformations in the organizational development of our Armed Forces.

Structure

The structure of our Armed Forces has been taking shape over decades. There have been repeated attempts throughout the history of the Armed Forces to upgrade their structure, standardize weapons, regulate military service, and train command cadres. This was particularly noticeable after the events at Lake Khasan, the Khalkhin-Gol conflict, the war in Spain, and the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. There have been many

changes in connection with the appearance of nuclear weapons. Having failed to become established, some of the innovations have disappeared without our noticing, others exist to this day, while still others never received definitive status such as, for example, the main commissariats [glavkomaty] in the theaters of military operations [TVDs]. In their proposed conception, the Armed Forces are to be made up of three contingents which will differ from each other according to their operational readiness and their tasking designation.

The first contingent comprising personnel, weapons, hardware, and military equipment and property will be kept in a state of **permanent combat readiness** and will always be ready for combat employment. It should combine nuclear and space-based weapons, the bulk of the Air Defense Forces, part of the Air Force, a specific section of the Navy and the highly-mobile Ground Forces. Its strength and composition could change depending on the military-political international situation and the economic situation in the country. In all cases, it should be sufficient in order to resolve a conflict in an individual region by emphasis on its defensive role and in order to ensure the deployment of the second contingent in the event of war.

The second contingent will be the largest. It will include reserve personnel, weapons, hardware, and material and technical supplies intended for the formation of units, combined units, and large strategic formations in the event of war. Apart from the reserve elements, the units in this contingent will also include regular personnel. The latter will make up one-third of the first contingent. As regards the contingent's general numerical strength and composition, this will be determined by the strategic plans for the combat employment of the Armed Forces.

The third contingent will focus on training and alternative service. Its principle function will be to ensure that all the country's citizens do regular military service on the basis of the Law on Universal Military Service Obligation. Approximately 600,000-700,000 persons will make up this contingent. The length of service will be no more than six months in training units followed by a full period of service in units of the first or second contingent. This period will be extended for those doing alternative service in republican units. This contingent will be one of the main sources for bringing the first and second contingents up to full strength on a voluntary basis (according to contract) and in the transitional stage it will be the main source. Civil defense units can be included in this contingent.

In connection with the above, it is proposed that a significant change be made in the system of command and control of the Armed Forces. Analysis shows that in no other armed forces and in no other country are there such cumbersome and overlapping forms of command and control of the different branches of the armed forces as in ours. In fact, these forms of command and control have, as yet, no status and their precise functional duties and limits of responsibility have not been defined. For

example, during the well-known campaigns in Afghanistan, the troops of the 40th Army came under the direct command of the Army but were also commanded by the operational maneuver group of the Turkestan Military District [MD], and the operational maneuver group of the Ministry of Defense, supplemented by representatives of almost all the different branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the Army and services. This gave rise to considerable criticism on the part of unit and combined unit commanders as it caused confusion.

The proposed conception envisions having three forms of command and control in the Armed Forces: administrative, strategic, and operational.

The Administrative Form of Command and Control

Instead of the administrative staffs of the commanders in chief of the different branches of service, it is proposed to form committees. A committee will be a collective organ of command and control. A council will form the basis of the committee and will adopt the final decision on one question or another. The council will include representatives of the Ministry of Defense and military industry, scientists, and workers in the military sphere. The committee will number no more than 100-150 persons. The committees will elaborate military, technical, organizational and personnel policy pertaining to the different branches of service for a specific period (five years) and, with a view to the long-term future, submit proposals for coordination and approval, place orders for the manufacture of military goods in industry, have control over their output and quality, organize bringing up to full strength units and combined units, and have control over the servicing and maintenance of military hardware and property belonging to troops. At the same time, they will work under the direct supervision of the Minister of Defense in close coordination with the General Staff and the commands of the forces of the strategic form of command and control.

The Strategic Form of Command and Control

The purpose of the strategic form of command and control of the country's Armed Forces is to **plan** the combat use of the Armed Forces and their direction and leadership as well as that of their separate components both in limited military conflicts and in a war if these are forced upon us. It is proposed that the strategic form of command and control should consist of those commands which will form an organic part of the General Staff: the Strategic Forces Command, the Command of Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness [sily postoyannoy gotovnosti], the General-Purpose Forces Command, the Command of Forces Undergoing Training [uchebnyye sily], the Command of Republican Units and Civil Defense, and the Command of Organs of Local Military Administration. The numerical strength of the staff of the administrative headquarters of the commands will be between 50 and 200.

The Strategic Forces Command This is to include the currently existing Strategic Rocket Forces and units and combined units of the Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense and Antisatellite Forces equipped with nuclear weapons and weapon-delivery vehicles which are to be consolidated into Nuclear Forces and also Space Forces [Kosmicheskiye voyska] whose units and combined units will be provided with systems capable of destroying the enemy's installations from space. These forces will also include support and service units and subunits.

The General Staff will elaborate a plan for the employment of these forces and submit it for presidential approval. At the first stage of the transformations, the strength level of the Strategic Forces could be approximately 400,000 men depending on the military-political situation in the world. This number will be reduced as agreement is reached with the other side and in accordance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency. These forces will be used in independent operations in interaction with other forces. The Supreme High Command will direct their combat employment. The Strategic Forces will be maintained out of the state budget and will be used only in wartime. Armies, flotillas, divisions, and regiments could make up the basic military elements of the Strategic Forces.

The Command of Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness In peacetime, these forces will be manned, armed, and equipped according to the prescribed strength level and will receive supplies according to the established norms. They will be used in peacetime and in wartime (in peacetime, on the decision of the president) to repulse enemy aggression or resolve a limited military conflict in an individual region. In this case, they can conduct independent operations under the leadership of the High Command of the Armed Forces in the TVDs. Wherever necessary, they are to ensure the mobilization and deployment of General-Purpose Forces.

In wartime, units and combined units of the Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness will form part of the fronts which will direct their employment. Naturally, they will also plan how they are to be employed in the event of war. It is the president who will decide where the Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness are to be deployed and they will be maintained out of the all-Union state budget. Their strength level will also depend upon the military-political situation and could total between 1,200,000 and 1,300,000 men: Ground Forces—700,000; Air Force—170,000; Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces [voyska PKO]—250,000; Navy—150,000.

General-Purpose Forces This will be the main and largest component of the country's Armed Forces. They will be composed of reserve units, combined units, and large strategic formations from the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces, and Navy. Personnel will be assigned to these units through the military commissariats; hardware, weapons, and supplies will be stored on bases, in munition depots, and

at supply terminals. The technology to be used in the formation of units and combined units of the General-Purpose Forces will be similar to that existing today.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that the current strength level of newly activated units and combined units is low and incomplete, and hardware in stock often has parts missing and cannot be used for combat. The hardware belonging to units is virtually never serviced. What can two dozen drivers do today when ordered to prepare about 100 tanks for combat use. One should also take into account the fact that hardware allocated to military units from the national economy has also not been properly maintained and has often been damaged through negligent overuse. Evidently, it would be expedient to maintain hardware and weapons intended for newly activated units and combined units on the bases and in the munition depots (having created an integral system out of them), employing for this purpose maintenance personnel made up of civilian employees of the Armed Forces and specialists from among contract servicemen. In any case, the system of mobilizing military units and the servicing and maintenance of stockpiled hardware and weapons calls for in-depth study.

The numerical strength of the General-Purpose Forces could total approximately 630,000 servicemen and a varied principle of manpower acquisition will operate—according to contract and by way of compulsory service. Of this number, approximately 400,000 will be in the Ground Forces, 80,000 in the Air Force and the same number in the Navy, and 70,000 in the Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces. They will be maintained out of the all-Union budget. The deployment of units and combined units and the regions in which they will be organized will be determined by the General Staff and approved by the Supreme High Command.

Forces Undergoing Training These will implement the Law on Universal Military Service Obligation together with republican units, that is to say the whole body of persons subject to military conscription will have to undergo this training and, thereafter, either conclude a contract for service in the Strategic Forces, the Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness, or the General-Purpose Forces, or remain in alternative service in republican units. The strength level of the Forces Undergoing Training will be between 300,000 and 350,000 men and the period of training will last five to six months. Of this number, approximately 25,000 will prepare themselves for service in the Strategic [Rocket] Forces, 200,000 in the Ground Forces, 30,000 in the Air Force, 15,000 in the Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces, and 40,000 in the Navy. The Forces Undergoing Training will be maintained out of the state budget, their deployment will be determined by the minister of defense, and they will come under the command of the MD on whose territory they will be stationed during peacetime. In wartime, they will form reserve units ready to augment troops in the field. It is also possible that they will form line units. Call-up will take place twice a year.

Republican Units and Civil Defense Evidently, such a formulation of the question can give rise to a variety of differing opinions. On the one hand, the creation of republican units will, as it were, decentralize the Armed Forces' command and control of the country as a whole. On the other hand, voices are being heard in favor of the removal of Civil Defense from the country's system of Armed Forces. I will try to substantiate my proposal.

Every year, dozens of battalions are formed in our Armed Forces in order to help with the harvest. Equipment, principally automobiles, is allocated from line units (that is to say combat units, those intended for combat operations) and personnel (with the exception of officers and warrant officers) are called up from the reserve, that is to say from the national economy. Moreover, battalions formed in one oblast and even one republic are sent, as a rule, to another oblast or republic (for example, from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic). In recent years, several road brigades have been formed for the purpose of constructing roads in central oblasts. In the second half of each year, personnel and motor transport from military units have been assigned to Moscow and other large cities in order to stock vegetables for the winter and now they are also being assigned for the purpose of transporting produce to trading establishments. There are military units which construct fruit and vegetable storage-centers, carry out restoration work, and so forth. There are also military units which constantly work in production in various ministries.

It is not difficult to imagine what occurs as a result of this: the erosion of military procedures, a loss of prestige with regard to military service, and the virtual undermining of the combat readiness of line units due to the estrangement of personnel and the diversion of equipment. Consequently, it is proposed that the republics be allowed to have their own units (companies and battalions) which will be made up of no more than one half percent of their overall populations. What kind of units will these be? These will be the same battalions which help with the harvest, render assistance to agriculture and industry, implement protective measures, maintain law and order, and participate in eliminating the consequences of accidents and natural disasters. The ever increasing trend toward introducing alternative service can serve as an argument in support of this proposal.

In peacetime, it is the government of a republic which will decide whether republican units and civil defense units are to be used to accomplish national economic tasks while, in wartime, it is the command of the MD (front) which will decide how they are to be employed within the frontiers of a given republic.

Organs of Local Military Administration It is proposed that these take the form of military departments of soviets and military commissariats.

Military departments in local organs of administration do not represent a new institution in our country. The only difference is that previously, between 1939 and 1948, they formed part of the framework of party organs, whereas in the present conception it is proposed that they be embraced within local soviets of people's deputies. Incidentally, this question has already been raised at several sessions of the local soviets. Military departments of local soviets could concern themselves with questions relating to the training of preinductees; their call-up for service in the Forces Undergoing Training, republican units, and self-defense units; engage in military-patriotic and defense work among the population; and, if necessary, assist military organs in conducting mobilization work. To all intents and purposes, their function in local organs of administration would be that of executors of the Law on Universal Military Service Obligation.

Military commissariats are a key element in the general structure of the Armed Forces. It is not necessary in this article to enumerate their duties and the positive role that they have played in our military history. At the same time, one cannot fail to note that they are currently burdened with so many duties that they have simply started to get bogged down and, as a result, mobilization work is suffering. Evidently, military commissariats have to be maintained within the organs of local military administration and be subordinate to their military department; they should be allowed to exercise the principle of recruiting volunteers on a contract basis for service in the Armed Forces, first and foremost in the Strategic Forces and Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness; deal with pensions; keep a record of servicemen in reserve; and conduct mobilization work.

The Operational Form of Command and Control

The operational form of command and control will not be an intermediate link between the other forms of command and control. This will be an independent authority and will function under the leadership of the Supreme High Command, first and foremost, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. The principle task of the organs of the operational form of command and control in peacetime will be to plan and prepare operations to be mounted by force groupings of the Armed Forces in the TVDs, fronts and armies, and also fleets, flotillas, and squadrons. In peacetime, the chain of command will remain as follows: the High Commands of the Armed Forces in the TVDs, MDs as they are organized in peacetime (with the exception of the Moscow Air and Space Defense District), and armies; In wartime, it will be as follows: the High Commands of the Armed Forces in the TVDs, fronts, armies, and MDs as they are organized in wartime. Thus, it is not proposed to make large changes to the currently existing situation apart from reducing the number of MDs and fleets, and forming a High Command of the Armed Forces in the North-Western TVD.

In peacetime, the MD will include units, combined units, and large strategic formations of the General-Purpose Forces and the Forces Undergoing Training as well as the military commissariats which are deployed within its boundaries; units and subunits of the Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness will come under operational subordination. The command of the MDs will work in close interaction with the military departments of the local soviets and with the command of republican units and subunits. In peacetime, the High Commands of the Armed Forces in the TVDs will direct the preparation of the MDs. All units, combined units, and large strategic formations deployed within the command's boundaries including the Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness, republican units, and civil defense units will be subordinate to them. In the event of war, operations will be elaborated in coordination with the Strategic Forces.

It is proposed in the conception that all MDs as they are organized in peacetime and fleets (apart from the Northern Fleet, the Moscow, North Caucasus, Volga-Urals, and Siberian MDs which will left under the direct control of the General Staff) are to be subordinated to the High Commands of the Armed Forces in the TVDs.

By way of discussion, I would like to submit several more proposals. The first concerns the reduction of the strength level of the Armed Forces and the corresponding financial expenditure on their maintenance with a simultaneous improvement in servicemen's material welfare. In the given conception, it is proposed to reduce their strength level principally at the expense of the administrative staff of the administrations of the five branches of the Armed Forces, the MDs as they are organized in peacetime, and the fleets; it is also proposed to maintain the administrative staff of the High Commands of the Armed Forces in the TVDs, the MDs, and the fleets at a strength level necessary only for the preparation of the combat employment of subordinate troops (forces). The remaining functions (support, combat training, control, and so forth) will be carried out by the forces' commands.

Finally, it is proposed to reduce the strength level of servicemen by employing civilians to perform their duties and by disbanding those units engaged in the economy and construction whose work can be done by civilian organizations. In principle, military units of the Strategic Forces, the Forces in a State of Permanent Readiness, the General-Purpose Forces, and the Forces Undergoing Training should not be engaged in economic work and should not perform tasks which do not conform with their status.

In the interests of raising the prestige of military service, it would be useful to regulate promotion. Is it necessary to bestow the rank of officer upon workers in the spheres of military trade, finance, and medicine (with the exception of medical administrators), translators, sportsmen, and living quarters maintenance service workers? After

all, the following rank does not have a military ring to it: Major Chief of the sanitary engineering service. Yet, such titles exist.

The time has also come to regulate the system of training military cadres beginning with the training of noncommissioned officers and ending with the academies. Much is already being said about the fact that the training divisions and, now, the training centers have not justified themselves and that the person, the individual, the future noncommissioned officer has become impersonalized in these institutions. People are fondly recalling the old regimental schools.

Why is it that an officer studies a foreign language in military school for four years, then at an academy, and then again at the General Staff Academy yet, thereafter, never serves in the country whose language he has learned? Wouldn't it perhaps be better to make the study of a foreign language optional and before an officer is posted for service abroad he could take a course and take a test in the appropriate foreign language?

The Law on Universal Military Service Obligation should apply equally to all the country's citizens. The exemption of a certain category from service in the Armed Forces will affect the social mood of the population, particularly the youth, and will engender the appearance of negative phenomena not only in the organization of military service but also in the life of society. Is it possible that, in the event of war, there will be some who will fight and others who will not? Social injustice lies at the very heart of this issue—the exemption of certain people from military service.

Naturally, it is not possible in this article to set forth all the questions of the proposed conception in sufficient detail. Moreover, the author does not claim that certain proposals are unique and, in particular, that they are incontrovertible.

Major General Interviewed on Military Reform

AU0509185090 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*

VOORUZHENNYKH SIL

in Russian No. 14, 8 August 1990 (signed to press 16 July 1990) pp 18-22—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Interview with Major General G. Zhivitsa, chief of the Directorate for the Prospective Development of the Army and Navy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Perestroyka or Glossing Over?"]

[Text] Perestroyka in international relations, the adoption of a new Soviet military doctrine, the reduction of the Armed Forces, and the attention paid to qualitative parameters of defense organizational development—all these and many other factors are urgently dictating a need for military reform. On what principles should it be based, what should its content be, and how will it contribute to strengthening the country's defense capability?

The editorial board is inviting all those who are interested in these questions to take part in a conversation about what military reform should be like. Your judgments and proposals will be welcome. In this connection we are starting the following new rubrics: "Military Reform: Problems and Judgments" and "Military Reform—I Am Submitting a Proposal." Today our special correspondent is talking to Major General G. Zhivitsa, chief of the Directorate for Prospective Development of the Army and Navy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, about the goals and tasks of military reform.

[KVS] It is well known that this is not the first reform being carried out in the Armed Forces. Presumably, this must be a large number of measures to be implemented over a long period of time. Naturally, they must be based on well considered and comprehensively validated principles. What are these principles?

[Zhivitsa] From the political point of view, this is, first and foremost, the principle of a reasonable combination of political and military means in the system of safeguarding security, the former being given unconditional priority. Among the organizational principles, we must list the principle of combining the cadre organization of the Armed Forces with the universal military service obligation, whereby professional servicemen gradually increase as a proportion of personnel, and the extraterritorial principle of manpower acquisition for the Army and Navy. In the social sphere, we propose guaranteed social protection for all categories of servicemen in society and in the Armed Forces and a realization of the potential of the democratic institutions of the Army and Navy.

[KVS] The new defensive doctrine has engendered quite a number of specific terms and notions which, to all appearances, reflect and will continue to reflect the key aspects of military reform, for example, "reasonable sufficiency" and "new qualitative parameters." In this connection, many of our readers are asking the following question: Aren't these terms farfetched and speculative? We may, they say, understand the notion of "reasonable sufficiency" in one way and the Americans in an entirely different way. Where are the objective criteria here? Besides, just take the said "new qualitative parameters"..... Haven't they always existed? The Armed Forces have continuously developed. Isn't this a situation in which a play upon new words has been substituted for real reform?

[Zhivitsa] First of all, it is necessary to comprehend a simple truth. Our doctrine, which is an integral part of military reform, has become purely defensive in character. It cannot be said that this quality was not inherent in our military doctrine before. The problem lay in the existence of certain discrepancies between its sociopolitical and military and technological aspects. The former aspect was essentially defensive, rejected the striving for military supremacy, and recognized the need for disarmament. At the same time, it was believed that aggression must be repulsed with the help of decisive actions

on the part of our Armed Forces, first and foremost through crippling nuclear strikes delivered by strategic means.... With regard to strategic defense and defensive strategy, they must be decisively rejected as extremely dangerous for our country. It turned out that the sociopolitical aspect of the doctrine was defensive in character, whereas the military technological aspect, military art, and, accordingly, individual areas of military organizational development were dominated by aggressive elements. Eliminating this discrepancy has become one of the main trends of perestroika in doctrinal views.

With regard to the principle of "reasonable sufficiency," it seems to me that there may be diverse opinions and even differences in the understanding of its content. However, everybody, both in the Warsaw Pact and in NATO, is unanimous on the main point. Preference is given to disarmament and to the reduction of those types of weapons which constitute the potential for a surprise attack or for large-scale offensive operations. Specifically for us, the Soviet military doctrine's defensive orientation and the emphasis on qualitative parameters in the development of weaponry and technology demand that changes be effected in the organization of the strength structure. Such work is already under way and, in our opinion, a reorganization of the strength structure, which will affect all elements and components of the Armed Forces, must become one of the main points of military reform.

Thus, as far back as in 1989, the railway troops, the Internal Security Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR KGB Border Guard Troops were removed from the Armed Forces. For the future, it is also planned to remove from the Armed Forces the Civil Defense Troops and their headquarters, as well as military construction and road construction units.

[KVS] Many of the vitally important undertakings in the Armed Forces not infrequently failed because they were not supported by the opinions of broad masses of servicemen but were based on theories and projects which had been devised in the offices of high-ranking officials and were cut off from life. Will this not also befall the new military reform? Incidentally, what is your strictly personal opinion as a specialist about the platform of military reform as proposed by the servicemen who are USSR people's deputies? What is acceptable in it and what is not?

[Zhivitsa] I must say straightaway that there is much in this platform which is rational and, I would also say, democratically appealing, and this cannot fail to win peoples' hearts. For example, it advocates a need for a stage-by-stage professionalization of the Army and a preferential orientation toward qualitative characteristics of defense and military organizational development and toward an enhancement of every citizen's personal interest in the qualitative resolution of our country's defense tasks. In principle, this coincides with what has been expounded in the draft military platform proposed by the General Staff. However, it also contains proposals

with which it is difficult to agree. For example, it envisages the Army's complete transition, within four or five years, to professional-volunteer principles of manpower acquisition. How can this be possible given the present state of our economy? It is not justifiable to set such tasks. Here is another proposal which envisages creating national military units of the Ground Forces on the territory of every republic, units which are to be administratively subordinated to both the central and local leadership and which may be used in extreme situations on the authority of the local leadership. I think that every sensible person understands where this can lead given the present situation and national conflicts. First, the Army will, in point of fact, be broken up and deployed at "national quarters." Second, it may be drawn into a military conflict on interethnic grounds. There are also other provisions in this alternative platform of military reform which should, in my opinion, be treated with great reservation.

[KVS] Speaking about organizational principles of military reform you mentioned, in particular, a "gradual increase in the proportion of professional servicemen." Is such an increase envisioned on the scale of the Armed Forces as a whole or of their individual branches of service or individual units?

At present, professionals account for about one-third of the numerical strength of our Armed Forces. They include officers, warrant officers, servicemen in extended military service, and women in military service. Subsequently, an increase in the proportion of professional servicemen, achieved as a result of enlisting citizens for military service on a contractual basis and replacing a number of positions of inducted personnel by professionals will, naturally, require higher expenditure, and not only because of the wages paid them. Tentative evaluations of the increase in the cost of keeping the Armed Forces will only become possible after completion of the experiment in the Navy where, starting from 1991, a variant of service will be introduced whereby the serviceman signs a three-year contract and is paid between 150 and 200 rubles [R] a month. Thereafter, this experiment will also be conducted in other branches of service and combat arms of the USSR Armed Forces. After experience has been accumulated of military service on a contractual basis, it will become possible to objectively evaluate the size of pay for professional servicemen.

[KVS] Judging by your answers, the principle of extraterritoriality in the manpower acquisition of the Army and Navy is one of the principles of military reform. Is it possible to say that absolutely everything will remain unchanged here? The same applies to the principle of the statewide system of providing the Armed Forces with arms and equipment, support, and supplies. The following question suggests itself: Does reform not concern these issues?

[Zhivitsa] Specialists believe that, basically, the principle of extraterritoriality in the manpower acquisition of the

Army and Navy should be maintained. On the one hand, this is justified by the fact that defense is a task common to the state as a whole and cannot be considered at the regional level, because the military threat is a matter of concern for the whole of the state, and that, on the other hand, in the presence of interethnic conflicts and disagreements, the creation of republican military units may, as I have already said, lead to unpredictable consequences.

Apart from this, serving in units manned according to the ethnic or territorial principle is at variance with the principles of social justice and the equality of all people before the law, especially in the conditions of our federation. It cannot be tolerated that one particular people should bear the full brunt of military service in severe mountainous conditions, in the arctic region, in the Navy, or in faraway garrisons. The Soviet Army has been and must remain a school for international indoctrination.

With regard to the statewide system of providing the Armed Forces with arms and equipment, support, and supplies, it is appropriate to say that the production of even a few hundred items of military output would be quite a difficult task for any republic. Today, not a single republic can independently keep a modern army, train highly skilled specialists, and accumulate mobilizational resources. For example, there are more than one hundred specializations in a single motorized regiment, and on the scale of the Armed Forces as a whole they number several thousand.

[KVS] Elaborating guarantees for the social protection of servicemen is, perhaps, one of the acutest questions of military reform. We have been talking about it for many years, and yet there is still no real legal mechanism for it. What do you think about this?

[Zhivitsa] Quite true, there is no real legal mechanism for protecting servicemen. In my opinion, however, it must be created, otherwise reform will not be complete. Strictly speaking, army service is self-sacrifice, and we are simply obliged to work out guarantees for the rights of our servicemen.

For example, formally speaking, every officer may leave the service "of his own free will," but in practice it is by no means as simple as that. We have a procedure for discharging servicemen on completion of fixed terms of service, for reasons of health, or by way of punishment, but we do not have a law stipulating a discharge simply of one's own free will (for example, two months from the moment of handing in the separation request). Everything depends upon the decision of a higher commander, and he decides, as a rule, what is best for the service. It seems to me that in this case the higher commander is right, otherwise it will be impossible to man certain godforsaken places, because living conditions there cannot be considered normal. Consequently, we need a

legal document which protects people from departmental arbitrary rule and which makes provision for people in military uniform.

[KVS] Will military reform involve a reduction in the numerical strength of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense?

[Zhivitsa] The reductions being carried out in the Armed Forces have also unilaterally resulted in a certain reduction of the numerical strength of the central apparatus. There is no doubt that far-reaching military reform and implementation of the Vienna Accords on the reduction of armaments and armed forces will necessitate a reorganization of the structure of the military administration. It will certainly also affect the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, with the purpose of eliminating parallelism and enhancing the efficiency of work. It will become necessary to sharply reduce those administrative organs which have nothing to do with the direction and leadership of troops, the quantity of attendant staff, the number of secretariats, offices, and other support sub-units....

[KVS] You must agree that successful implementation of military reform in many ways depends on the everyday life of the servicemen, especially officers and warrant officers. In what way is this problem being tackled?

[Zhivitsa] Quite right, one may agree with the assumption that successful implementation of military reform will also be in many ways determined by the living conditions of servicemen. However, the number of servicemen not provided with housing has not decreased lately, in spite of an annual increase in the volume of housing construction.

The withdrawal of units and combined units from groups of forces back onto USSR territory and the discharge of servicemen into the reserve or their retirement in connection with the reduction of the Armed Forces have resulted in a further aggravation of the housing problem. At the same time, the measures being taken by the government and the capital investments being allocated to the Ministry of Defense for housing construction are obviously insufficient to enable its resolution. As a result, this problem is still hanging in the air.

[KVS] Military reform also touches upon such an aspect as conversion. The editorial board is receiving information to the effect that, in the case of many enterprises, conversion has turned into fiction and has had a negative effect on the output and quality of military output.

[Zhivitsa] The practice of conversion in various sectors of the defense industry confirms that in this sphere not everything is as we would like it to be. It suffices to say that only 15 percent of all the items of equipment for the foodstuffs industry which are manufactured by a number of enterprises are of good quality. This is not an isolated example. Nor are things going well with the fulfillment of orders for manufacturing military output. Over recent

years, plans for supplying weapons and military hardware have been underfulfilled. Of course, this fact and many others are giving occasion to conclude that conversion is supposedly turning into fiction. However, I think that such a conclusion is premature. Conversion of military production is a complicated matter and it takes time. The point is that about R9 billion of capital investment is necessary to change the character of the output of enterprises, and it is not enough just to have all this money—it must also be properly invested.

[KVS] The last question. Our leaders associate military reform with a renewal of all spheres of the life and training of the personnel of the Armed Forces. Undoubtedly, this also implies strict adherence to the principles of social justice on the part of everybody, from the minister of defense to a simple soldier. Unfortunately, a number of publications in the central press (OGONEK, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and IZVESTIYA) lead one to think that some representatives of our Ministry of Defense are allegedly more concerned about building their own summer cottages [dachas].... What is your opinion about this?

[Zhivitsa] Let us be more specific: Well, does the leadership of other ministries not have such dachas? Then why should so much attention be paid precisely to the Ministry of Defense? Why should the press, when it publishes its "accusations," hush up the fact that, even though these official dachas were built on a legal basis (as formerly understood), many people have already given them up? Glasnost on these issues must be full. It is to the credit of our officer corps that for them it is precisely state interests which have always prevailed over personal ones. Notwithstanding this, some, and let us say it directly, unscrupulous individuals want to convince the Soviet people of the contrary and to groundlessly accuse our officer corps of all mortal sins, including corruption and bribery, and, by doing this, to give rise to doubts, even among military personnel, as to the integrity and high morale of the officers and generals of the Armed Forces.

Strictly speaking, as far as the answer to your question is concerned, the luxurious dachas, villas, and many other similar things do, of course, have a negative effect upon the moral atmosphere in our country and, in particular, in the Army. This problem exists, and it must be resolved at national and not departmental level. In my opinion, the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges and the implementation of the principle of social justice within the framework of military reform will have a normalizing effect on the moral climate in the Armed Forces.

Cut Planned in Number of Bombers at Irkutsk
OW1509061390 Tokyo TOKYO SHIMBUN
in Japanese 14 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 3—FOR
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[Text] The Japanese-Soviet Symposium on "Considerations on Security and Disarmament in the North

Pacific" was held in Sapporo City. G.V. Batenin [name as published], spokesman of the CPSU Central Committee, who attended the symposium, stated on 13 September that the United States and the Soviet Union would reach an accord on the START talks by mid-November. He added that the Soviet Union would reduce its strategic bombers and other hardware deployed at various locations, including Irkutsk, in the Asian-Pacific region. This was the first time that actual names of bases where hardware would be reduced were disclosed.

Moreover, he disclosed at the symposium that once an accord is reached, the Soviet Union would reduce one-third of its hardware, within the framework of strategic nuclear weapons reduction, from the Asian-Pacific region. Among hardware to be reduced from this region are strategic bombers equipped with air-launched cruise

missiles (ALCM's) and nuclear-powered submarines equipped with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's).

According to the same spokesman, the Soviet Union has deployed 35 to 40 strategic bombers, mainly the "TU-160's," in suburban Irkutsk and 15 to 20 strategic bombers in suburban Khabarovsk. One-third of them, totalling 20 bombers, will be reduced from each of the two air bases. The Soviet Union possesses a total of 156 strategic bombers. However, including those to be reduced in the European region, a total of 40 to 50 strategic bombers will be reduced.

Meanwhile, (according to the spokesman), the Soviet Union has deployed a total of 50 to 60 strategic nuclear-powered submarines, "25 to 30" each at Vladivostok and at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, and the number of these submarines will be reduced to around 20.

RSFSR

Problems of Soviet Far East Listed, Reviewed

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[Article by Yevgeniy Matveyevich Korotchenkov, chief designer of the "Dalrybsistemotekhnika" scientific production association (in Vladivostok): "The USSR Is Not Only Europe"]

[Text] If it is recognized that providing its citizens with the chance to enjoy a normal life by earning the necessary means with their own labor is one of the state's most important functions, then the natural goal of its foreign policy must be to guarantee this with the help of interaction between states. Of course, the above does not by any means exhaust the range of the state's functions or the role of its foreign policy organs but, nevertheless, these tasks constitute a considerable part of them.

With precisely this in mind, I will try to analyze our foreign policy in the Far East from the point of view of a resident of the Soviet Far East. Is our foreign policy helping us, the residents of the Far East, to earn our living independently?

I want to say straightaway that I fully recognize our foreign policy's achievements over recent years in spheres such as the deideologization of interstate relations, the elimination of paternalistic attitudes in relations with our allies, and questions of nuclear security, human rights, and so on. The contribution made by our foreign policy and by the USSR Foreign Ministry to perestroika is substantial and valuable, and people do justice to it, justice which is well deserved.

At the same time, there is much to be done. However, do we have a well thought out and well-coordinated policy for the Soviet Far East? Individual visits take place and individual agreements are signed which, although important, are only local. Notwithstanding this, a single integral conception of the place of the Soviet Far East in the contemporary world has yet to take shape.

One of the participants in a discussion on the pages of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN says the following: "Practically all of us have agreed that our country must be referred to as a major European country with essentially European interests and with certain (they must be specified) interests in Asia...." Judging by the character of the given material, this opinion is shared by a broad group of representatives of the public. Indeed, a significant part of the territory, resources, and population of the country to which this statement pertains is situated in Asia.

It is impossible to explain such a statement as being the result of error, misunderstanding, or lack of information. In my opinion, this is a common manifestation of the

imperial thinking which regards individual provinces as something auxiliary in relation to the center of the empire and subordinated to the interests of that center. I believe that overstressing the primacy of European interests over Asiatic ones for the USSR as a whole (or even for Russia alone) amounts to making a serious mistake.

In the final analysis, this is not a matter of words or of the wounded pride of the residents of our country's Asiatic part, even though by now we are quite well aware of the fact that the wounded pride of large groups of people is a serious phenomenon which must not be disregarded. The point is that this primacy determines the priorities of economic and social development, the sequence in which burning domestic and foreign tasks are to be resolved, and many other factors.

Let me offer my own interpretation of this. The Soviet Union is a Eurasian power whose main state interests are localized in Europe and in Asia and have their own specific features in each of these global regions.

What, in my opinion, should determine the USSR's specific state interests in Asia and, in particular, the Far East?

1. An interest in guaranteeing a stable and predictable peaceful development of the interstate relations in this region.
2. A consistent rise in the standard of living of the population of the Soviet Far East and the development of the region's economy, first to all-Union level, and then to the level of its most developed neighbors.
3. Ensuring interaction, via the Soviet Far East, with what is the fastest developing region today—the Asiatic-Pacific Region.

At the same time, a specifically regional understanding of state interests lies in the fact that, in the case of a resident of the European part of the USSR, the first and third of the problems listed above are considered to be of prime importance, whereas the second one is regarded as auxiliary. For residents of the Far East, the order of priorities will be precisely as it is given here. It is not a matter of words or even of the notions which they denote. It is a matter of mutual understanding.

Either we will reach the necessary understanding of what is common and what is dissimilar in our interests or, at a certain stage, our ways will part and we will, in the future, proceed along different paths—this is where I see the problem. Interests are superior to an ideology and superior to any a priori assessments, because they are objective and are determined not by people themselves but by those conditions in which people live. A resident of the Far East who has moved to the European part of the country, will accept the formulation focusing on Europe, whereas a European who has settled in the Soviet Far East will, sooner or later, arrive at the opposite conclusion.

The Far East has a primarily geostrategic significance for the USSR—as a window which opens onto the Atlantic-Pacific Region, as a gateway to the west coast of America, and as one of the regions of interaction with China. Furthermore, it is an important source of raw materials both for the USSR and for our foreign trade. It is also a reserve of still undeveloped expanses and poorly explored resources. Finally, it is a boarder living off the USSR and obtaining from it virtually everything it needs—from metal and machinery to the simplest consumer goods.

It is perhaps worth looking into the question of whether there is a source of military threat in the Far East, what its character is, and what conclusions must be drawn with regard to the structure of our Armed Forces in the Far East.

During the postwar years, our military policy in the Far East has been determined by the military confrontation with the United States, in which Japan and South Korea have played the role of an auxiliary military force. In the sixties and seventies, this was augmented by military confrontation with China and the factor of the war in Vietnam.

Changes in our policy of military confrontation with "world imperialism" and in relations between the USSR and China, as well as changes in South Korea have demanded that our strategy, including the military one, be reassessed. Such reassessments are made, but only on a one-shot basis. There are no long-term programs or conceptions here, nor is there an analogue to the CSCE or to any other political mechanisms.

Are they possible in principle? Of course not, if a precise copy is meant. The states are too diverse and so are their interests and contradictions.

What can be proposed? The basis of the confrontational military structure is the "triangle" made up of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, a triangle which has tilted somewhat to one side but still retains its shape. It is unlikely that any of the sides will drop out spontaneously and impossible that the United States will voluntarily give up this military structure. Can the USSR influence this process? I think so. In spite of the fact that Japan and South Korea are interested in military interaction with the United States, they are independent countries with interests and problems of their own. To regard them as military satellites of the United States and as that country's natural reserves would be to take an unjustifiably one-sided view of things.

If their orientation in the military sphere toward the United States ceases to be profitable for them, they will change it. However, to promote this, it is necessary to resolve cardinal political issues. For South Korea, this means our traditional policy of support for North Korea while, for Japan, it concerns the problem of the Northern Territories. This may also be promoted by changing the structure of our Armed Forces—reorienting them from a state of direct confrontation with the military bloc of the

United States and its allies toward the defense of our state interests and sea lines of communication in distant regions.

The well-known events which involved the shooting down of a South Korean airliner suggest the need for closer communication between the security structures of all the countries in the region. This communication must be accomplished not only via Moscow and Washington—this path may turn out to be too cumbersome and ineffective in cases of emergency—but should also be maintained at the level of local command authorities. However, in order to avoid finding ourselves hostages to the military at a critical moment, we must also elaborate political mechanisms for resolving crisis situations. At the beginning, they may be bilateral, and later, if necessary and possible, they might acquire a multilateral character.

The idea, advanced by the president of our country more than three years ago, to the effect that the incorporation of the Soviet Far East into the Asiatic-Pacific Region system of ties, must be the main strategy of its development is a truly revolutionary thought, and its implementation could turn the shabby province into an important and necessary region of the USSR.

However, there are multitudes of reasons as to why it is so difficult to put this idea into practice. I will not dwell upon cases of the absolutely irresponsible conduct of our local authorities or on examples of bureaucratic delays, outright misappropriation, and so on. This is our local problem, and we must resolve it ourselves. However, there also exist problems which cannot be resolved at a local level.

At present, South Korea is perhaps the most suitable partner for us. Taking into account our specific relations with Japan, the difficulties with which China is now confronted, and the large distance separating us from other countries of the region, it can be said that today, South Korea is a highly developed industrial state which is interested in cooperating with our country. Such interest exists and will continue to exist for economic reasons, first and foremost, due to the fact that South Korea needs a capacious and stable market. Besides, having no resources of its own, it imports a great deal from other countries.

With the help of South Korean technologies and capital investments, we could create a base for the production of components in our country, gradually proceeding to higher levels of cooperation. Finally, our economies might, in a certain respect, become mutually complementary in some way.

We have at our disposal a certain reserve of quite well trained engineers who work in poorly equipped laboratories. The fulfillment of orders from South Korean industry could be profitable for both partners. On the basis of South Korean technologies and of our own resources, we could create a powerful economic tandem.

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17 September 1990

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

51

However, for how long will our relations with North Korea determine Soviet policy? Why should one of the few surviving totalitarian regimes dictate our Far Eastern policy? The stupidity of the present situation in which Vladivostok traders have to fly to Moscow for negotiations with South Korean businessmen may perhaps be compared only to the absurdity of the Vladivostok-Tokyo telegraphic line passing through Moscow. However, both these absurdities are a reality. For how long is this going to continue? We have nothing against North Korea, but let it resolve its own problems; what we need to resolve our problems are direct and straightforward ties with South Korea.

No economic considerations can justify the unprofitable agreement according to which North Korean fishermen are using our fishing reserves. What are we paying them for? This might have still made sense during the period of our impaired relations with China, although even then it was moral rather than real, but now this is absolutely meaningless.

There is no need to explain to anybody the importance of normalizing our relations with Japan. It is also quite understandable that we should not speed up the development of our relations too much either. Japan is not interested in us to such an extent that it might be worthwhile for us to try our hardest. However, the existing situation cannot be considered normal either. We must put an end to a situation in which accords on the utilization of our raw materials are concluded in Moscow and Tokyo in our name, but without taking our interests into account.

Japan is now getting from us everything which it would have received had the 1918-1922 occupation continued, but it has absolutely no obligations to us, even those which it might have had with regard to a colony. Our specialists have estimated that we have been losing more than \$100 million a year as a result of the unbalanced agreement on the utilization of our fishing reserves. The right to conclude such agreements should be transferred to local authorities. The USSR could reserve for itself some of the resulting profits.

However, of course, this is not the most important problem. The main issue in our interrelations with Japan is the problem of the "Northern Territories." Sovereign control over a territory is a sign of its sovereignty. We have been exercising this control on dry land but not at sea. Our frontier guards record 5,000 violations of the Soviet border by Japanese fishermen every year. If we take into account the fact that fishing is not conducted the whole year round, this means that a few dozen Japanese fishing vessels operate in these waters every day of the fishing season. Consequently, we do not possess or do not want to possess full and genuine sovereignty over the Southern Kurils.

It is usually written that the activity of Japanese fishermen is the result of the campaigns for the return of the

"Northern Territories" which are conducted by Japanese governments. However, what is the cause and what is the effect here? The point is that all political parties of the country without exception, including Communists, support and participate in these campaigns. This must not be ignored. It is possible to arrange matters with the state and it is possible to compel or persuade political figures to make concessions. However, it is impossible to explain to an ordinary person why he cannot live where he was born, where his forefathers were buried, and where he has roots. Any such explanation is useless—even if he understands, he will not accept it.

This is history, but there is also the present reality of the islands. They have been developed, our people live on them, and enterprises operate. I believe that even if we admit the disputable nature of our acquisition of the islands, we must not simply hand them over to Japan. For us, this land has also become our homeland; our people have been born, grown up, lived, and died on it, and this must not be disregarded.

Possibly, resolving this problem at a contemporary civilized level amounts to a certain form of joint administration of these islands. Notwithstanding the fact that this process would evidently be a very complicated one, professional diplomats endowed with political will might be able to elaborate acceptable forms of a decision which would, of course, take account of the opinion of local residents and be conditional upon their consent. Moreover, the very process of such negotiations could have an exceptionally favorable effect on interstate relations and would have promoted mutual rapprochement. It seems to me that, in spite of the fact that there is no unique solution to this problem, the game is worth the candle.

Our relations with China do not constitute a regional problem. China is too powerful a country to let one region dictate the policy of a whole country. At the same time, there are questions which apply only to us.

Even though domestic problems are now the most topical ones for China, is it not likely that the country's present leaders may yield to the temptation to resolve at least part of them outside their own borders? Such temptation may also find validation in those problems which have existed in our mutual relations since 1949.

China has older traditions of interrelations with the southern regions of the Soviet Far East. If our historians are to be trusted, the Chinese started settling here at about the same time as the Russians, but their trade relations go back to much earlier times. The eviction of the Chinese after the formation of the PRC was painful for both sides.

According to the estimates of the Far East Institute, implementation of the program for the development of the Soviet Far East will require the resettlement of up to 10 million persons on our territory. Of course, the Soviet Union has "surplus" population—in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Some people are already moving to our region, but these people are settling down mainly in ports

and work as fishermen or sailors on the vessels of our steamship lines, and so on. They are not moving to villages. This is only natural. How can a former resident of the Central Asian desert or the Caucasian mountains live in our villages? Everything is different here: the climate, the soil, the agricultural practices, and the weather. Even Ukrainians and Belorussians find it difficult to adapt to them.

However, this land and climate are habitual and natural for the Chinese, because these conditions do not greatly differ from those prevailing in their own homeland. They are familiar with the agricultural practices, local crops, and so on. Much is being justly said in our country about the fact that the category of peasant, real farmer, and entrepreneur has disappeared in the Soviet Union, but he still exists in China, where the authorities have not managed to do away with him. This is why letting the Chinese into our agriculture—not as hired laborers but as farmers—would be profitable for us. It goes without saying that this must be a local initiative, first and foremost, but that the center can also have its say here.

I understand perfectly well the intricacies and problems associated with the slightest attempt to let Chinese farmers onto our land in the Far East. This is not just a matter of grumblings about the "selling off" of Russia which will resound from our western regions. The same or even a more clamorous grumbling will be heard here, and it will not stop at grumbling. However, I do not see any other way out. Our collective and state farms [kolkhozes and sovkhozes] will not be able to guarantee the necessary level of agricultural production, with the exception, perhaps, of a limited number of labor-intensive crops. The transformation of kolkhoz and sovkhoz laborers into farmers is an agonizingly difficult and long process, especially considering that it will take us a long time to provide them with the necessary smaller-scale equipment.

Given the indisputable and exceptional importance of interstate relations with China (or, perhaps, by virtue of this importance) our attitude toward a rapprochement with it must be very cautious and circumspect. We must avoid—at least for the time being—any costly "prestigious" projects involving long periods of cost recovery. There are certain indications of a revival of such "projects of the century" as the cascade of the hydroelectric power stations along the course of the Amur River. If somebody again tries to do us a great favor by imposing on us construction projects of this type, we will oppose them.

Indisputably, we need electrical power and we perfectly well understand China's interest in resolving this problem. However, this is primarily the task of two parties—the Soviet Far East and the Chinese provincial authorities. If the central governments of the two countries are interested in resolving this problem, they may find a way of allocating money to local authorities by

creating a joint development fund or some other financial establishment, and let them decide for themselves how to spend this money to the best advantage.

At the beginning, it would be expedient to rely on the interaction of enterprises or their associations and to avoid long-term projects unless absolutely necessary. It is better to agree to a large quantity of small-scale contracts directed at satisfying the specific needs of local residents than to conclude several grandiose ones, the effect of which will only be felt at the level of high-ranking officials. This will bring our mutual interests closer and will make them more intimately and directly related, so that even significant political upheavals will not be able to easily violate them.

Accordingly, emphasis must be made at intergovernmental level on facilitating the process of exchanging information on mutual needs, creating a trade infrastructure, encouraging the development of the production and export of simple consumer goods, and gradually and cautiously making a transition to projects for creating a joint industrial infrastructure. Considered and well coordinated measures are needed from both sides, measures which will facilitate the creation of mutually complementary economies in border regions; however, this must not by any means be done with the help of management by orders and decrees but rather by easing the terms of trade as much as possible and by easing the process of creating small- and medium-scale industries oriented toward the needs of the respective neighbors.

It goes without saying that this does not preclude larger-scale deals intended to satisfy the needs of the USSR, but on the condition that they are economically profitable. They must emerge naturally, as the necessary preconditions mature.

I am aware of the fact that I am touching upon quite a sensitive area, but it must not be hushed up either. Our interrelations with China have long been a domain of party interests. Of course, the leading party and the state have tasks and problems of their own. However, last year's events in China, the repressions with regard to the opposition, and the departure of popular and progressive leaders from the political scene require us to make a comprehensive analysis of our attitude toward China. Will we not see the emergence of breeding grounds of neo-Stalinism and neo-Marxism quite close to our border? If China maintains its present trend toward suppressing democracy and toward centralism, will it not be threatened by a new explosion? Is it not possible for centrifugal tendencies to prevail in that country?

In its time, the proposal to create open zones was a significant step forward which urged a discussion about paths of development and which somewhat stirred up the stagnant water. Now, however, this idea seems to have exhausted itself. Countless bureaucratic delays and the need for approvals and coordination, on the one hand, and provincial sluggishness, inertia, and habitual reliance on higher authorities, on the other, clearly rule

out the possibility of creating a "trade paradise" at a separate spot which has been chosen by the pointing finger of the Council of Ministers. This does not mean that we should altogether give up the principle of free-trade zones, but the right to create these zones must be given to local authorities, whereby the conditions of their creation and the form and size of the "fee" which the USSR will receive for them must be clearly specified.

There are two aspects to state interests. One of them embraces objectively existing phenomena which take shape and develop regardless of peoples' will or consciousness and independently of them. They are determined by numerous internal and external factors which are difficult to control and manage, if this is possible at all. The other aspect is the fact that, once they are realized, these phenomena become a leading, acting, and guiding force which determines the functioning of state structures. Revealing, comprehending, and formulating state interests, elaborating a policy for putting them into effect, and implementing this policy all presupposes the availability of corresponding structures and requires that these structures be created.

If we admit that the Soviet Far East has specific interests of its own within the framework of national interests, it must also be recognized that it needs organs capable of revealing, formulating, and transforming them into real policy and of putting this policy into practice. The creation of such organs may and must be a subject of discussion. Well, what seems to be possible at the present stage?

First. The elaboration of a program of mutually coordinated foreign policy and military measures for putting an end to the confrontational situation and making a transition to cooperation and interaction.

Second. The elaboration of a complex of measures for the development of small- and medium-sized business with an orientation toward the markets of our neighbors. This problem is not only a national one, because it also requires that simultaneous steps be taken by our neighbors.

Third. State participation in regional programs must amount, first and foremost, to creating regional funds for the development of the social and production infrastructure and to easing border and customs barriers and not to direct financing and implementing prestigious projects.

Will we, in the Soviet Far East, be able to guarantee a decent standard of living for ourselves? The residents of the Far East can cope with this task. However, there are things which do not depend upon us, and here we expect help from our central organs. It is not so much material help that we expect, as the USSR cannot provide it in present conditions. We need help in the form of the elimination of barriers to a free choice of the means of developing the economy and of participating in the regional and worldwide division of labor. We will be able to repay the USSR for this help by pursuing and realizing its vital interests in this part of the world.

Footnotes

1. See "Common Sense and Defense. An Independent Expert Appraisal." MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1990, No. 4, p 145.

Satellite Photos Show Eastern Forest Fires

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in Japanese 4 Sep 90 Evening Edition p 1—FOR
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[Text] It was learned on 4 September that pictures taken by the marine observation satellite "Momo 1-B" showed areas of smoke on the Soviet coast off the Sea of Okhotsk. The satellite belongs to the Science and Technology Agency and the National Space Development Agency [NASDA]. It appeared from the shapes of smoke zones that they were large forest fires.

The "Momo 1-B" was launched on an H1 rocket in February of this year. Pictures were taken using visible, infrared radiation instruments of the satellite from an orbit about 900 km high.

The general zone of the fire areas was south of Khabarovsk in the vicinity of north parallel 56 degrees and east latitude 136 degrees. There were three red-colored areas in the middle of mountains, and there was a distance of about 50 km between the smoke areas near the coast and one further inland. An official of the Global Observation Center of the NASDA (at Hiki County, Saitama Prefecture), said: "They are apparently forest fires, judging from the smoke, but rarely are such fires so big in scale as to be photographed from a satellite."

Western Republics

Academics Discuss Labor Strife in Donbass

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I SOVREMENNYIY MIR in Russian No 4,
July-August 1990/ (signed to press 27 June 90) pp
142-143—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Viktor Viktorovich Komarovskiy and Vadim Leonidovich Kunin, candidates of historical sciences and scientific associates of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute: "The Donbass: The Time of Promises Has Passed"]

[Text] New phenomena are entering the life of our society, phenomena which, although public interest in them wanes from time to time, are nevertheless exerting an ever increasing influence upon this life and becoming a permanent and integral part of it. What I am speaking about here is the revival of an independent workers movement, primarily that of the miners as the one which

is the most mass and organized in character, uniting diverse social and professional groups.

It is not a matter of chance that precisely this group, which is in essence only the tip of the iceberg of sociopsychological and sociopolitical change, finds itself subjected to quite bitter attacks from conservatives. The workers are accused of attempting to destabilize and disrupt society, of attempting to "rock the boat," and so forth. However, the losses from the miners' strikes, even according to official data, are in no way comparable to those material losses sustained as a result of stoppages, substandard output, thefts, and overreporting of performance. So what is the issue here? The fact is that the working man who, for so long, was called upon to "become more active" and was referred to as the "master of production and of the country" has decided to become this in practice. In so doing, he has threatened the designs of the directors of a grandiose spectacle—an imitation of perestroika.

Why is the activity of working people assuming such unexpected and dramatic forms? How do workers regard strikes as a method of satisfying their demands? Scientific materials for answers to these and other questions connected with the development of the workers movement in our country are to be provided by a research program being implemented by specialists of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute (The program coordinator is the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute Department of Comparative Research into the Development of the Workers Class).

At the end of January 1990, within the framework of this program, 475 miners engaged on underground work at six Donetsk mines were submitted to a questionnaire. This revealed their opinions on the course of changes in the Donetsk Basin [Donbass], on the fulfillment of the agreements reached with the government in 1989, and their attitude to strikes and to new forms of organization for working people.

The data obtained show that a breakthrough is occurring in the consciousness of workers. There is a noticeable increase in their real activity against a background of stubborn reticence on the part of the administration (technical, economic, political) to undertake agreements and make compromises with independent workers organizations.

The majority of those questioned did not perceive any visible changes as a result of the implementation of the 1989 agreements. This concerns such spheres as interrelations with their direct bosses (66 percent of negative responses), the attention paid by the administration to the miners' vital needs (62 percent), style and methods of leadership (60 percent), relations within the collective (58 percent), and the activity of traditional social organizations—the party committee, the trade union committee, and the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] (50 percent). In the opinion of those

questioned, the work load of the miners has remained unchanged, and 48 percent of the respondents believe that it has even increased.

How has the activity of the miners themselves changed where the resolution of production questions is concerned? Fifty-six percent of the respondents believe that it has increased, and only 39 percent that it has stayed the same. With regard to the extent to which miners are informed about affairs at the pit, 45 percent indicated that this had improved, and 42 percent that it had remained unchanged.

What must be done if the promises made to the miners are to be kept? They should not just automatically resort to strikes (such moods are frequently attributed to the miners). Many of those questioned believe that, prior to undertaking this extreme form of action, it is necessary to turn to various authorities and management organs and to the mass media, and to try to achieve their legitimate demands with their assistance.

However, as our experience shows us, the authorities and management organs still react only to "strong measures." A characteristic example is the refusal of the Ministry of the Coal Industry to hand over the building of the main technical administration of the "Donetskugol" production association to house child-care facilities, although this demand has actually been fixed in a conciliatory protocol. That is evidently why 74 percent of those questioned believe that the strike movement in the country will spread; 11 percent believe that it will not spread, and 14 percent had difficulty in replying.

Once they had come to understand what a strike means in reality, 79 percent of miners referred to it as just as much of an inalienable right as the right to work, freedom of assembly, and so forth. Only 10 percent of respondents were not of this opinion. At the same time, every second participant in the questionnaire understands that a collective stoppage of work, although an extreme measure, is unavoidable today. It is therefore not a matter of chance that every third respondent called strikes the only means of obtaining the satisfaction of their demands. Only four percent regarded a strike as something harmful.

As the survey confirmed, such views of the methods and means of fighting for one's rights are not a consequence of the "subversive activity" of some kind of external forces (informal groups and others) but the result of the miners' strictly practical experience and of the increased self-awareness and self-organization of the independent workers movement. It is independent not of other strata of working people, but of the obsolete administrative command structures. The evaluation made by the respondents of the need for some kind of organizations to protect the interests of working people is very indicative in this respect. Fifty-two percent supported the idea of creating new, independent unions of working

people, 32 percent advocated reformed trade unions, and only six percent were in favor of the existing ones.

The survey revealed the quite high level of authority which the strike committees enjoy among the miners. Thirty-three percent of respondents believe that strike committees are necessary for the entire period of implementation of agreements reached with the government; 29 percent regard them as necessary on a permanent basis, as organs to protect the rights of working people; 17 percent believe that they are necessary only while strikes are being prepared and carried out. Only 16 percent regard strike committees as totally unnecessary. A somewhat higher proportion of engineering and technical workers—26 percent—have a negative attitude toward strike committees. Soviets of work collectives and strike committees are the two types of organization which the greatest number of respondents count upon for help in the case of a possible conflict with the administration (54 and 17 percent respectively). Let us note that those elected to the soviets of work collectives after the 1989 strike were mostly active strike committee members.

The spectrum of opinions cited shows that the struggle for their immediate rights and interests is pushing the workers willy-nilly toward self-organization. In our view, the authority of the strike committees can be explained, first and foremost by the fact that they are a pure, 100-percent product of such self-organization; they are "sovereign" social institutions.

The next step in the self-organization of the workers movement will evidently be the creation of unions of working people, similar to those in the Kuznetsk basin. In any case, only 11 percent of miners opposed such associations (21 percent among engineering and technical workers) and a further 15 percent had difficulty in replying. Thirty-one percent of miners favor the creation of an independent union of working people at regional level, and 36 percent advocate a union on the scale of the entire country.

On 27 January 1990, representatives of a number of enterprises, mines, informal sociopolitical organizations, workers clubs, and associations of Donetsk, Gorlovka, Makeyevka, and Mariupol decided to create the Union of Working People of the Donbass for Democratic Perestroika. The task of the new association, as stated in the address of its coordinating committee, must be to coordinate actions directed at deepening the process of the democratization of society and creating an active

system of economic and social interaction between branches of industry and social groups in the region.

Judging by the results of the survey, the new association of Donbass workers may find broad support in the mining environment. Such a judgment is also reinforced by replies testifying to the low authority of traditional social organizations among the miners. Only six percent of those questioned replied that, in the case of a conflict with the administration, they would turn to the party organization, and seven percent to the trade union. For the sake of fairness it must be noted that many mine party organizations are undertaking a realistic evaluation of the existing situation and are trying to influence it in some way. In January 1990, there was a meeting in Donetsk of the secretaries of the party committees of the mines of the "Donetskugol" production association. Those who came forward spoke about the extremely tense situation in the town, about the number of communists leaving the party, a number which is increasing from one month to the next, and about the growing dissatisfaction of rank-and-file CPSU members with the sluggishness of party organs in resolving urgent problems.

Even the data cited are sufficient to illustrate the degree of social tension among the miners. It is naive to count upon the efficacy of summons, assurances, speeches, and promises. Their time has passed. It must be understood that the workers do not only need soap and shoes (although, of course, they need those as well). What is most important is the freedom to dispose of their labor and the products of this labor.

In the workers movement and in its new organization we must see equal, honest partners, we must seek ways of agreement and alliance with them, and not push them to undertake new strikes. The possibility of new and acute conflicts is great. There were political strikes in a number of Donetsk mines between 28 February and 3 March 1990. Ten members of the city strike committee carried out a hunger strike in front of the building of the party oblast committee.

Elections to local and republican soviets in the Donbass occurred in very complicated conditions. They brought success to the miners' candidates. A new page has been turned in the development of the workers movement in the Donbass. Its representatives in local and republican organs of power have started to be active. This will evidently give new impetus to its further self-organization and will elevate the genuine creative activity of the workers.